In The United States District Court
For The Southern District of Texas
Houston Division
Slave Negro
Louis Charles Hamilton II
U.S.
Docket No.4:2016-CV-00964
Further appearances “Motion to Strike”
“PLANTIFFS” Defendant United States of
America et al
Vs. Appeals of
Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al.
And Timothy Hurdle, et al.
United
States of America et al Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305.
Defendant(s)
et al Decided:
December 13, 2006
"Negro Slaves “PLANTIFFS” collective official Notice of
Motion to Strike Defendant(s) United States of America et al all “Entire
Reply(s) collectively in the matter as described:
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
IN RE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals
of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al.
Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305., Decided: December 13, 2006
Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and POSNER and MANION,
Circuit Judges. Bruce I. Afran (argued), Carl J. Mayer, Princeton, NJ, Roger S.
Wareham (argued), Wareham Law Office, Brooklyn, NY, Benjamin O. Nwoye, Nwoye
& Associates, Chicago, IL, Barbara K. Ratliff (argued), Los Angeles, CA,
for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Andrew R. McGaan,
Kirkland & Ellis,
Chicago, IL, Owen C. Pell (argued), White & Case, New York, NY, Andrew L.
Sandler, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom Llp, Washington, DC, Alan S.
Madans (argued), Rothschild, Barry & Myers, Chicago, IL, Thomas F. Gardner,
Jones Day, Chicago, IL, Heidi K. Hubbard, Williams & Connolly, Washington,
DC, Christina M. Tchen, Ryan J. Rohlfsen, Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom
Llp, Chicago, IL, James A. Fletcher, Fletcher & Sippel, Chicago, IL,
Michael T. Novak, Homewood, IL, Debra Torres, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver
& Jacobson, New York, NY, John H. Beisner, O'Melveny & Meyers,
Washington, DC, Maya M. Eckstein, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, VA, for
Defendants-Appellees.
Nine suits were filed in federal district courts around the
country seeking monetary relief under both federal and state law for harms
stemming from the enslavement of black people in America.
A tenth suit, by the Hurdle group of plaintiffs, makes
similar claims but was filed in a state court and then removed by the
defendants to a federal district court.
The Multidistrict
Litigation Panel consolidated all the suits in the district court in Chicago
for pretrial proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
Once there, the plaintiffs (all but the Hurdle plaintiffs,
about whom more shortly) filed a consolidated complaint, and since venue in
Chicago was proper and in any event not objected to by the parties (other than
the Hurdle group, whose objection we consider later in the opinion), the
district court was unquestionably authorized, notwithstanding Lexecon Inc. v.
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28, 118 S.Ct. 956, 140
L.Ed.2d 62 (1998), to determine the merits of the suit.
In re Carbon Dioxide Industry Antitrust Litigation, 229 F.3d
1321, 1325-27 (11th Cir.2000); cf. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68, 60 S.Ct. 153, 84 L.Ed. 167 (1939).
We are also persuaded that a district court to which a case
is transferred under section 1407 can rule on a motion to dismiss the case even
if the plaintiff has not agreed to let the court decide the merits. In re
Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1230-31
(9th Cir.2006);
15 Charles W. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H.
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3866 (2006). While it is true that
the Supreme Court held in the Lexecon case that a transfer under section 1407
does not authorize the district court to retain the case for trial, the Court
left open the question whether pretrial proceedings, which are the business
(the exclusive business) of the transferee court, include rulings on
dispositive pretrial motions, such as motions to dismiss.
But the Court hinted that they do include them. Section
1407(a) states that “each action so transferred [by the multidistrict
litigation panel] shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of
such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless
it shall have been previously terminated.”
Concerning this “provision of § 1407(a) limiting the Panel's
remand obligation to cases not ‘previously terminated’ during the pretrial
period,” the Court remarked that “this exception to the Panel's remand
obligation indicates that the Panel is not meant to issue ceremonial remand
orders in cases already concluded by summary judgment, say, or dismissal,” 523
U.S. at 37, 118 S.Ct. 956 (emphasis added)-implying that the transferee court
can indeed decide the entire case at the pretrial stage.
And rightly so.
The duty to conduct the pretrial proceedings in a
multidistrict litigation entails the transferee court's ruling on a host of
pretrial motions, many of which, whether or not formally dispositive, can shape
the litigation decisively.
There is no reason to
exclude from the court's authority rulings on motions to dismiss-especially a
motion to dismiss on the ground that there is no federal jurisdiction. It
would be odd to require a court to transfer a case to another federal court
when it was apparent that neither court had jurisdiction over the case.
Were it not for the Hurdle suit, we wouldn't have to decide
whether the district judge could have dismissed the transferred suits had the
parties not agreed, by filing a new complaint, to his retaining them after
completion of pretrial proceedings. But the Hurdle plaintiffs did not agree, so
we cannot duck the question.
The suits are a series of mostly identical class actions on
behalf of all Americans descended from slaves with whom one or more of the
defendants or their corporate predecessors may have been directly or indirectly
involved. The consolidated complaint (the Hurdle complaint is similar, so
need not be discussed separately) alleges the following facts, for which we do
not vouch, but merely summarize, the complaint having been dismissed before the
truth or falsity of the allegations was determined.
The defendants are companies or the successors to companies
that provided services, such as transportation, finance, and insurance, to
slaveowners.
At least two of the defendants were slaveowners; the
predecessor of one of the bank defendants once accepted 13,000 slaves as
collateral on loans and ended up owning 1,250 of them when the borrowers
defaulted, and the predecessor of another defendant ended up owning 346 slaves,
also as a consequence of a borrower's default.
Even before the Thirteenth Amendment, slavery was illegal in
the northern states, and the complaint charges that the defendants were
violating the laws of those states in transacting with slaveowners.
It also claims that there were occasional enslavements long
after the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and that some of the defendants
were complicit in those too. By way of relief, the complaint seeks
disgorgement to the class members of the profits that the defendants obtained
from their dealings with slaveowners.
The legal basis for the plaintiffs' federal claim is 42
U.S.C. § 1982, which provides that “all citizens of the United States shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property.”
See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 119-20, 101
S.Ct. 1584, 67 L.Ed.2d 769 (1981); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968). A claim based on a federal statute
invokes the federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts. But since
most of the conduct of which the plaintiffs complain occurred prior to the
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, and indeed prior to the Civil War,
section 1982 does not
provide a sturdy basis for the retention of federal jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs' nonfederal claims. A frivolous federal law claim cannot
successfully invoke federal jurisdiction. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,
536-37, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974); Turner/Ozanne v. Hyman/Power,
111 F.3d 1312, 1317 (7th Cir.1997); Crowley Cutlery Co. v. United States, 849
F.2d 273, 276-77 (7th Cir.1988);
Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654-55 (4th Cir.1999). So
it cannot provide a perch on which to seat nonfederal claims in the name of the
federal courts' supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. And very few of
the plaintiffs have a nonfrivolous claim under section 1982.
But with one exception, all the nonfederal claims are within
the federal diversity jurisdiction and so do not require a federal-law handle.
The exception is Richard E. Barber, Sr.'s suit; for both he and Brown
Brothers, one of the defendants in his suit, are citizens of New Jersey.
Since he thus cannot invoke diversity as a basis for federal
jurisdiction and does not have a colorable section 1982 claim (in fact he makes
no section 1982 claim at all), his suit must be dismissed for want of federal
jurisdiction without regard to the other challenges that the defendants mount
to federal jurisdiction over these suits.
The district judge ruled that by virtue of both the political-question
doctrine and the requirement of standing to sue derived from Article III of the
Constitution, there was no federal jurisdiction over any of the suits and that
in any event they had no merit because the applicable statutes of limitations
had lapsed and anyway the complaint failed to state a claim.
375 F.Supp.2d 721 (N.D.Ill.2005). The dismissal was with
prejudice. But if the judge was correct that there is no jurisdiction, he
should have dismissed the suits without prejudice and thus not decided their
merits.
The political-question doctrine bars the federal courts from
adjudicating disputes that the Constitution has been interpreted to entrust to
other branches of the federal government. The earliest and still the best
example is Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 12 L.Ed. 581 (1849). Rhode
Island had not adopted a new constitution after the break with England, but
instead continued to govern itself under its colonial charter.
Restive citizens convened a constitutional convention not
authorized by the charter. The convention adopted a new constitution to which
the charter government refused to submit, precipitating rebellion and the
establishment in 1842 of a rival state government. The Supreme Court refused
to decide which of the two competing governments was the legitimate one. It
would have been exceedingly difficult to gather and assess, by the methods of
litigation, the facts needed for such a decision. Id. at 41-42.
It would have been even more difficult to formulate a legal
concept of revolutionary legitimacy to guide the decision. Formulating and
enforcing a remedy would have presented additional stumbling blocks. The case
simply exceeded judicial capabilities. So the Court left the matter to the
President, to whom Congress had delegated the duty of resolving it. Id. at 43;
see also Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District, 281 U.S. 74,
79-80, 50 S.Ct. 228, 74 L.Ed. 710 (1930); Pacific States Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133-50, 32 S.Ct. 224, 56 L.Ed. 377
(1912).
A case that sought reparations for the wrong of slavery would
encounter similar obstacles, but the plaintiffs have been careful to cast the
litigation as a quest for conventional legal relief. All they are asking the
federal judiciary to do is to apply state law (plus the one federal statute, 42
U.S.C. § 1982) to the defendants' conduct.
They face, of course,
formidable obstacles, quite apart from the severely limited applicability of
section 1982. To name just one of those obstacles, it is highly unlikely that
antebellum laws in northern states were intended to confer financial or other
benefits on the twenty-first century descendants of slaves.
But the obstacles to the vindication of the plaintiffs' legal
claims have the form at least of conventional defenses to a lawsuit. If one
or more of the defendants violated a state law by transporting slaves in 1850,
and the plaintiffs can establish standing to sue, prove the violation despite
its antiquity, establish that the law was intended to provide a remedy (either
directly or by providing the basis for a common law action for conspiracy,
conversion, or restitution) to lawfully enslaved persons or their descendants,
identify their ancestors, quantify damages incurred, and persuade the court to
toll the statute of limitations, there would be no further obstacle to the
grant of relief.
But we think that the district court was correct, with some
exceptions to be noted, in ruling that the plaintiffs lack standing to sue.
It would be impossible by the methods of litigation to connect the defendants'
alleged misconduct with the financial and emotional harm that the plaintiffs
claim to have suffered as a result of that conduct.
See generally James R. Hackney, Jr., “The Jurisprudence of
Slavery Reparations: Ideological Conflict, African American Reparations, Tort
Causation, and the Case for Social Welfare Transformation,” 84 B.U.L.Rev. 1193
(2004).
For example, Aetna is alleged to have written several
insurance policies on slaves in the 1850s in violation of state law applicable
to the company, and to have obtained premiums from the insureds-the
slaveowners-that (we'll assume) exceeded the cost of the insurance to Aetna
(its expenses plus the payment of proceeds if the insured event came to pass).
The plaintiffs argue
that Aetna's net income from this insurance was a wrongful profit that the
company should be ordered to restore to the plaintiff classes.
If the insurance business was competitive back then (and the
plaintiffs do not argue that it was not), Aetna did not profit in an economic
sense from the transactions of which the plaintiffs complain (its “profit”
would just be its cost of equity capital), and in any event it would have
distributed any profits from the transactions to its shareholders long ago.
All that to one side, there is a fatal disconnect between the
victims and the plaintiffs. When a person is wronged he can seek redress, and
if he wins, his descendants may benefit, but the wrong to the ancestor is not a
wrong to the descendants.
For if it were, then (problems of proof to one side) statutes
of limitations would be toothless. A person whose ancestor had been wronged a
thousand years ago could sue on the ground that it was a continuing wrong and
he is one of the victims.
The plaintiffs introduce another claim of injury by asserting
that had the defendants refused to violate their own states' laws by doing
business with slaveowners, there would have been less slavery because the
refusal would have been tantamount to subjecting the slaveowners to a partial
boycott.
That would have raised their costs, and, by making slavery
less profitable, might have reduced the amount of it. (“Might,” not “would,”
because the higher costs might simply have depressed the price of a slave.)
And had there been less slavery, the argument continues, some
of the ancestors of the members of the plaintiff classes would not have been
slaves, but instead free laborers, and they would have had some disposable
income part of which they might have saved rather than spent, and left to their
heirs.
But this causal chain is too long and has too many weak links
for a court to be able to find that the defendants' conduct harmed the
plaintiffs at all, let alone in an amount that could be estimated without the
wildest speculation.
It is impossible to
determine how much, if any, less slavery there would have been had the
defendants not done business with slaveowners, what effect a diminution of
slavery would have had on bequests by ancestors of the class members, and how
much of the value of those bequests would have trickled down to the class
members.
Suppose a class member could prove that he was descended from
one of the slaves insured by Aetna or transported by the Union Pacific Railroad
(another defendant) or bought with money lent to the buyer by the predecessor
of the JPMorgan Chase Bank (still another defendant), and that these
transactions were illegal and that the descendants of slaves are among the
people whom the laws were intended to protect.
Had he not been insured or transported or bought with a
bank loan, how would the financial welfare of his remote descendant be
affected? Would the ancestor have been freed, or perhaps never enslaved in
the first place?
As the plaintiffs
stress, slavery was profitable; is it conceivable that slaveholders would have
been unable to insure, transport, and finance the purchase of slaves if
northern companies had been excluded from the provision of these services or
had refused to violate their states' laws that sought to keep them from
providing the services?
Even if compliance with those laws would have curtailed
slavery and even if it could be shown (it could not be) that as a result of
that hypothetical curtailment a plaintiff's remote ancestor would not have been
a slave but instead a free laborer, how could the wages that the ancestor would
have earned as a free laborer be shown to have influenced the wealth of his
remote descendant?
Economists actually study such issues, under the rubric of
“intergenerational mobility,” see, e.g., Kerwin Kofi Charles & Erik Hurst,
“The Correlation of Wealth Across Generations,” 111 J. Pol. Econ. 1155 (2003);
Keith N. Hylton, “The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations: Slavery and Tort
Law,” 84 B.U.L.Rev. 1209, 1239-41 (2004), but these are studies of aggregate
effects, not of the effects of particular acts, affecting particular
individuals, on the wealth of specific remote descendants. There is no way to
determine that a given black American today is worse off by a specific,
calculatable sum of money (or monetized emotional harm) as a result of the
conduct of one or more of the defendants.
Nor are the problems of measuring and tracing elided by
recasting the relief sought as restitution rather than damages. Restitution-the
transfer of the wrongdoer's gain to his victim-is an alternative to damages,
the monetization of the victim's loss.
ConFold Pacific, Inc. v. Polaris Industries, Inc., 433 F.3d
952, 957-58 (7th Cir.2006); Charter Communications Entertainment I, DST v.
Burdulis, 460 F.3d 168, 182 (1st Cir.2006); Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott &
Co., 184 F.3d 938, 944 (8th Cir.1999); 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies
§ 4. 1, pp. 551, 555 (2d ed.1993).
It is a sensible remedy for egregious misconduct because it
makes the conduct worthless to the defendant by taking away his profit even if
it exceeds the loss to the plaintiff. But it presupposes an injury-it is a
remedy for a legal wrong-and there is no way in which to determine what if any
injury the defendants inflicted on the members of the plaintiff classes.
And again, if there were a legal wrong, it would not be a
wrong to any living persons unless they were somehow the authorized
representatives to bring suits on behalf of their enslaved ancestors. With some
exceptions to be noted, the plaintiffs are suing to redress harms to third
parties (their ancestors), without being authorized to sue on behalf of those
parties.
It is like a suit by a descendant of a Union soldier,
killed in battle, against a Civil War era gun manufacturer still in business
that sold guns to the Confederacy in violation of federal law. A federal
court could not entertain the suit because the plaintiff would be unable to
prove a harm to an interest of his (such as his bank account) that the law
protects.
E.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818-19, 117 S.Ct. 2312,
138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739-40, 92 S.Ct.
1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). It is possible that had the ancestor not died
when he did he would have become a wealthy person and left bequests so immense
that his remote descendant, the plaintiff, would have inherited more money from
his parents or grandparents than he actually did.
But that is too
speculative an inquiry to provide a basis for a federal suit. See McConnell
v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 225-26, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003); Branton v.
FCC, 993 F.2d 906, 909 (D.C.Cir.1993).
The two cases just cited, and others, treat remoteness as a
limitation on Article III standing. Still other cases treat it as a
nonjurisdictional limitation on who may sue in federal court-but still a
limitation. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258,
268-69, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992); Blue Shield of Virginia v.
McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476-77, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982); Israel
Travel Advisory Service, Inc. v. Israel Identity Tours, Inc., 61 F.3d 1250,
1257 (7th Cir.1995); Allegheny General Hospital v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228
F.3d 429, 435 (3d Cir.2000).
Another group of cases
would deem the suit barred by Article III because one function of the Article
III standing doctrine is to prevent parties with slight interests in a
litigation from crowding those who have the main interests. Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982);
Morlan v. Universal Guaranty Life Insurance Co., 298 F.3d
609, 621 (7th Cir.2002); Illinois Department of Transportation v. Hinson, 122
F.3d 370, 373 (7th Cir.1997); People Organized for Welfare & Employment
Rights (P.O.W. E.R.) v. Thompson, 727 F.2d 167, 173 (7th Cir.1984); Abraham v.
Intermountain Health Care Inc., 461 F.3d 1249, 1268 (10th Cir.2006).
In our hypothetical
case of the Union soldier, the litigant with the paramount interest in the case
would be his estate and the damages that the estate could recover would include
whatever amount of money he would have wanted his descendant to inherit. If
the descendant could sue the tortfeasor directly for that amount (or for the
tortfeasor's profit, in a suit for restitution), there would be either double
recovery or an impossible task of allocating the monetary recovery between the
descendant and the estate.
A few of the plaintiff's claims, however, as we noted at the
outset, are claims of subjection to involuntary servitude after it was outlawed
by the Thirteenth Amendment, and indeed into the twentieth century. Cain
Wall, Sr. claims that “during the time that [he] was enslaved”-which he
contends extended into the 1960s-“one or more of the defendants were doing
business in Mississippi or Louisiana.
Some of the defendants
had reason to know of the enslavement of Cain Wall and yet failed to take steps
to eliminate same, while they continued to inure benefits from the illegal, but
sanctioned system of servitude post-emancipation.” But there is no claim that
the defendants subjected Wall (or any other class member) to involuntary
servitude or did anything to perpetuate or exacerbate his condition.
The claim is that they
took no steps to free him.
The briefs suggest no
basis for thinking that there is any kind of Good Samaritan legal duty to
eliminate a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment committed by someone else.
The limitations that Article III places on the right to sue
in a federal court require us to affirm (though striking “with prejudice”), on
the basis of lack of standing, the greater part of the district court's
judgment. But there are three qualifications. First, although most of the
plaintiffs and class members are suing as descendants rather than as
representatives of their ancestors' estates authorized to sue on those
ancestors' behalf, a few do claim to be suing in such a representative
capacity.
It is highly unlikely
that the estate of anyone who died a century or more ago, or indeed more than
half a century ago (for although many former slaves survived into the twentieth
century, very few would still have been alive 50 years ago, which is to say in
1956, 91 years after the end of the Civil War), has not yet been closed. But
the district judge accepted that the purported representatives had a right to
sue on behalf of their ancestors, and the defendants offer only a perfunctory
rebuttal.
We shall assume
without deciding that some of the plaintiffs are legal representatives of their
slave ancestors. These plaintiffs not only escape the objection to standing
that the suits seek damages for injuries actually suffered by third parties
(the ancestors-no longer third parties, but the real parties in interest,
merely represented by the plaintiffs), but have less to prove. They just have
to prove the injury to the ancestors; the trickle-down question is elided.
In all likelihood it would still be impossible for them to
prove injury, requiring as that would connecting the particular slavery
transactions in which the defendants were involved to harm to particular
slaves. But in any event, suits complaining about injuries that occurred more
than a century and a half ago have been barred for a long time by the
applicable state statutes of limitations.
It is true that
tolling doctrines can extend the time to sue well beyond the period of
limitations-but not to a century and more beyond. Slaves could not sue, and
even after the Thirteenth Amendment became effective in 1865 suits such as
these, if brought in the South, would not have received a fair hearing.
However, some northern
courts would have been receptive to such suits, and since the defendants are
(and were) northern companies, venue would have been proper in those states.
Even in the South, descendants of slaves have had decades of effective access
to the courts to seek redress for the wrongs of which they complain. And it's
not as if it had been a deep mystery that corporations were involved in the
operation of the slave system. See, e.g., Edgar J. McManus, Black Bondage in
the North 174 (1973); Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in
the AnteBellum South 397 (1956).
The second qualification concerns a claim, rather buried in
the complaint but not forfeited, that in violation of state fraud or consumer
protection law members of the plaintiff classes have bought products or
services from some of the defendants that they would not have bought had the
defendants not concealed their involvement in slavery.
This claim has nothing to do with ancient violations and
indeed would be unaffected if the defendants' dealings with slaveowners had
been entirely legal. It is a complaint of consumers' being deceived because
sellers have concealed a material fact. The injury is the loss incurred by
buying something that one wouldn't have bought had one known the truth about
the product.
It is true that under no consumer protection law known to us,
whether a special statute or a doctrine of the common law of contracts or
torts, has a seller a general duty to disclose every discreditable fact about
himself that might if disclosed deflect a buyer.
To fulfill such a duty
he would have to know much more about his consumers than he possibly could.
But the plaintiffs are charging the defendants with misrepresenting their
activities in relation to slavery.
A seller who learns
that some class of buyers would not buy his product if they knew it contained
some component that he would normally have no duty to disclose, but fearing to
lose those buyers falsely represents that the product does not contain the
component, is guilty of fraud.
An example would be a
manufacturer who represented that his products were made in the United States
by companies that employ only union labor, whereas in fact they were made in
Third World sweatshops. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal.4th 939, 119
Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 45 P.3d 243, 248 (Cal.2003); Price v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
219 Ill.2d 182, 302 Ill.Dec. 1, 848 N.E.2d 1, 19 (Ill.2005); Oliveira v. Amoco
Oil Co., 201 Ill.2d 134, 267 Ill.Dec. 14, 776 N.E.2d 151, 154-55 (Ill.2002);
Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1185 (3d Cir.1993).
We do not offer an opinion on the merits of the consumer
protection claims, but merely reject the district court's ruling that they are
barred at the threshold.
The third qualification concerns the Hurdle suit and is
related to the second qualification. Unlike the other plaintiffs, the Hurdle
plaintiffs didn't want to remain in the district court in Chicago. They
wanted to return to the California district court from which their case had
been transferred to Chicago for pretrial proceedings, when the pretrial
proceedings concluded.
Actually they wanted
to return to the California state court from which the defendants had removed
their case to the district court, but that is an issue for that district court
to resolve if and when the case is returned. As we pointed out at the
beginning of this opinion, the district court, as the transferee court in a
transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, was authorized to rule on a motion to
dismiss the Hurdle suit.
But though the
district judge in the exercise of that power rightly dismissed so much of that
suit as attacks wrongs done to the plaintiffs' ancestors, the Hurdle plaintiffs
are among the plaintiffs who have consumer protection claims as well. As to
them there will be further pretrial proceedings, and they will be conducted in
Chicago. So the Hurdle plaintiffs can't go back to California, at least not
yet.
To summarize, the district court's dismissal, for want of
standing, of all but the claims brought by legal representatives of slaves plus
the consumer protection claims is modified to be a dismissal without prejudice,
and as so modified is affirmed. (Barber's suit is dismissed, also without
prejudice, for want of diversity.) The dismissal of the claims brought by the
plaintiffs who claim to be legal representatives is affirmed, but on the merits
(statute of limitations) and so with prejudice.
The dismissal of the
consumer protection claims is reversed and the case remanded to the district
court for further proceedings on those claims consistent with this opinion.
The district court is authorized to retain those claims for the duration of the
litigation, except in the case of the Hurdle plaintiffs, as to whom the court
is authorized only to conduct pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
Modified And Affirmed, In Part; Reversed In Part And
Remanded.
POSNER, Circuit Judge.
Pursuant to defendant own rules of governing laws namelyRule
12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Motion to Strike Defendant(s) United States of America et al,
respond and reply, filed above being official Strike “Entire Reply/Respond pursuant
to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Respectfully Appearance Slave Negro (Pro Se Plaintiff)
Louis Charles Hamilton II herein (USN) #2712 before “Honorable Court Justice”
Honorable Court Justice Kenneth Michael Hoyt
Comes Now Slave Negro Pro Se
Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II” United States of America Navy hereinMotion
to Strike Defendant(s) “Entire Reply/Respond,
IN RE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals
of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al.
Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305.,
Decided: December 13, 2006
Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and POSNER and MANION,
Circuit Judges. Bruce I. Afran (argued), Carl J. Mayer, Princeton, NJ, Roger S.
Wareham (argued), Wareham Law Office, Brooklyn, NY, Benjamin O. Nwoye, Nwoye
& Associates, Chicago, IL, Barbara K. Ratliff (argued), Los Angeles, CA,
for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Andrew R. McGaan,
Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL, Owen C. Pell (argued),
White & Case, New York, NY, Andrew L. Sandler, Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom Llp,
Washington, DC, Alan S. Madans (argued), Rothschild, Barry
& Myers, Chicago, IL, Thomas F. Gardner, Jones Day, Chicago, IL, Heidi K.
Hubbard, Williams & Connolly, Washington, DC, Christina M. Tchen, Ryan J.
Rohlfsen, Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom
Llp, Chicago, IL, James A. Fletcher, Fletcher & Sippel, Chicago, IL,
Michael T. Novak, Homewood, IL, Debra Torres, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &
Jacobson, New York, NY, John H. Beisner, O'Melveny & Meyers, Washington,
DC, Maya M. Eckstein, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, VA, for
Defendants-Appellees.
As follows are not valid or legally binding 1000% officially
filed on the court records with accompanying
Notice of Motion to Vacate Judgement and “Motion to Vacate Judgment
Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305., Decided: December 13, 2006 being listed US
Case filed before their fraudulent “Slave Regime” Whites Supremacy control in
“Support of “Slave PLAINTIFFS” and “Pro Se Slave Plaintiff” Louis Charles
Hamilton II” MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT”S “United States of America et al
(RICO) enterprise endeavor “Racket” Judicial Fraud illegal respond as further
stating to wit:
On or about the 8th day of November 1961 having
Slave Negro Pro Se Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II” United States of
America Navy #2712 officially born into “Slavery Servitude of the Defendant
“United States of America”, ‘Civil Rights” Attorney Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, born
in the year 1966 et al., being also born into
“Slavery Servitude of the Defendant “United States of
America”, all “legal records”, of her case United States Court of
Appeals,Seventh Circuit., IN RE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION.
Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al., file is
fully forever
“Plaintiffs exhibit (A) enforced completely against
Defendant(s) United States of America et al”, and filed as exhibit, current
with the “Clerk of Court” before this present case U.S. Docket
No.4:2016-CV-00964 and released said “Judgment” herein filed official “
Notice of Motion to Vacate Judgement and “Motion to Vacate
Judgment of
United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.
IN RE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals
of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al.Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266,
05-3305., Decided: December 13, 2006 being listed in direct violation of
18 U.S. Code § 1028 - Fraud and related activity in
connection with identification documents, authentication features, and
information
And 18 U.S. Code § 1002 - Possession of false papers to
defraud United States (RICO) Judicial Fraud US Case filed before their
fraudulent “Slave Regime” defendant “United States of America” committed to the
same as “Legal Circumstances” of RICO Judicial Obstruction of Justice Fraud of
the Defendant “United States of America” et al Judicial Branch of Government” past,
present and future, being described as the same
Slave Negro Pro Se Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II”
United States of America Navy #2712 from “custody of Slavery servitude” of
defendant (USA) on or about February 7th 2013 when Mississippi,
officially free all 44.5 Million Negro Slaves including Chief Plaintiff “Pro Se
Slave (Hamilton) appearance before the Honorable Court all cases filed:
- U.S. Docket No. 3:1999-CV-00011
- U.S. Docket No. 4:2011-CV-04420
- U. S. Docket No. 4: 1998-CV-00110
- 3. U. S. Docket No. 2010-CV-02709
- U. S. Docket No. 2011-CV-00510
- U. S. Docket No. 2011-CV-04256
- U. S. Docket No. 2001-CV-00095
- U. S. Docket No. 2011-CV-00240
- U. S. Docket No. 2001-CV-00036
- U. S. Docket No. 2011-CV-00005
- U. S. Docket No. 2002-CV-00034
- U. S. Docket No. 2010-CV-02220
- U. S. Docket No. 2009-CV-00496
- U. S. Docket No. 2009-CV-07029
- U. S. Docket No. 2010-CV-00055
- U. S. Docket No. 2001-CV-00100
- U. S. Docket No. 2011-CV-00442
- U. S. Docket No. 2007-CV-01510
- U. S. Docket No. 2009-CV-00954
- U. S. Docket No. 2009-CV-00289
- U. S. Docket No. 2012-CV-01014
- U. S. Docket No. 1999-CV-00011
- U. S. Docket No. 2010-CV-00808
- U. S. Docket No. 2001-CV-00069
- U. S. Docket No. 2011-CV-00122
- U. S. Docket No. 2012-CV-00053
- U. S. Docket No. 2012-CV- 00038
- U. S. Docket No. 2012-CV-00977
Being “Official” declared, Affirmed, and hostile dispute a
defendant (USA) own governing laws requires “Prima Facial Tort in Law, that all
described above Judgments 1-28 and
IN RE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals
of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al. Nos. 05-3265,
05-3266, 05-3305., being Vacate Judgment fully“ Voided” unconstitutional,
fraudulent, based 100% illegally imposed by “Judicial Fraud of The US Courts
and the laws derived of the
United States of
America et al from the exact date of August 20th 1619 - to the exact
date of February 7th 2013 “pursuant” (MIA) 13th and 14th
amendment provision by congress insurance equality to the governing Laws of the“Infamous
Slave Trade Defendant “United States of America” et al
And equality under all of defendant (USA) governing rules of The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) governs civil procedure (i.e. for civil
lawsuits) in United States district (federal) courts. The FRCP are promulgated
by the United States Supreme Court pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, and then
the United States Congress has 7 months to veto the rules promulgated or they
become part of the FRCP.
The Court's modifications to the rules are usually based upon
recommendations from the Judicial Conference of the United States, the federal
judiciary's internal policy-making body. Although federal courts are required
to apply the substantive law of the states as rules of decision in cases where
state law is in question, the federal courts almost always use the FRCP as
their rules of procedure. (States may determine their own rules, which apply in
state courts, although most states have adopted rules that are based on the
FRCP.)
The Rules, established in 1938, replaced the earlier
procedures under the Federal Equity Rules and the Conformity Act (28 USC 724
(1934)) merging the procedure for cases, in law and equity, The Conformity Act
required that procedures in suits at law conform to state practice usually the
Field Code and common law pleading systems. Significant revisions have been
made to the FRCP in 1948, 1963, 1966, 1970, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1993, 2000, and
2006.
(The FRCP contains a notes section that details the changes
of each revision since 1938, explaining the rationale behind the language).
The King Elite Klansmen Rules, established in 1938, also
established “Nigger Slaves Plaintiff (Hamilton) and collectively (Millions) of
Negros Race similarly the same were on or about The Rules, established in 1938,
replaced the earlier procedures under the Federal Equity Rules and the
Conformity Act (28 USC 724 (1934) merging the procedure for cases, in law and
equity,
The Conformity Act required that procedures in suits at law
conform to state practice usually the Field Code and common law pleading
systems. Significant revisions have been made to the FRCP in 1948, 1963, 1966,
1970, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1993, 2000, and 2006
still under defendant
(USA) 1619 continual (3) “ Black Code Laws, Jim Crow Laws and official “Slavery
Servitude” as United States of America defendant own governing laws requires
“Prima Facial Tort in Law, that all described
response by each and every defendant collectively 1000%
official under law fully “Voided” unconstitutional, fraudulent, based 100%
illegally imposed by (RICO) past acts of “Judicial Fraud of The US Courts and
the laws derived of the United States of America et al from the exact date of
August 20th 1619 - to the exact date of February 7th 2013 “pursuant” (MIA) 13th
and 14th amendment provision by congress insurance equality to the governing
Laws of the
“Infamous Slave Trade Defendant “United States of America” et
al, which each defendant seeking salvation under immunity in US case law
citing, US Amendment constitutional provision, US criminal case laws citing,
RICO act, The Rules, established in
1938, replaced the earlier procedures under the
Federal Equity Rules and the Conformity Act (28 USC 724
(1934)with all claimedSignificant
revisions have been thereoffrom the exact date of August 20th 1619 - to the
exact date of February 7th 2013 “made to the FRCP in 1948, 1963, 1966, 1970,
1980, 1983, 1987, 1993, 2000, and 2006, all being “Motion to Strike”
Defendant America et al grand scheme involving the continual
criminal acts of
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)
18 U.S.C. § 1589 (forced labor), 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (trafficking with respect to
peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor), “Slavery Servitude”
money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 1957, “Slavery Servitude” money
laundering statutes, RICO statute (18 U.S.C. § 1961(1),,, very 1000% 1790- 2016
(226) years control, in an ongoing future by the “Judicial Branch of Government
of Defendant
“United States of America” et al and the very Honorable
Knights of The Klu Klux Klansmen Whites Supremacy Absolutes unfetter 1000%
biases
“Whites Only Klansmen terrorist controlled Immunity Sovereign
Slave Regimes “Whites Supremacy” of The 1790 Naturalization Act reserves
naturalized citizenship for whites only in 2016 (December) United States of
America as
“Niggers Need Not Apply ever, in the “Sovereignty Nation of
“United States of America, Pursuant to: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393
(1857), official Slavery Servitude United States of America as such this Pro Se
Plaintiff “Nigger/Negro
And IN RE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION.
Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et
al.Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305.,
Need Not ever Apply to
said
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) govern civil
procedure (i.e. for civil lawsuits) in United States district (federal) courts.
“Regardless worthless white trash congress supremacy for the Republican
(KKK) and prosperity of “Whites Only” America (Bogus) discriminatory with all Significant
revisions have been made after 1938 to the FRCP in 1948, 1963, 1966, 1970,
1980, 1983, 1987, 1993, 2000, and 2006.
Once again being
“Motion to Strike” all case laws cited in IN RE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE
DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and
Timothy Hurdle, et al.Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305., lieu thereof, being
“Presented by Defendant(s) each respond and reply,
Pro Se Slave Plaintiff (Hamilton) and Deadria Farmer-Paellmann,
et al collectively still Slavery Servitude Subject, from November 8th
1961 – February 7th 2013, when “Defendant” United States of America
Mississippi finally as required by (MIA) 13th Amendment free
“Nigger/Negro Pro Se Plaintiff on or about February 7th 2013 and as
being “Property and a Official” Slave “Motion to Strike” each reply, as
defective,
Voided, and 1000% unconstitutional amendment provide therein,
false material subject matter regarding “Slavery Rights of Plaintiff, defective
Constitutional State of Texas laws, and Federal laws, all derived in a Slave
Regimes” of Defendant Whites Supremacy and all “Slave Laws derive since August
20th 1619 - February 7th 2013
AS such “Motion to Strike Defendant(s) reply in each entirely
as before Law and equity “Slaves needing not apply to said governing laws of a
“Slave Regime” in the exact time frame of August 20th 1619 - February 7th 2013further
as the defendant “United States of America “Own” legal doings, “Motion to
Strike” is adequate under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) govern civil
procedure (i.e. for civil lawsuits) in United States district (federal) courts,
defendant case laws, constitutional laws, and State of Texas Laws cited and
contained there in each reply fully from the effect date of such Laws, August
20th 1619 – February 7th 2013, filed in
U.S. Docket No. 4:2016-CV-00964 Respectfully Appearance Slave
Negro (Pro Se Plaintiff) Louis Charles Hamilton II herein (USN) #2712 before
“Honorable Court Justice” Honorable Court Justice Kenneth Michael Hoyt on its whole face reply being defective legal
non-effect in law and equity worthless legal trash in dealing with
“Slaves” having no citizenship rights of the 14th
amendment in 2016 (December) as being required any law of defendant “United
States of America” et al collectively submitted in said written reply in the
exact time frame of August 20th 1619 – February 7th 2013 al Pro Se Plaintiff
(Hamilton) USN Veteran herein, and
Presidential First Slaves Nigger (Obama) Family of the
defendant of the “United States of America, and all 44.5 Million (Nigger Slaves
Plaintiffs) having been by Defendant own occurred “Motion” to Strike” each
reply as described herein and further Required “Oral Argument” on anOrder to
Show Cause why “Motion to Strike” against each defendant entire reply/response,
being levy and made entry into the record as
Have no legal standing as Identified above and each described
Federal Court case laws, Amendment of the Constitution, Texas States Laws, US
Court Case Citing fully submitted in the Time-Frame of August 20th
1619 – Mississippi Free Slave Negro Pro Se Plaintiff Veteran (Hamilton) #2712
born on November 8th 1961 from Slavery Servitude”, of the defendant
“United States of America”, as such Slavery officially being continual till
February 7th 2013 regarding
IN RE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE
DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and
Timothy Hurdle, et al.Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305.,
Judical Grand Fraud committed against “Civil Rights Attorney
of Record Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al in a (RICO) corruption Fraud None-
disclosure “, for and additional (75)
years Slaves of America grand scheme involving the continual criminal acts of
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)
18 U.S.C. § 1589 (forced labor), 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (trafficking with respect to
peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor), “Slavery Servitude”
money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 1957, “Slavery Servitude” money
laundering statutes, RICO statute (18 U.S.C. § 1961(1),,, very 1000% 1790- 2016
(226) years control, in an ongoing future by the
“Judicial Branch of
Government of Defendant all Said contain fully “Motion to Strike” invalid, null,
ineffective, nonviable, useless, worthless, and officially in 2016 (December)
on behalf of no-citizenship continual being official “Property and No
Citizenship/Slave Pursuant to: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), being
in “Human Rights Violation
official Slavery Servitude Subject Abused PLANTIFFS of
Defendant collectively United States of America et al as “Niggers/Negro
Plaintiff Pro Se Respectfully assert official Laws being denied to said
Nigger/Negro Slave on or aboutthe Time-Frame of August 20th 1619 – Mississippi
Free Slave Negro Pro Se Plaintiff Veteran (Hamilton) #2712 born on November 8th
1961 from Slavery Servitude”, of the defendant “United States of America”, as
such Slavery officially being continual till February 7th 2013
Required Need Not ever Apply to said Slave Trade official
lost voided herein Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) govern civil procedure (i.e. for civil lawsuits) in
United States district (federal) courts.
Whites Supremacy Slave
Regime sealed under The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) White Man Only
Slave endless Rules, established on or about 1938, 1948, 1963, 1966, 1970,
1980, 1983, 1987, 1993, 2000, and 2006, being “Motion to Strike” in its entire
defense directed at the Pro Se Slave Plaintiff Louis Charles Hamilton II USN
#2712 as a descendant of
August 20th 1619 since (Negro) Slave was born on November 8th
1961 thee official (FRCP) govern civil procedure (i.e. for civil lawsuits)
being laws ruled over “Slaves whom have no rights, no citizenship which officially
been denaturationand such Fraud, in destroyed constitutional 13th
and 14th amendments (MIA) with
the official (FRCP) govern civil procedure, having no 14th amendment
provide same equality for (Pro Se) Negro Hamilton held hostage in a defendant
“United States of America a Slave regime, in 2016 (December)
Conclusion
Animal rights is the idea that some, or all, non-human
animals are entitled to the possession of their own lives and that their most
basic interests—such as the need to avoid suffering—should be afforded the same
consideration as similar interests of human beings.
Appearance Slave Veteran Negro (Pro Se Plaintiff) Louis
Charles Hamilton II herein (USN) #2712 Furtherance’s Affirm, state and fully
declare all allegation, contention, disputes, disputation, argument, conflict
and disharmony, fully cause of action for “official” Motion to Strike” each
respond/reply being filed and supported
TO WIT: on or about “October” 9th 2012 past (RICO) enterprise
David Hittner ‘United States District Judge” presiding official present (RICO)
David Hittner ‘United States District Judge”
biased in the current (2016) matter Hamilton v. Federal
Reserve Bank et al having full conscious knowledge and professional legal
expert fiduciary responsibility on or about “October” 9th 2012 that:
1. The 1790
Naturalization Act reserves naturalized citizenship for whites only was fully
enforced against the (Pro Se Plaintiff) the first Presidential Negro Family
(Obama) and 44.5 Million Negros legally without legal citizenship after 1865
“civil war” trapped by this continual 1790 (RICO) Naturalization Act.
2. Articles of
Agreement Relating to the Surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia. April 10,
1865, was fully violated and that “Mississippi” never freed the (Pro Se
Plaintiff) the first Presidential Negro Family (Obama) and 44.5 Million Negros legally without legal
citizenship after 1865 “civil war” trapped by this continual collusion of the
defendant (USA) The 1790 (RICO) Naturalization Act.
3. The 13th
amendment to the “United States of America” was destroyed, annihilate, wipe
out, and fully obliterate, fully in law and equity” official in leaving (Pro Se
Plaintiff), the first Presidential Negro Family (Obama) and 44.5 Million Negros
legally born between the exact dates of August 20th 1619 - February 7th 2013
“Slaves of The United States of America”, as so legally Born unto “Slavery
Servitude”.
4. The 14th
amendment to the “United States of America” was also destroyed, annihilate,
wipe out, and fully obliterate, fully in law and equity” official in leaving
(Pro Se Plaintiff), the first Presidential Negro Family (Obama) and 44.5 Million Negros legally born between
the exact dates of February 7th 2013 – 2099 pursuant to “Elite Secret Whites
Only”
Judicial Government The 1790 Naturalization Act reserves
naturalized citizenship for whites only having “officially” denaturalization
(Pro Se Plaintiff), the first Presidential Negro Family (Obama) and 44.5 Million Negros legally born between
the exact dates of February 7th 2013 – 2099 “Leaving”
(Pro Se Plaintiff),
the first Presidential Negro Family (Obama) and 44.5 Million Negros “without”
any legal citizenship, any just equal claim legal standing before any Federal
Court of Law, and “official property” of all “card-holders” of the Knights of
The Klu Klux Klansmen, and United States of America et al forevermore, Pursuant
to: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857),
Notwithstanding Pro Se Slave Negro Louis Charles Hamilton II
declared “Legally” 1000% Dead (DOA) to have his minor children kidnaped by the
“Church of Jesus Christ of Ladder Day Saints in an ongoing (RICO) fraudulent
cover up by defendant United States of America (Utah), as Being an open unlimited
quite morbid statute of limitation wi9thy a (MIA) dead wife Body being the same
all occurred in (UTAH) mystery of 2016 undersigned notary sealed date herein on
additional defendant
RICO enterprise abduction of a pronounce “dead nigger pro se
slave” (Hamilton) by also (Texas) State Hospital defendant herein of a Legally
declared Dead Pro Se Nigger Slave Plaintiff, (Hamilton) in a fix 1619 – 2013
years of scheme of things surround among others Masterful Complex Bully in
Obstruction of Judicial Branch of
Uncouth inbreed godless slim civilization of Conquering
Klansmen Justices Government and “Whites Only”, Ho’s 1000% safe and always
secured by The 1790 Naturalization Act reserves naturalized citizenship for
whites only and enforced by David Hittner ‘United States District Judge” having
full conscious knowledge and professional legal expert fiduciary responsibility
with additional exhibit(s)
(A) filed in support herein fully as follows: Memorandum on
Dismissal dated “October 9th 2012, as Pro Se (Hamilton) being
sentenced by said court to remain a Slavery Servitude non-citizenship, trapped
by
Supremacy Defendant United States of America RICO Judicial
Fraud and “Obstruction of Justices as described being free from “Slavery in
2013 contradicting exhibit (A)dated “October 9th 2012, and remaining a Negro slave – February 2013
by the same Conquering Klansmen and “Whites Only”,
Defendant “United States of America et al, secured by The
1790 Naturalization Act reserves naturalized citizenship for whites only and
enforced by David Hittner ‘United States District Judge” having full conscious
knowledge and professional legalexpert fiduciary responsibility as such evidence
before this legal matter being filed in support and so served on the “Honorable
Court as described, being “Truthful” Notary sworn before the Honorable Court
Justices
Plaintiff Negro Slave Louis Charles Hamilton II respectfully
requesting all other furtherance’s relief being fair, fully before the court in
“Law and equity” defendant
United States of America” et al and “District Judge” having full conscious
knowledge and professional legal expert fiduciary responsibility
IN RE:
AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria
Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al.Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266,
05-3305., to refrain from (RICO) in Slavery
officially being continual by “United States of America et al” Justices till
February 7th 2013 in a Fraud None- disclosure racket “, for and additional (75)
years Negro Plaintiff(s) collectively Slaves of defendant America grand scheme
involving the continual criminal acts of
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)
18 U.S.C. § 1589 (forced labor), 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (trafficking with respect to
peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor), “Slavery Servitude”
money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 1957, “Slavery Servitude” money
laundering statutes, RICO statute (18 U.S.C. § 1961(1),,, very 1000% 1790- 2016
(226) years control, in an ongoing future by the
“Judicial Branch of
Government of Defendant all Said contain fully “Motion to Strike” invalid,
null, ineffective, nonviable, useless, worthless, and officially in 2016
(December) on behalf of no-citizenship continual being official “Property and
No Citizenship/Slave Pursuant to: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857),
being in direct acts of
“Human Rights Violation as (PLANTIFFS) herein officially filed
said complaints now 2016 request expedited hearing on an Order to show cause
why each Federal Case all described contain herein official in that defendant committed
(RICO) in law and equity Judicial Fraud against said case laws filed for “Judgement
against (Plaintiffs) being committed under Fraud by (USA) in its entire form contained
therein being
“Motion to Strike” forever in the records of each described “US
Case with the Vacated of all Judgment in each separately in official light of a
Criminal ongoing (RICO) schemes August 20th 1619 - 2016 (December) continual
(RICO) racket Slavery Servitude surrounding peddling (MIA) 13th and 14th amendment
rights, (RICO) Judicial Fraud of civil stole rights under law and equity
committed hostile-fashion the defendant (USA) past, present well into future
(PLANTIFF NEGRO
SLAVES) herein to be continual denied fairly, justly, and proper Honorable
Honest in so heard legally before Justice in all matters as required by defendant
“whites only” Law.
Subscribed before a Public Notary, On this ____ Day of
______________ 2016
____________________________________
Public Notary
________________________________________
Pro Se Slave Negro Louis Charles Hamilton II (USN),
2724 61st street Ste. I-B
Galveston, Texas. 77551
bluefinlch2@gmail.com
832-894-9465
832-344-7134
louishamilton2015@gmail.com
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