In The United
States District Court
For The Eastern District of Texas
U.S. Docket No. 1:20-CV-00266
Estate of
Louis Charles Hamilton II
Louis
Charles Hamilton II
Notice of Motion to Strike and
Vacate Judgment(s)
Estate of
Rachel Ann Hamilton II (Defendant) Chief Justice Earl
Warren
Estate of
Chandra D. Hamilton Brown v. Board
of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
Estate of
Natasha C. Hamilton
Aaron
Michael Halvorsen (Hamilton II) (Son)
Alexis
Jemtrude (Hamilton II) (Daughter)
William
Arthur Philip Louis, Prince William, Duke of Cambridge,
Henry
Charles Albert David, Prince Harry, Duke of Sussex,
Vladimir
Vladimirvich Putin
Lalisa
Manoban
Emma
Watson
Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez
Bae
Yoo-bin
Vs.
Donald
John Trump Sr. 45th President
United
Nations et
al
United
States Supreme Court
United
States Congress
Defendant(s)
(Respectfully) herein plaintiffs collective Motions before
the Federal Court, by undersigned council of record Estate of Louis
Charles Hamilton II, undersign proceeding
“Pro Se” collectively (Plaintiffs) files Notice of
Motion, Motion to Strike, with joining Motion to Vacate Judgments(s) Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) Citations: Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Argued December 9, 1952, Reargued December 8, 1953, Decided
May 17, 1954* APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF KANSAS, MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of
the Court.
These cases come to us from the States of Kansas,
South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on different facts
and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their
consideration together in this consolidated opinion. [Footnote 1]
[487]
In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race,
through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining
admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In
each instance,
[488]
They had been denied admission to schools attended
by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to
race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases
other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied
relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called "separate but equal"
doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Fergson, 163 U. S.
537. Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races
are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be
separate.
In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware
adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the
white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.
The plaintiffs contend that segregated public
schools are not "equal" and cannot be made "equal," and
that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of
the obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction.
[Footnote 2]
Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on
certain questions propounded by the Court. [Footnote 3]
[489]
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances
surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered
exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the
states, then-existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of
proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own
investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is
not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are
inconclusive.
The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments
undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among "all
persons born or naturalized in the United States." Their opponents, just
as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the
Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in
Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any
degree of certainty.
An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of
the Amendment's history with respect to segregated schools is the status of
public education at that time. [Footnote 4]
In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported
[490]
by general taxation, had not yet taken hold.
Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups.
Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were
illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some
states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in
the arts and sciences, as well as in the business and professional world. It is
true that public school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced
further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was
generally ignored in the congressional debates.
Even in the North, the conditions of public
education did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum was usually
rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the school term was
but three months a year in many states, and compulsory school attendance was
virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be
so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended
effect on public education.
In the first cases in this Court construing the
Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted
it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. [Footnote 5]
The doctrine of
[491]
"separate but equal" did not make its
appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson,
supra, involving not education but transportation. [Footnote 6]
American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century.
In this Court, there have been six cases involving the "separate but
equal" doctrine in the field of public education. [Footnote 7]
In Cumming v. County Board of Education, 175 U. S.
528, and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S.
78, the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. [Footnote 8]
In more recent cases, all on the graduate school
[492]
level, inequality was found in that specific
benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the same
educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S.
337; Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U. S.
631; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S.
629; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S.
637. In none of these cases was it necessary to reexamine the doctrine to
grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the
Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v.
Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.
In the instant cases, that question is directly
presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings
below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being
equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of
teachers, and other "tangible" factors. [Footnote 9]
Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible
factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must
look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the
clock back to 1868, when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896, when Plessy
v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the
light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout
[493]
the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection
of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.
We come then to the question presented: does
segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even
though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be
equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational
opportunities? We believe that it does.
In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in
finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal
educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on "those
qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for
greatness in a law school." In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white
graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to
intangible considerations: ". . . his ability to study, to engage in
discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn
his profession."
[494]
Such considerations apply with added force to
children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age
and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on
their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case
by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:
"Segregation of white and colored children in
public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact
is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating
the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro
group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the
educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some
of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system. [Footnote 10]"
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is
amply supported by modern authority. [Footnote 11]
Any language [495]
in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.
We conclude that, in the field of public education,
the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the
plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought
are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition
makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote 12]
Because these are class actions, because of the wide
applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local
conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of
considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief
was necessarily subordinated to the primary question -- the constitutionality
of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation
is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
In order that we may have the full assistance of the
parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and
the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5
previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term. [Footnote 13]
The Attorney General
[496]
of the United States is again invited to
participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting
segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici
curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of
briefs by October 1, 1954. [Footnote 14]
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v.
Elliott et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of South Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1952, reargued
December 7-8, 1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County School Board of
Prince Edward County, Virginia, et al., on appeal from the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, argued December 10,
1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953, and No. 10, Gebhart et al. v. Belton
et al., on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware, argued
December 11, 1952, reargued December 9, 1953.
In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of
Education, the plaintiffs are Negro children of elementary school age
residing in Topeka. They brought this action in the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas to enjoin enforcement of a Kansas statute
which permits, but does not require, cities of more than 15,000 population to
maintain separate school facilities for Negro and white students. Kan.Gen.Stat.
§ 72-1724 (1949). Pursuant to that authority, the Topeka Board of Education
elected to establish segregated elementary schools. Other public schools in the
community, however, are operated on a nonsegregated basis.
The three-judge District Court, convened under 28
U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284, found that segregation in public education has a
detrimental effect upon Negro children, but denied relief on the ground that
the Negro and white schools were substantially equal with respect to buildings,
transportation, curricula, and educational qualifications of teachers. 98
F. Supp. 797. The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
In the South Carolina case, Briggs v.
Elliott, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high
school age residing in Clarendon County. They brought this action in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina to enjoin
enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which
require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. S.C.Const.,
Art. XI, § 7; S.C.Code § 5377 (1942).
The
three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284, denied
the requested relief. The court found that the Negro schools were inferior to
the white schools, and ordered the defendants to begin immediately to equalize
the facilities. But the court sustained the validity of the contested
provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the
equalization program. 98
F. Supp. 529.
This Court vacated the District Court's judgment and
remanded the case for the purpose of obtaining the court's views on a report
filed by the defendants concerning the progress made in the equalization
program. 342 U. S.
350. On remand, the District Court found that substantial equality had been
achieved except for buildings and that the defendants were proceeding to
rectify this inequality as well. 103
F. Supp. 920. The case is again here on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
1253.
In the Virginia case, Davis v. County School
Board, the plaintiffs are Negro children of high school age residing
in Prince Edward County. They brought this action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin enforcement of provisions
in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of
Negroes and whites in public schools. Va.Const., § 140; Va.Code § 22-221
(1950). The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and
2284, denied the requested relief.
The court found the Negro school inferior in
physical plant, curricula, and transportation, and ordered the defendants
forthwith to provide substantially equal curricula and transportation and to
"proceed with all reasonable diligence and dispatch to remove" the
inequality in physical plant. But, as in the South Carolina case, the court
sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs
admission to the white schools during the equalization program. 103
F. Supp. 337. The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
In the Delaware case, Gebhart v. Belton, the
plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high school age residing
in New Castle County. They brought this action in the Delaware Court of
Chancery to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and
statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public
schools. Del.Const., Art. X, § 2; Del.Rev.Code § 2631 (1935). The Chancellor
gave judgment for the plaintiffs and ordered their immediate admission to
schools previously attended only by white children, on the ground that the
Negro schools were inferior with respect to teacher
training, pupil-teacher ratio, extracurricular activities, physical plant, and
time and distance involved in travel. 87
A.2d 862.
The Chancellor also found that segregation itself
results in an inferior education for Negro children (see note 10 infra),
but did not rest his decision on that ground. Id. at 865. The
Chancellor's decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, which
intimated, however, that the defendants might be able to obtain a modification
of the decree after equalization of the Negro and white schools had been
accomplished. 91
A.2d 137, 152.
The defendants, contending only that the Delaware
courts had erred in ordering the immediate admission of the Negro plaintiffs to
the white schools, applied to this Court for certiorari. The writ was granted,
344 U.S. 891. The plaintiffs, who were successful below, did not submit a cross-petition.
344 U. S. 1,
141, 891.
345 U.S. 972. The Attorney General of the United
States participated both Terms as amicus curiae.
For a general study of the development of public
education prior to the Amendment, see Butts and Cremin, A
History of Education in American Culture (1953), Pts. I, II; Cubberley, Public
Education in the United States (1934 ed.), cc. II-XII. School practices current
at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment are described in Butts
and Cremin, supra, at 269-275; Cubberley, supra, at
288-339, 408-431; Knight, Public Education in the South (1922), cc. VIII,
IX. See also H. Ex.Doc. No. 315, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1871).
Although the
demand for free public schools followed substantially the same pattern in both
the North and the South, the development in the South did not begin to gain
momentum until about 1850, some twenty years after that in the North.
The reasons for the somewhat slower development in
the South (e.g., the rural character of the South and the different
regional attitudes toward state assistance) are well explained in
Cubberley, supra, at 408-423. In the country as a whole, but
particularly in the South, the War virtually stopped all progress in public
education. Id. at 427-428.
The low
status of Negro education in all sections of the country, both before and
immediately after the War, is described in Beale, A History of Freedom of
Teaching in American Schools (1941), 112-132, 175-195. Compulsory school
attendance laws were not generally adopted until after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and it was not until 1918 that such laws were in force in
all the states. Cubberley, supra, at 563-565.
Slaughter-House
Cases, 16
Wall. 36, 67-72 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S.
303, 307-308 (1880):
"It ordains that no State shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. What is
this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the black
as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal
before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose
protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall
be made against them by law because of their color?
The words of the amendment, it is true, are
prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity,
or right, most valuable to the colored race -- the right to exemption from
unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored -- exemption from
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the
security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and
discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a
subject race."
See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S.
313, 318 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S.
339, 344-345 (1880).
The doctrine apparently originated in Roberts
v. City of Boston, 59 Mass.198, 206 (1850), upholding school
segregation against attack as being violative of a state constitutional
guarantee of equality. Segregation in Boston public schools was eliminated in
1855. Mass.Acts 1855, c. 256. But elsewhere in the North, segregation in public
education has persisted in some communities until recent years. It is apparent
that such segregation has long been a nationwide problem, not merely one of
sectional concern.
See also Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S.
45 (1908).
In the Cummin case, Negro taxpayers
sought an injunction requiring the defendant school board to discontinue the
operation of a high school for white children until the board resumed operation
of a high school for Negro children. Similarly, in the Gong Lum case,
the plaintiff, a child of Chinese descent, contended only that state
authorities had misapplied the doctrine by classifying him with Negro children
and requiring him to attend a Negro school.
In the Kansas case, the court below found
substantial equality as to all such factors. 98
F. Supp. 797, 798. In the South Carolina case, the court below found that
the defendants were proceeding "promptly and in good faith to comply with
the court's decree." 103
F. Supp. 920, 921. In the Virginia case, the court below noted that the
equalization program was already "afoot and progressing" (103
F. Supp. 337, 341); since then, we have been advised, in the Virginia
Attorney General's brief on reargument, that the program has now been
completed. In the Delaware case, the court below similarly noted that the
state's equalization program was well under way. 91
A.2d 137, 149.
A similar finding was made in the Delaware case: "I
conclude from the testimony that, in our Delaware society, State-imposed
segregation in education itself results in the Negro children, as a class,
receiving educational opportunities which are substantially inferior to those
available to white children otherwise similarly situated."
87
A.2d 862, 865.
K.B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination
on Personality Development (Mid-century White House Conference on Children and
Youth, 1950); Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI;
Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation A Survey
of Social Science Opinion, 26 J.Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What are the
Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3
Int.J.Opinion and Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, Educational Costs, in
Discrimination and National Welfare (MacIver, ed., 1949), 44-48; Frazier, The
Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. And see generally Myrdal,
An American Dilemma (1944).
See Bolling v. Sharpe, post, p. 497, concerning the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
"4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in
public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment"
"(a) would a decree necessarily follow
providing that, within the limits set by normal geographic school districting,
Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice,
or"
"(b) may this Court, in the exercise of
its equity powers, permit an effective gradual adjustment to be brought about
from existing segregated systems to a system not based on color
distinctions?"
"5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a)
and (b) are based, and assuming further that this Court will exercise
its equity powers to the end described in question 4(b),"
"(a) should this Court formulate
detailed decrees in these cases;"
"(b) if so, what specific issues should
the decrees reach;"
"(c) should this Court appoint a special
master to hear evidence with a view to recommending specific terms for such
decrees;"
"(d) should this Court remand to the
courts of first instance with directions to frame decrees in these cases and,
if so, what general directions should the decrees of this Court include and
what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at the
specific terms of more detailed decrees?"
See Rule 42, Revised Rules of this Court
(effective July 1, 1954).
Under the factual allegation (Defendant) Chief
Justice Earl Warren absolutely legal
experts in law and education of higher sorts..? at (Defendants) University of California
Berkeley, UC Berkeley Law Citing false classification of “Slaves and Descendants”
manipulation of the judicial records Brown v. Board
of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) as in 1954, (Plaintiffs) are not
legal descendants of 19th century African-American slaves but actual living
slaves until on or about the 6th day of February 2013, thereby such
wire fraud committed directly by (Defendants) Supreme Court
(Defendant) Chief Justice Earl Warren officially acting under color of law, “Oath of Office” of the “Supreme
Court of the United States of America” for whatever reasoning might be on or
about the dates of December 9th 1952, December 8th 1953
and May 17th 1954
(Defendant) Chief Justice Earl Warren officially acting under color of law never
ratified (Plaintiffs) Captive Negro Slave 13th amendment on or about December 9th 1952, December 8th
1953 and May 17th 1954 “ending said crimes against humanity
enslavement of a entire population “Citing evidence of correct government
records filed herein
(exhibit
A) citing *See Case
3:16-mc-00016 the 1800s 13th Amendment being not complete and official ratified as described
in all school books “world-wide published” in 1865 but (Defendant Confederate
State of Mississippi) Join the (Plaintiffs) United States of America Union
government until on or about February 7th 2013
False slavery data of the (“Defendants”) entire Supreme
Court Surrounding continue records Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347
U.S. 483 (1954) Subject to said wire fraud, false judicial decree, Obstruction
of Justice against (Plaintiffs) being still captive slaves in 1954 “thereby by method of the “Federal Courts, Appeals
Courts and ” with (Defendants) Supreme Courts Justice conspire, mislead, or for
whatever reasoning maybe (“RICO”) judicial
fraud against Surrounding continue records
(Defendant) Chief Justice Earl Warren officially acting under color of law Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) subject to “fraud of the courts”
Making false statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001), against
the correct freedom rights of the (Plaintiffs) Negro DNA Slaves herein further
assert, before the “Federal Court” this being
Absolutely in
direct violation against undersigned council of record 18 U.S. Code § 3056 -
Powers, authorities, and duties of United States Military Secret Service Cmdr.
Louis Charles Hamilton II US Naval Intelligence (military investigation
records) in these matters., while undersigned council of record, family et al
being “held still Great Whiteman Negro captive slave”…
Jurisdiction and Venue
“United
States of America” did not existed until on or about the 7th day of February
2013 (Exhibit A) attached herein,
Conclusion
Wherefore (plaintiffs) collective
move For or these official correct reasoning in law and equity, (plaintiffs) collective
move to strike (Defendant) Chief Justice
Earl Warren Citations:
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483
(1954)
Wherefore (plaintiffs) collective
move further court
records RICO scheme of things further to having illegal occurred under false
slavery data regarding Argued December 9, 1952
Reargued December 8, 1953, Decided May 17, 1954*, APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS (Exhibit
B)
(Defendant) MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the
opinion of the Court.
Wherefore
(plaintiffs)
collective move for oral argument(s) being made into the records of this
proceeding base upon the “illegal, improper, unethical, and very fraudulent
actions” of the “Entire Judicial Government” of the past… dealing with millions
of (Captive Negro Slaves) against correct informed knowledge, will, peace,
dignity, international freedom rights
Wherefore
(plaintiffs)
collective citing there is no “Legal Standards” presenting this case and
raising issue of “aggravated perjury” while dealing with the elusive
(Defendants) illegal existences (The 13 Confederate States of America et al) and
it it’s very clear relief could be granted by the undersigned Court on the
facts, exhibit(s) consistent with the allegations set forth in the complaint,
before being “Amended”.
The circumstances quite clear and criminal cut
“absolute fraud of the court” holding in favor against the plaintiffs, and the
evidence is sufficient on the merits perjury having occurred on all allegations
of false slavery data argued
December 9, 1952, Reargued December 8, 1953
Fraudulent published when Decided May 17, 1954* APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS under
all material facts mention herein “still captive slave property, of Whiteman’s
criminal “expert international fraudulent doings under false slavery data, wire
fraud scheme of things since 1865.
*See
Case 3:16-mc-00016 13th Amendment being ratified 2013 7th day Feb.
Subscribed and sworn before Public Notary Public on this
_____ day of __________ 2020
_________________________
Public Notary
Respectfully ________________________________________
Estate of Louis Charles Hamilton II
Cmdr. US Navy MSS (Pro Se Plaintiff)
Queen Elizabeth II, Princess Elizabeth Alexandra
Mary,
Prince William, Duke of Cambridge, KG, KT, PC,
ADC (William Arthur Philip Louis)
Prince Henry of Wales, KCVO, (Henry Charles
Albert David)
Prime Minister Boris Johnson
The British Consulate 1301 Fannin Street #2400
Houston Texas 77002-7014
CC: International Criminal Court “Honorable Mrs.
Fatou Bensouda
In The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas 300 Willow St United States Federal Courthouse
Beaumont, TX 77701 Ste. 104
Clerk of Court et al please find
“Pro Se” collectively (Plaintiffs) files Notice of
Motion, Motion to Strike, with joining Motion to Vacate Judgments(s) (Defendant) Chief
Justice Earl Warren Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) Citations: Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, Argued December 9, 1952, Reargued December 8, 1953, Decided May 17, 1954
* APPEAL
FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered
the opinion of the Court.
2. Order of Magistrate Judge Keith
F. Giblin
_____ Day of __________ 2020
Respectfully
________________________________________
Estate of Louis Charles Hamilton II
Cmdr. US Navy MSS (Pro Se Plaintiff)
Queen Elizabeth II, Princess Elizabeth Alexandra
Mary,
Prince William, Duke of Cambridge, KG, KT, PC,
ADC (William Arthur Philip Louis)
Prince Henry of Wales, KCVO, (Henry Charles
Albert David)
Prime Minister Boris Johnson
The British Consulate 1301 Fannin Street #2400
Houston Texas 77002-7014
CC: International Criminal Court “Honorable Mrs.
Fatou Bensouda
For
The Eastern District of Texas
(Plaintiffs)
(Hamilton et al)
U.S. Docket No. 1:20-CV-00266,
1. “Pro Se” collectively (Plaintiffs) files Notice
of Motion, Motion to Strike, with joining Motion to Vacate Judgments(s) Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) Citations: Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, Argued
December 9, 1952
Reargued
December 8, 1953, Decided May 17, 1954* APPEAL
FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
MR.
CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
2. Order of Magistrate Judge
Keith F. Giblin
From: Louis Charles Hamilton II
Cmdr. US Navy MSS (Pro Se Plaintiff)
Pages
with Cover:_________
409-370-1907
cell Fax: 409-740-2104
Louishamilton2015@gmail.com
In The United States
District Court
For The Eastern District of
Texas
U.S.
Docket No. 1:20-CV-00266
Estate of
Louis Charles Hamilton II
Louis
Charles Hamilton II
Order of the Court
Estate of
Rachel Ann Hamilton II Magistrate
Judge Keith F. Giblin
Estate of
Chandra D. Hamilton
Estate of
Natasha C. Hamilton
Aaron
Michael Halvorsen (Hamilton II) (Son)
Alexis
Jemtrude (Hamilton II) (Daughter)
William
Arthur Philip Louis, Prince William, Duke of Cambridge,
Henry
Charles Albert David, Prince Harry, Duke of Sussex,
Vladimir
Vladimirvich Putin
Lalisa
Manoban
Emma
Watson
Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez
Bae
Yoo-bin
Vs.
Donald
John Trump Sr. 45th President
United
Nations et
al
United
States Supreme Court
United
States Congress
Defendant(s)
This cause is before the court U.S. Docket No.
1:20-CV-00266, plaintiffs collective Motions before the Federal Court, by
undersigned council of record Estate of Louis Charles Hamilton II,
undersign proceeding
“Pro Se” collectively (Plaintiffs) files Notice of
Motion, Motion to Strike, with joining Motion to Vacate Judgments(s) (Defendant) Chief
Justice Earl Warren, Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) Citations: Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Argued
December 9, 1952
Reargued December 8, 1953, Decided May 17, 1954* APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS MR.
CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court, The court has reviewed
the (plaintiffs) motion to strike, and exhibit (A) filing of the official 13th
Amendment on or about the 7th day of February 2013 attached herein,
being duly advised in the premises, this Court finds as follows:
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over
Notice of Motion, Motion to Strike, & joining Motion to Vacate Judgments(s)
of Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) Citations: Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Argued
December 9, 1952 Reargued December 8, 1953, Decided May 17, 1954* APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS MR.
CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
There is good cause to modify, and vacate Judgments Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) Citations: Brown v. Board
of Education of Topeka, Argued December 9, 1952 Reargued December 8, 1953, Decided
May 17, 1954* APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF KANSAS MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the
Court.
IT IS
THEREFORE ORDERED:
1.
Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) Citations: Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Argued
December 9, 1952
Reargued December 8, 1953, Decided
May 17, 1954* APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF KANSAS
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered
the opinion of the Court Judgments is vacated and dismissed
IT IS SO ORDERED.
2.
On or
about this ______ day _________________ 2020
__________________________________
Magistrate Judge Keith F. Giblin
Tina Fey
Prince Harry Windsor
Will Smith
Bill and Hillary Clinton
Megyn Kelly
Cara Delevingne
Samuel L Jackson
Jerry Springer show
Jerry Seinfeld
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Israel
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British Royal Family
President Barack Obama
United States Navy Seals
Will Ferrell
Derek Zoolander
The View
Jimmy Fallon
Bill Muhar
Fox News Live
BBC World News
Dixie Chicks bitches
Sen. Ted Cruz
NATO
Nobel Prize
ABC NBC CBS
India
Tiwain
Texas
Supreme Court
Sarah Palin
Bristol Palin
Track Palin
Star Trek
Star Wars
It always sunny in Philadelphia
As the world turns
Days of our lives
LA Clippers
British Parliament
Inspector Callahan
David and Charles Koch
Africa
Thailand
Bill Gates Bill Cosby
Cheers
Big Bang Theory
30 Rock
Alec Baldwin
Clint Eastwood
Tom Cruise
Tom Jones
Jimmy Kimmel
Jimmy Carr
Jimmy Hendrix
Japan
Soviet Union
Madonna
Cher
Chris Isaac
Oscar
Conan Congress
Washington DC
Texas
Alaska Air
The Beetles
Johnny Depp
Johnny Cash
Pirates of the Caribbean
Super Mario Bros
Victoria Secret
NASA Space Station
Hogwarts
Kim Kardashian
Jim Carrey
Jim Morrison
Courtney Love
The Who
James Brown
Black Lives Matters
Michael Jackson
Michael Jordan
Cobey Bryant
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Track Morgan
United States Marshal
UPS FedEx
PTSD
US Marines
US Army
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Bill Murray
Stephen Colbert
Stephen Hawking
Boris Johnson
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Solar panels
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Apple iPad
Maia Shibutani
California
New York City
New Jersey Shore
Abraham Lincoln
National Geographic
David Beckham
David Cameron
Cameron Diaz
Drew Barrymore
Justin Bieber
Marco Rubio
Eva Longoria
London
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David Spade
Ben Stiller
Adel
Dallas Cowboys
John Mayer
John Saseen
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Angela Mcglowan
Rajinder Singh Dhiman
Dr Seuss
Dr Pepper
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Locheed Martin
Martin Lawrence
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BMW
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Jarad Leto
Tom Hanks
Tom Hardy
The Hollywood Reporter
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John Kerry
Ash Carter
Republican Party
Russia
Chicago
Kristen Stewart Samuel L Jackson
Kevin Hart
Kevin Durant
Jay Z
Kareem Abdul Jabar
Lakers
NBA
Republican party
Selena Gomez
Will Smith
Thailand
Fox Sports
Charles Barkley
Jerry Springer
Jerry Seinfeld
North Dakota
Hollywood
Oscar
Nobel Prize
British Parliament
Switzerland
Geniva
Paris Hilton
Paris
Donald Trump
Sen Ted Cruz
It's always sunny in Philadelphia
Derek Zoolander
Ben Stiler
Owen Wilson
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Mexico
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Isreal
Saudi Arabia
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David Duke
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NAACP
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William McCants
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Professor Roger Griffin
Ivana Trump
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Ben Carson
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Chris Rock
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Willie M Zanders
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Ray Romano
Amy Poehler
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President Donald Trump
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