+United Nations Human Rights +Peace Palace +DONALD TRUMP NEWS As already stated
Notice to strike defendant In re
AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria
Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al. Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266,
05-3305., Decided: December 13, 2006 and
direct/compensatory/intentional/exemplary damages of $150,000.00 Million U.S.
Dollars with 6% interest incurred payable to Negro Plaintiff Slave Deadria
Farmer-Paellmann, et al., under RICO statue Treble Damages (included) for such
high court rouge underhanded Judicial Whites Supremacy Klansmen Court Justices
Funky White Man Greedy dogs as defendant GOP Government Judicial Justices
acting quite criminal under color of planet “Pluto” governing laws continue to
fraudulent keep RICO Mail and Wire Fraud, Cyber Fraud in all government and
public crooked whites man records putting ya loser KKK bitches to official
“International
Community” no less lie’s in snake ink funky ugly dog fashion print “Slavery
Servitude” had end in defendant “State of Mississippi” back in 1865 covering up
enslavement of 148 years delinquent defendant GOP Republican Party being
pirates, looting, plundering the entire world for DNA Negro Plaintiffs Slaves race
eliminated well incorporation RICO criminal scheme of things with defendant “Federal
Reserve Bank et al” till 2013 slave trade peddlers as this (Whites Man)
governing Judicial body of crooks enjoying ($$$) niggers taxes as such slave
trade further criminal was Decided: December 13, 2006 and aftermath of the
defendant
“State of
Mississippi” actually ending “Slavery Servitude” in States of Mississippi” on
or about February 7th 2013 some (MIA) 7 years later the defendant
GOP Judicial Government, Defendant GOP Congress, Defendant GOP Supreme Court of
Defendant (USA) conspired in the “full” legal enslavement of 44.5 Million Negro
Plaintiffs Slaves all being still held captures since august 20th
1619, 1000% official no legal citizenship (ever) as all being
Crimes against
humanity of the “entire” International Community” defendant (USA) cock roaching
off all Immigrants Negro Plaintiffs Slaves to be further stripped of all past
legal citizenship from a foreign country of origin to be now a dam Nigger Slave
of Defendant 1865 – 2013 “legacy” and after 2013 “Limbo Nigger Loser no-citizenship
slave trade abused toss off loss since 1619 the exact (MIA) years of crimes
against humanity “trash” as said defendant GOP Republican Government did so
knowingly with direct criminal conscious intent while acting under color of law
of defendant (USA) RICO Mail and Wire Fraud of Judicial Court Records, all transcripts,
and computer records therein void, fraudulent against the civil rights, peace,
will, dignity, well-being of Negro Plaintiff Slave Deadria Farmer-Paellmann whom
put aside her (career) in Law to having spent at the least five years digging
for evidence that ties Corporate America to pre-Civil War slavery as all being
described in this official complaint, further enforced, to include all facts,
of
“Civil Rights
Attorney Negro Plaintiff Slave being reincorporate, fully stated in full force
as well already filed as evidence in Hamilton Vs. United States of America et
al” U.S. District Judge Melinda Sue (Furche) Harmon official “De jure
segregation”, under government seal as
“Chief Defendant”, U.S. District Judge Melinda Sue (Furche) Harmon continue in
this pattern and practice of “Aggravated Perjury”, Fraud while acting under
color of law in the capacity of defendant
“United States
District Judge, for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division as such knowingly
with direct criminal conscious intent while acting under color of law of
defendant (USA) RICO Mail and Wire Fraud of Judicial Court Records,.
under color of
law against defendant “United States of America et al own rules of governing
laws pursuant to 18 U.S. Code Chapter 47 - FRAUD AND FALSE STATEMENTS ... never
served defendant United States of America et al said complaint Hamilton et al
v. United States of America et al Filed: May 11, 2016 as 4:2016mc01057, with an
actual copy of
In re AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS
LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et
al. Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305., Decided: December 13, 2006 made into the evidence
of the proceeding U.S. Docket No. 4:16-CV-01354 as U.S. District Judge Melinda
Sue (Furche) Harmon continue in this pattern and practice of “Aggravated
Perjury”, Fraud while acting under color of law in the capacity of defendant “United
States District Judge, for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division as
such
Knowingly with
direct criminal conscious intent while acting under said (USA) color of law,
having direct evidence of ongoing factual facts “Slavery Servitude” and the 13th
amendment of defendant (USA) constitution was never ratified as Negro
Plaintiffs Slaves were indeed entitled to Citizenship, compensation in excess
of 6 Trillion U.S. Dollars conspired against all in fraudulent RICO whites supremacy
slave trade of defendant GOP Judicial Government against normal (USA) defendant
et al Federal/States/Local under law and equity as described in said complaint of
the proceeding U.S. Docket No. 4:16-CV-01354,
Further being the
conspiring factors in U.S. Docket No. 4:16-CV-01774 Hamilton et al vs. Federal
Reserve Bank et al of Chief Defendant Federal Judge David Hittner, wrongfully
in that Mississippi free said (Slave) Negro Plaintiff Hamilton on or about
February 7th 2013 and as “Such” enslave Pro Se Hamilton having no
constitutional rights of both “United States of America” et al and State of
Texas et al,
November 8th 1961
Birth Certificate of Pro Se Plaintiff (Hamilton) II being filed into this
action which under rules of common law, one cannot be Born into “Slavery
Servitude” in 1961 while having 14th amendment privileges then free from
“Slavery Servitude” 148 years later in 2013 after the passage of the
1865 Civil War
establishment of equality for negro Race by the passage of 14th Amendment which
is voided forever by United States of America Mississippi ratifying the (MIA)
13th amendment of the USA in 2013
As exhibit (A) filed
into the records dated October 9th 2012 by “David Hittner” United States of
America District Judge engaging in In conscious disregards for his (KKK) Fiduciary
Duties of an acting sitting Official impartial United States District
Government Federal Judge
Signed at
Houston Texas on or about October 9th 2012 Pro Se Slave Veteran “United States
Navy #2712 Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II herein “Actually” born into
“Slavery Servitude” on or about the direct birth on November 8th 1961 as
“One” David
Hittner ‘United States District Judge” United States Southern District of Texas
Federal Courthouse Houston Texas Division, engaged in The Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization Act to continual Slavery Servitude ongoing
directed at
“pro se”
Plaintiff (Hamilton) II in his person in Texas on or about October 9th 2012 –
February 7th 2013 for an additional 4 months and days counting later legally
“Enslavement” pursuant to the Civil War of 1865 passage of the missing 13th
Amendment never freeing said (Plaintiffs Slaves) collectively
When decision
occurred by accident in a (RICO) 148 years delinquent later defendant “United
States of America et al” KKK “Mississippi Lynching Town USDA free Pro Se Slave
Veteran “United States Navy #2712 Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II herein
February 7th 2013
official (52)
enslavement years being an official
Slaves of
Defendant (USA) Judicial Government Grand Non-Disclosure of the 13th Amendment
never was ratified for 148 years later after the “Civil War” This Fraud upon
the Court committed under color of Law by Judge David Hittner criminal in
promoting, directed, and securing
(RICO)18 U.S.C. §
1589 (forced labor), 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (trafficking with respect to peonage,
slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor),
“Slavery
Servitude” money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 1957, “Slavery
Servitude” money laundering statutes, RICO statute (18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), and
Texas Black Codes
Laws, with “Jim Crow Laws protect in this omission of material facts submitted
by the court in direct conflict of actual Living event v. the fabrication
fraudulent dismissal in favor of the “White Only” defendant (Texas) et al
RICO
obstruction of Justice direct with intent and deliberate conscious did
Prima Facial Tort committed to David Hittner herein officially a defendant
committed major fraud against the United States,
False Statements,
Concealment—18 U.S.C. § 1001, having full knowledge of History of Pro Se
Plaintiff and fully aware that President Barack Obama on file as (Plaintiff)
being “Enslaved” in addition to 44.5 Million Negro race,
Further affirm
David Hittner being Rouge in “Aiding & Abetting”, “Assisting or
Encouraging”, “Assistant& Participating”, “Concert of Actions” all behalf
of all Defendant and Co-Defendant as described being officially “Kidnaped” by
Texas
to keeping the
secret “Slaver Servitude still ongoing at the time said complaints were made
dating to 2010, and the Mystery arrest being criminal conspire with all parties
herein involved.
Judicial Fraud and
Obstruction of Justice, abuse of power, Judicial bias, and having a direct
interest in the out-come of said Hamilton v.
Federal Reserve
Bank in nature of (RICO) Professional Judge engaging forevermore in
“Slavery Servitude surround circumstances of August 20th 1619 kidnapping of
Plaintiff(s) Slaves collective descendant(s) and
Human
rights ugly violations occurred and continual to be the same in said abduction
declared over at time frame of 1865 “Civil War” well now into February 7th2013
when “Mississippi” Join the Union of United States of America freeing said
Pro Se Slave
Veteran “United States Navy #2712 on or about February 7th 2013 as “United
States District Court Judge enjoying “Senior Status”, David Hittner”,
having already on or about On or about “October” 9th 2012 refusal to even
acknowledge the Legal standing of a “Slave”
On or about
“October” 9th 2012, and being the same (RICO) Judicial Corruption cover up in
favor of Defendant “Federal Reserve Bank” (RICO 1913) scheme of things to
maintain this “Racket” direct at destroyed
14th
amendment civil rights as of this undersigned notary sealed date Pro Se Slave
Veteran “United States Navy #2712, his DNA Negro Family, DNA Negro Presidential
first Family (Obama) and DNA 44.5 Million of Still Slaves from a destroyed
having also no “Legal Citizenship” all current being scammed and “Obstruction
of Justices” cover up
Judicial
Republican 1865 ongoing Civil War Coup, to maintain of all things “Slavery
Servitude”, whites supremacy, by vain, lost, out of control Justices, both
Negro/whites race, now past the abysses of “National Security” in the direct
destruction of all constitutional values in
“Conquering
“Whites Only” control, over unjust enrichments of the “Slaves Plaintiffs herein
“monetary taxes forevermore.
Plaintiff “Louis
Charles Hamilton II herein from “Slavery Servitude” of United States of America
et al Pursuant to: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. 393 (1857),
which “One” David Hittner ‘United States District
Judge” so did
engaging in as shown in “Exhibit” A herein filed attached to the records U.S.
Docket No. 4:16-CV-1774
On or about
“October” 9th 2012 (RICO) enterprise declared said Pro Se Slave Veteran “United
States Navy #2712 Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II have no legal standing
before any Federal Court of Law and further (RICO) enterprise sentences further
Pro Se Slave
Veteran “United States Navy #2712 Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II
continual to be a “Slave” of United States of America Pursuant to: Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), as which “Mississippi” so free said Pro
Se Slave Veteran “United States Navy #2712 Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II
exactly (124) DAYS LATER
After Legally
sealed (RICO) racket of ongoing White Supremacy” Slavery Servitude” refusal to
acknowledge as described in “Exhibit” A attached herein
Signed at Houston
Texas on or about October 9th 2012 “One” David Hittner ‘United States District
Judge” United States Southern District of Texas Federal Courthouse Houston
Texas Division, engaged in maintaining
Slavery
Servitude” in direct violation of United States of America own rules of
governing laws Namely The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO) 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (forced labor), 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (trafficking with
respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor),
“Slavery
Servitude” money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. 1956 and
1957, “Slavery
Servitude” money laundering statutes, RICO statute (18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), direct
with intent and deliberate conscious after Judicial Fraud and Obstruction
of Justice, abuse of power, Judicial bias,
“White
Supremacy” racket of an actual (RICO) enterprise scheme of things in physical
Ownership of a (Public) Federal Courthouse, being illegal and criminal 1000%
against the peace, will, life, well-being, civil rights and dignity, directed
officially 1000% at the “Pro Se Plaintiff Negro Slave in his person, being
(Louis Charles Hamilton II) born November 8th 1961 into Slavery Servitude of
United States of America
Title 18, U.S.C.,
Section 242 Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law ... Title 18, U.S.C., Section
1001 Fraud and False Statements; forever in favor of all defendant United
States of America et al and all acting “third party”
Whites
Supremacy Corporation Slave Trade unjust enrichment civil/criminal (RICO)
ongoing hidden slave regime until Mississippi Join the “Union on February 7th
2013 ending official enslavement victory against Just Claims of still held
enslaved Plaintiffs 1865 – 2013 herein
Slave Regime
(RICO) enterprise of defendant United State of America et al” and defendant
“State of Texas” well into the undersigned seal notary date before court
inspection “Chief Defendant
Slave Negro Louis
Charles Hamilton II (USN), herein reincorporates all and files a Notice of
Motion to Strike Civil Action H-11-4256, Motion to Strike, with accompanying
Motion to Vacate and invalidate this fraudulent
Public Record
RICO Judgement, Notice requesting “Oral Arguments” and official certified
records of Mississippi 13th Amendment being ratified on February 7th 2013
freeing the Pro Se Plaintiff Louis Charles Hamilton II filed into this Civil
Action.,
Further 44.5
Million Negro Plaintiffs Slaves as of this undersigned notary seal date each
and every crooked white bastard having laws degrees while playing (fu-cking) Judicial
GOP Government rogue Attorney under color of laws of whites supremacy XXX
stupid in your Judicial combine 1865 – 2017 (December) reading and comprehension
skills against this particular “Pro Se” Negro Plaintiff Slaves
To summarize, the
district court's dismissal, for want of standing, of all but the claims brought
by legal representatives of slaves, In re AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of
Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al. Nos. 05-3265,
05-3266, 05-3305. Decided: December 13, 2006, each case law cited therein
including the Constitution of this (S-H-I-T) hole defendant “United States of
America et al” as also each worthless case laws of fine pure inbred of drug up
Judgment of sorts to still keeping “enslavement” of
44.5 Million
Negro Plaintiffs Slaves as each UFO case laws citing identified 1- 11, below as
such infamous UFO case laws citing including each 50th “States”
Alabama – Wyoming constitution from the exact date of August 20th 1619 - to the
exact date of February 7th 2013 “pursuant” among other things, Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) these infamous case laws, each 50th “States” Alabama – Wyoming
constitution and the “entire defendant special ed. U. S. Constitution of rouge
town Klansmen USDA Mississippi (elite) are
1000% “Funky
Whites Man’s Gutter Snake Oil Disappearing Honky Yack Mouth Horse drunken thievery
sorts of elicited perverted Klansmen Magic Words of Fu-cked up Slave Trade Trailer
Park at Trump Klansmen 45th elected Presidential Sexual Predators of
own mentions Groping XXX Whites Only Hotel Bottom Out/Oval Office finest Whites
Man Garage selling off Ho sell discount “Garbage”,
if any laws* pay
extra special attention greedy, crooked defendant GOP Judicial and Congress,
and XXX and a X Loser GOP Republican Party Supreme Court of the Knights of the
Klu Klux Klansmen, The 44.5 Million Negro will automatically motion for strike
all UFO Case law citing between the exacts dates of August 20th 1619
– February 7th 2013, thereby you just save your “Ink and Paper, and
funky whites lying Ho ass Klansmen (Loser) education laws degrees combine for
the “Whole Rouge U.S. nations collectively”, submitted all such worthless trash
to C/o:
U.S.
District Judge Melinda Sue (Furche) Harmon continue in this pattern and
practice of “Aggravated Perjury”, Fraud while acting under color of law in the
capacity of defendant “United States District Judge, for the Southern District
of Texas, Houston Division King KKK and extra K Chief Defendant Federal Judge
David Hittner,, with enough exact bus fare back to 1960s Lynching town
Mississippi Burring USDA and be sure with “bedsores” ride upon all the way in the
“Back of the Bus” ya worthless 2016 December still Slave Trade wanted at large
before the World Court Criminal Court (ICC) of the Hague these two (Judicial Klansmen Cracker Ho’s Ass Rouge Bitches)
and there sell-out sidekick 2 RICO Nigger
fungus breath (Loser) bribery Judges, at the Bob Casey Federal Klansmen Texas
Strong-hold Courthouse.
* if you’re a Honorable
Judicial U.S. District Judge which I doubt, please note from august 20th 1619 –
February 7th 2013 all laws, derived thereof are voided and never
represent the legal interest of 44.5 Million Negro Plaintiffs captures slaves
before the “Whites Supremacy” “Lynching Crazy” Ass Loser defendant GOP Republican
Party Government et al Federal/State/ and local (I) need not “Pro Se” Negro
Plaintiff Slave reference such wording in the direct before the World Court Honorable
Justices or “JAG” they collectively not motherfucking 24/7 = 365 GOP Republican
Party Slave Trade criminally insane and fully “Ignorant”.
1. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad
Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28, 118 S.Ct. 956, 140 L.Ed.2d 62 (1998),In re
Carbon Dioxide Industry Antitrust Litigation, 229 F.3d 1321, 1325-27 (11th
Cir.2000); cf. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165,
167-68, 60 S.Ct. 153, 84 L.Ed. 167 (1939).
2. Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100,
119-20, 101 S.Ct. 1584, 67 L.Ed.2d 769 (1981); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968).
3. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,
536-37, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974); Turner/Ozanne v. Hyman/Power,
111 F.3d 1312, 1317 (7th Cir.1997); Crowley Cutlery Co. v. United States, 849
F.2d 273, 276-77 (7th Cir.1988); Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654-55 (4th
Cir.1999).
4. Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron
Metropolitan Park District, 281 U.S. 74, 79-80, 50 S.Ct. 228, 74 L.Ed. 710
(1930); Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118,
133-50, 32 S.Ct. 224, 56 L.Ed. 377 (1912).
5. Kerwin Kofi Charles & Erik Hurst, “The
Correlation of Wealth Across Generations,” 111 J. Pol. Econ. 1155 (2003);
Keith N. Hylton, “The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations: Slavery and Tort
Law,” 84 B.U.L.Rev. 1209, 1239-41 (2004),
6. ConFold Pacific, Inc. v. Polaris
Industries, Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 957-58 (7th Cir.2006); Charter Communications
Entertainment I, DST v. Burdulis, 460 F.3d 168, 182 (1st Cir.2006); Kerr v.
Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 944 (8th Cir.1999); 1 Dan B.
Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies § 4. 1, pp. 551, 555 (2d ed.1993).
7. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818-19,
117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
739-40, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972).
8. Holmes v. Securities Investor
Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268-69, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992);
Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476-77, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 73
L.Ed.2d 149 (1982); Israel Travel Advisory Service, Inc. v. Israel Identity
Tours, Inc., 61 F.3d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir.1995); Allegheny General Hospital v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 435 (3d Cir.2000).
9. Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473,
102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); Morlan v. Universal Guaranty Life
Insurance Co., 298 F.3d 609, 621 (7th Cir.2002); Illinois Department of
Transportation v. Hinson, 122 F.3d 370, 373 (7th Cir.1997); People Organized
for Welfare & Employment Rights (P.O.W. E.R.) v. Thompson, 727 F.2d 167,
173 (7th Cir.1984); Abraham v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., 461 F.3d 1249,
1268 (10th Cir.2006).
10.
Edgar
J. McManus, Black Bondage in the North 174 (1973); Kenneth M. Stampp, The
Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the AnteBellum South 397 (1956).
11.
Kasky
v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal.4th 939, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 45 P.3d 243, 248
(Cal.2003); Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 219 Ill.2d 182, 302 Ill.Dec. 1, 848
N.E.2d 1, 19 (Ill.2005); Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 201 Ill.2d 134, 267
Ill.Dec. 14, 776 N.E.2d 151, 154-55 (Ill.2002); Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco
Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1185 (3d Cir.1993).
As cited in
United States
Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
In re
AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria
Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al.
Nos. 05-3265,
05-3266, 05-3305.
Decided:
December 13, 2006
Before
EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and POSNER and MANION, Circuit Judges.Bruce I. Afran
(argued), Carl J. Mayer, Princeton, NJ, Roger S. Wareham (argued), Wareham Law
Office, Brooklyn, NY, Benjamin O. Nwoye, Nwoye & Associates, Chicago, IL,
Barbara K. Ratliff (argued), Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Andrew
R. McGaan, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL, Owen C. Pell (argued), White
& Case, New York, NY, Andrew L. Sandler, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom Llp, Washington, DC, Alan S. Madans (argued), Rothschild, Barry
& Myers, Chicago, IL, Thomas F. Gardner, Jones Day, Chicago, IL, Heidi K.
Hubbard, Williams & Connolly, Washington, DC, Christina M. Tchen, Ryan J.
Rohlfsen, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom Llp, Chicago, IL, James A.
Fletcher, Fletcher & Sippel, Chicago, IL, Michael T. Novak, Homewood, IL,
Debra Torres, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York, NY, John
H. Beisner, O'Melveny & Meyers, Washington, DC, Maya M. Eckstein, Hunton
& Williams, Richmond, VA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Nine suits were
filed in federal district courts around the country seeking monetary relief
under both federal and state law for harms stemming from the enslavement of
black people in America. A tenth suit, by the Hurdle group of plaintiffs,
makes similar claims but was filed in a state court and then removed by the
defendants to a federal district court. The Multidistrict Litigation Panel
consolidated all the suits in the district court in Chicago for pretrial
proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
Once there, the
plaintiffs (all but the Hurdle plaintiffs, about whom more shortly) filed a
consolidated complaint, and since venue in Chicago was proper and in any event
not objected to by the parties (other than the Hurdle group, whose objection we
consider later in the opinion), the district court was unquestionably
authorized, notwithstanding Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28, 118 S.Ct. 956, 140 L.Ed.2d 62 (1998), to determine the
merits of the suit. In re Carbon Dioxide Industry Antitrust Litigation, 229
F.3d 1321, 1325-27 (11th Cir.2000); cf. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68, 60 S.Ct. 153, 84 L.Ed. 167 (1939).
We are also
persuaded that a district court to which a case is transferred under section
1407 can rule on a motion to dismiss the case even if the plaintiff has not
agreed to let the court decide the merits. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA)
Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1230-31 (9th Cir.2006); 15
Charles W. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 3866 (2006). While it is true that the Supreme Court held in
the Lexecon case that a transfer under section 1407 does not authorize the
district court to retain the case for trial, the Court left open the question
whether pretrial proceedings, which are the business (the exclusive business)
of the transferee court, include rulings on dispositive pretrial motions, such
as motions to dismiss.
But the Court
hinted that they do include them. Section 1407(a) states that “each action so
transferred [by the multidistrict litigation panel] shall be remanded by the
panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district
from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated.”
Concerning this “provision of § 1407(a) limiting the Panel's remand
obligation to cases not ‘previously terminated’ during the pretrial period,”
the Court remarked that “this exception to the Panel's remand obligation indicates
that the Panel is not meant to issue ceremonial remand orders in cases already
concluded by summary judgment, say, or dismissal,” 523 U.S. at 37, 118 S.Ct.
956 (emphasis added)-implying that the transferee court can indeed decide the
entire case at the pretrial stage.
And rightly so. The
duty to conduct the pretrial proceedings in a multidistrict litigation entails
the transferee court's ruling on a host of pretrial motions, many of which,
whether or not formally dispositive, can shape the litigation decisively. There
is no reason to exclude from the court's authority rulings on motions to
dismiss-especially a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is no federal
jurisdiction. It would be odd to require a court to transfer a case to
another federal court when it was apparent that neither court had jurisdiction
over the case.
Were it not for
the Hurdle suit, we wouldn't have to decide whether the district judge could
have dismissed the transferred suits had the parties not agreed, by filing a
new complaint, to his retaining them after completion of pretrial proceedings.
But the Hurdle plaintiffs did not agree, so we cannot duck the question.
The suits are a
series of mostly identical class actions on behalf of all Americans descended
from slaves with whom one or more of the defendants or their corporate
predecessors may have been directly or indirectly involved. The consolidated
complaint (the Hurdle complaint is similar, so need not be discussed
separately) alleges the following facts, for which we do not vouch, but merely
summarize, the complaint having been dismissed before the truth or falsity of
the allegations was determined.
The defendants
are companies or the successors to companies that provided services, such as
transportation, finance, and insurance, to slaveowners. At least two of the
defendants were slaveowners; the predecessor of one of the bank defendants
once accepted 13,000 slaves as collateral on loans and ended up owning 1,250 of
them when the borrowers defaulted, and the predecessor of another defendant
ended up owning 346 slaves, also as a consequence of a borrower's default.
Even before the
Thirteenth Amendment, slavery was illegal in the northern states, and the
complaint charges that the defendants were violating the laws of those states
in transacting with slaveowners. It also claims that there were occasional
enslavements long after the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and that some
of the defendants were complicit in those too. By way of relief, the
complaint seeks disgorgement to the class members of the profits that the
defendants obtained from their dealings with slaveowners.
The legal basis
for the plaintiffs' federal claim is 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which provides that “all
citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” See City of Memphis v.
Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 119-20, 101 S.Ct. 1584, 67 L.Ed.2d 769 (1981); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968). A
claim based on a federal statute invokes the federal-question jurisdiction of
the federal courts. But since most of the conduct of which the plaintiffs
complain occurred prior to the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, and indeed
prior to the Civil War, section 1982 does not provide a sturdy basis for the
retention of federal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' nonfederal claims.
A frivolous
federal law claim cannot successfully invoke federal jurisdiction. Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974);
Turner/Ozanne v. Hyman/Power, 111 F.3d 1312, 1317 (7th Cir.1997); Crowley
Cutlery Co. v. United States, 849 F.2d 273, 276-77 (7th Cir.1988); Lovern v.
Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654-55 (4th Cir.1999). So it cannot provide a perch on
which to seat nonfederal claims in the name of the federal courts' supplemental
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. And very few of the plaintiffs have a
nonfrivolous claim under section 1982.
But with one
exception, all the nonfederal claims are within the federal diversity
jurisdiction and so do not require a federal-law handle. The exception is
Richard E. Barber, Sr.'s suit; for both he and Brown Brothers, one of the
defendants in his suit, are citizens of New Jersey. Since he thus cannot
invoke diversity as a basis for federal jurisdiction and does not have a
colorable section 1982 claim (in fact he makes no section 1982 claim at all),
his suit must be dismissed for want of federal jurisdiction without regard to
the other challenges that the defendants mount to federal jurisdiction over
these suits.
The district
judge ruled that by virtue of both the political-question doctrine and the
requirement of standing to sue derived from Article III of the Constitution,
there was no federal jurisdiction over any of the suits and that in any event
they had no merit because the applicable statutes of limitations had lapsed and
anyway the complaint failed to state a claim. 375 F.Supp.2d 721
(N.D.Ill.2005). The dismissal was with prejudice. But if the judge was
correct that there is no jurisdiction, he should have dismissed the suits
without prejudice and thus not decided their merits.
The
political-question doctrine bars the federal courts from adjudicating disputes
that the Constitution has been interpreted to entrust to other branches of the
federal government. The earliest and still the best example is Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 12 L.Ed. 581 (1849). Rhode Island had not adopted a new
constitution after the break with England, but instead continued to govern
itself under its colonial charter. Restive citizens convened a constitutional
convention not authorized by the charter. The convention adopted a new
constitution to which the charter government refused to submit, precipitating
rebellion and the establishment in 1842 of a rival state government. The
Supreme Court refused to decide which of the two competing governments was the
legitimate one.
It would have been exceedingly difficult to
gather and assess, by the methods of litigation, the facts needed for such a
decision. Id. at 41-42. It would have been even more difficult to formulate
a legal concept of revolutionary legitimacy to guide the decision.
Formulating and enforcing a remedy would have presented additional stumbling
blocks. The case simply exceeded judicial capabilities. So the Court left
the matter to the President, to whom Congress had delegated the duty of
resolving it. Id. at 43; see also Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan
Park District, 281 U.S. 74, 79-80, 50 S.Ct. 228, 74 L.Ed. 710 (1930); Pacific
States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133-50, 32 S.Ct.
224, 56 L.Ed. 377 (1912).
A case that
sought reparations for the wrong of slavery would encounter similar obstacles,
but the plaintiffs have been careful to cast the litigation as a quest for
conventional legal relief. All they are asking the federal judiciary to do is
to apply state law (plus the one federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1982) to the
defendants' conduct. They face, of course, formidable obstacles, quite apart
from the severely limited applicability of section 1982. To name just one of
those obstacles, it is highly unlikely that antebellum laws in northern states
were intended to confer financial or other benefits on the twenty-first century
descendants of slaves. But the obstacles to the vindication of the
plaintiffs' legal claims have the form at least of conventional defenses to a
lawsuit. If one or more of the defendants violated a state law by
transporting slaves in 1850, and the plaintiffs can establish standing to sue,
prove the violation despite its antiquity, establish that the law was intended
to provide a remedy (either directly or by providing the basis for a common law
action for conspiracy, conversion, or restitution) to lawfully enslaved persons
or their descendants, identify their ancestors, quantify damages incurred, and
persuade the court to toll the statute of limitations, there would be no
further obstacle to the grant of relief.
But we think
that the district court was correct, with some exceptions to be noted, in
ruling that the plaintiffs lack standing to sue. It would be impossible by
the methods of litigation to connect the defendants' alleged misconduct with
the financial and emotional harm that the plaintiffs claim to have suffered as
a result of that conduct.
See generally
James R. Hackney, Jr., “The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations: Ideological
Conflict, African American Reparations, Tort Causation, and the Case for Social
Welfare Transformation,” 84 B.U.L.Rev. 1193 (2004). For example, Aetna is
alleged to have written several insurance policies on slaves in the 1850s in
violation of state law applicable to the company, and to have obtained premiums
from the insureds-the slaveowners-that (we'll assume) exceeded the cost of the
insurance to Aetna (its expenses plus the payment of proceeds if the insured
event came to pass). The plaintiffs argue that Aetna's net income from this
insurance was a wrongful profit that the company should be ordered to restore
to the plaintiff classes.
If the insurance
business was competitive back then (and the plaintiffs do not argue that it was
not), Aetna did not profit in an economic sense from the transactions of which
the plaintiffs complain (its “profit” would just be its cost of equity
capital), and in any event it would have distributed any profits from the
transactions to its shareholders long ago. All that to one side, there is a
fatal disconnect between the victims and the plaintiffs. When a person is
wronged he can seek redress, and if he wins, his descendants may benefit, but
the wrong to the ancestor is not a wrong to the descendants. For if it were,
then (problems of proof to one side) statutes of limitations would be
toothless. A person whose ancestor had been wronged a thousand years ago
could sue on the ground that it was a continuing wrong and he is one of the
victims.
The plaintiffs
introduce another claim of injury by asserting that had the defendants refused
to violate their own states' laws by doing business with slaveowners, there
would have been less slavery because the refusal would have been tantamount to
subjecting the slaveowners to a partial boycott. That would have raised their
costs, and, by making slavery less profitable, might have reduced the amount of
it. (“Might,” not “would,” because the higher costs might simply have depressed
the price of a slave.) And had there been less slavery, the argument
continues, some of the ancestors of the members of the plaintiff classes would
not have been slaves, but instead free laborers, and they would have had some
disposable income part of which they might have saved rather than spent, and
left to their heirs.
But this causal
chain is too long and has too many weak links for a court to be able to find
that the defendants' conduct harmed the plaintiffs at all, let alone in an
amount that could be estimated without the wildest speculation. It is
impossible to determine how much, if any, less slavery there would have been
had the defendants not done business with slaveowners, what effect a diminution
of slavery would have had on bequests by ancestors of the class members, and
how much of the value of those bequests would have trickled down to the class
members.
Suppose a class
member could prove that he was descended from one of the slaves insured by
Aetna or transported by the Union Pacific Railroad (another defendant) or
bought with money lent to the buyer by the predecessor of the JPMorgan Chase
Bank (still another defendant), and that these transactions were illegal and
that the descendants of slaves are among the people whom the laws were intended
to protect.
Had he not been insured or transported or
bought with a bank loan, how would the financial welfare of his remote
descendant be affected? Would the ancestor have been freed, or perhaps never
enslaved in the first place? As the plaintiffs stress, slavery was
profitable; is it conceivable that slaveholders would have been unable to
insure, transport, and finance the purchase of slaves if northern companies had
been excluded from the provision of these services or had refused to violate
their states' laws that sought to keep them from providing the services?
Even if
compliance with those laws would have curtailed slavery and even if it could be
shown (it could not be) that as a result of that hypothetical curtailment a
plaintiff's remote ancestor would not have been a slave but instead a free
laborer, how could the wages that the ancestor would have earned as a free
laborer be shown to have influenced the wealth of his remote descendant?
Economists actually study such issues, under the rubric of “intergenerational
mobility,” see, e.g., Kerwin Kofi Charles & Erik Hurst, “The Correlation of
Wealth Across Generations,” 111 J. Pol. Econ. 1155 (2003); Keith N. Hylton,
“The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations: Slavery and Tort Law,” 84 B.U.L.Rev.
1209, 1239-41 (2004), but these are studies of aggregate effects, not of the
effects of particular acts, affecting particular individuals, on the wealth of
specific remote descendants. There is no way to determine that a given black
American today is worse off by a specific, calculatable sum of money (or
monetized emotional harm) as a result of the conduct of one or more of the
defendants.
Nor are the
problems of measuring and tracing elided by recasting the relief sought as
restitution rather than damages. Restitution-the transfer of the wrongdoer's
gain to his victim-is an alternative to damages, the monetization of the
victim's loss. ConFold Pacific, Inc. v. Polaris Industries, Inc., 433 F.3d
952, 957-58 (7th Cir.2006); Charter Communications Entertainment I, DST v.
Burdulis, 460 F.3d 168, 182 (1st Cir.2006); Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott &
Co., 184 F.3d 938, 944 (8th Cir.1999); 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies
§ 4. 1, pp. 551, 555 (2d ed.1993). It is a sensible remedy for egregious
misconduct because it makes the conduct worthless to the defendant by taking
away his profit even if it exceeds the loss to the plaintiff. But it
presupposes an injury-it is a remedy for a legal wrong-and there is no way in
which to determine what if any injury the defendants inflicted on the members
of the plaintiff classes.
And again, if
there were a legal wrong, it would not be a wrong to any living persons unless
they were somehow the authorized representatives to bring suits on behalf of
their enslaved ancestors. With some exceptions to be noted, the plaintiffs are
suing to redress harms to third parties (their ancestors), without being
authorized to sue on behalf of those parties. It is like a suit by a
descendant of a Union soldier, killed in battle, against a Civil War era gun
manufacturer still in business that sold guns to the Confederacy in violation
of federal law. A federal court could not entertain the suit because the
plaintiff would be unable to prove a harm to an interest of his (such as his
bank account) that the law protects.
E.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818-19,
117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
739-40, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). It is possible that had the
ancestor not died when he did he would have become a wealthy person and left
bequests so immense that his remote descendant, the plaintiff, would have
inherited more money from his parents or grandparents than he actually did.
But that is too speculative an inquiry to provide a basis for a federal suit.
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 225-26, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491
(2003); Branton v. FCC, 993 F.2d 906, 909 (D.C.Cir.1993).
The two cases
just cited, and others, treat remoteness as a limitation on Article III
standing. Still other cases treat it as a nonjurisdictional limitation on who
may sue in federal court-but still a limitation. Holmes v. Securities Investor
Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268-69, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992);
Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476-77, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 73
L.Ed.2d 149 (1982); Israel Travel Advisory Service, Inc. v. Israel Identity
Tours, Inc., 61 F.3d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir.1995); Allegheny General Hospital v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 435 (3d Cir.2000). Another group of cases
would deem the suit barred by Article III because one function of the Article
III standing doctrine is to prevent parties with slight interests in a
litigation from crowding those who have the main interests.
Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); Morlan v.
Universal Guaranty Life Insurance Co., 298 F.3d 609, 621 (7th Cir.2002);
Illinois Department of Transportation v. Hinson, 122 F.3d 370, 373 (7th
Cir.1997); People Organized for Welfare & Employment Rights (P.O.W. E.R.)
v. Thompson, 727 F.2d 167, 173 (7th Cir.1984); Abraham v. Intermountain Health
Care Inc., 461 F.3d 1249, 1268 (10th Cir.2006).
In our hypothetical case of the Union soldier,
the litigant with the paramount interest in the case would be his estate and
the damages that the estate could recover would include whatever amount of
money he would have wanted his descendant to inherit. If the descendant could
sue the tortfeasor directly for that amount (or for the tortfeasor's profit, in
a suit for restitution), there would be either double recovery or an impossible
task of allocating the monetary recovery between the descendant and the estate.
A few of the
plaintiff's claims, however, as we noted at the outset, are claims of
subjection to involuntary servitude after it was outlawed by the Thirteenth
Amendment, and indeed into the twentieth century. Cain Wall, Sr. claims that
“during the time that [he] was enslaved”-which he contends extended into the
1960s-“one or more of the defendants were doing business in Mississippi or
Louisiana. Some of the defendants had reason to know of the enslavement of
Cain Wall and yet failed to take steps to eliminate same, while they continued
to inure benefits from the illegal, but sanctioned system of servitude
post-emancipation.” But there is no claim that the defendants subjected Wall
(or any other class member) to involuntary servitude or did anything to
perpetuate or exacerbate his condition. The claim is that they took no steps
to free him. The briefs suggest no basis for thinking that there is any kind
of Good Samaritan legal duty to eliminate a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment committed by someone else.
The limitations
that Article III places on the right to sue in a federal court require us to
affirm (though striking “with prejudice”), on the basis of lack of standing,
the greater part of the district court's judgment. But there are three
qualifications. First, although most of the plaintiffs and class members are
suing as descendants rather than as representatives of their ancestors' estates
authorized to sue on those ancestors' behalf, a few do claim to be suing in
such a representative capacity. It is highly unlikely that the estate of
anyone who died a century or more ago, or indeed more than half a century ago
(for although many former slaves survived into the twentieth century, very few
would still have been alive 50 years ago, which is to say in 1956, 91 years
after the end of the Civil War), has not yet been closed.
But the district
judge accepted that the purported representatives had a right to sue on behalf
of their ancestors, and the defendants offer only a perfunctory rebuttal. We
shall assume without deciding that some of the plaintiffs are legal
representatives of their slave ancestors. These plaintiffs not only escape
the objection to standing that the suits seek damages for injuries actually
suffered by third parties (the ancestors-no longer third parties, but the real
parties in interest, merely represented by the plaintiffs), but have less to
prove. They just have to prove the injury to the ancestors; the trickle-down
question is elided.
In all likelihood
it would still be impossible for them to prove injury, requiring as that would
connecting the particular slavery transactions in which the defendants were
involved to harm to particular slaves. But in any event, suits complaining
about injuries that occurred more than a century and a half ago have been
barred for a long time by the applicable state statutes of limitations. It is
true that tolling doctrines can extend the time to sue well beyond the period
of limitations-but not to a century and more beyond. Slaves could not sue,
and even after the Thirteenth Amendment became effective in 1865 suits such as
these, if brought in the South, would not have received a fair hearing.
However, some northern courts would have been receptive to such suits, and since
the defendants are (and were) northern companies, venue would have been proper
in those states. Even in the South, descendants of slaves have had decades of
effective access to the courts to seek redress for the wrongs of which they
complain. And it's not as if it had been a deep mystery that corporations
were involved in the operation of the slave system. See, e.g., Edgar J.
McManus, Black Bondage in the North 174 (1973); Kenneth M. Stampp, The
Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the AnteBellum South 397 (1956).
The second
qualification concerns a claim, rather buried in the complaint but not
forfeited, that in violation of state fraud or consumer protection law members
of the plaintiff classes have bought products or services from some of the defendants
that they would not have bought had the defendants not concealed their
involvement in slavery. This claim has nothing to do with ancient violations
and indeed would be unaffected if the defendants' dealings with slaveowners had
been entirely legal. It is a complaint of consumers' being deceived because
sellers have concealed a material fact. The injury is the loss incurred by
buying something that one wouldn't have bought had one known the truth about
the product.
It is true that
under no consumer protection law known to us, whether a special statute or a
doctrine of the common law of contracts or torts, has a seller a general duty
to disclose every discreditable fact about himself that might if disclosed
deflect a buyer. To fulfill such a duty he would have to know much more about
his consumers than he possibly could. But the plaintiffs are charging the
defendants with misrepresenting their activities in relation to slavery. A
seller who learns that some class of buyers would not buy his product if they
knew it contained some component that he would normally have no duty to
disclose, but fearing to lose those buyers falsely represents that the product
does not contain the component, is guilty of fraud. An example would be a
manufacturer who represented that his products were made in the United States
by companies that employ only union labor, whereas in fact they were made in
Third World sweatshops.
See Kasky v.
Nike, Inc., 27 Cal.4th 939, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 45 P.3d 243, 248 (Cal.2003);
Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 219 Ill.2d 182, 302 Ill.Dec. 1, 848 N.E.2d 1, 19
(Ill.2005); Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 201 Ill.2d 134, 267 Ill.Dec. 14, 776
N.E.2d 151, 154-55 (Ill.2002); Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d
1153, 1185 (3d Cir.1993).
We do not offer
an opinion on the merits of the consumer protection claims, but merely reject
the district court's ruling that they are barred at the threshold.
The third
qualification concerns the Hurdle suit and is related to the second qualification.
Unlike the other plaintiffs, the Hurdle plaintiffs didn't want to remain in
the district court in Chicago. They wanted to return to the California
district court from which their case had been transferred to Chicago for
pretrial proceedings, when the pretrial proceedings concluded. Actually they
wanted to return to the California state court from which the defendants had
removed their case to the district court, but that is an issue for that
district court to resolve if and when the case is returned.
As we pointed out
at the beginning of this opinion, the district court, as the transferee court
in a transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, was authorized to rule on a motion
to dismiss the Hurdle suit. But though the district judge in the exercise of
that power rightly dismissed so much of that suit as attacks wrongs done to the
plaintiffs' ancestors, the Hurdle plaintiffs are among the plaintiffs who have
consumer protection claims as well. As to them there will be further pretrial
proceedings, and they will be conducted in Chicago. So the Hurdle plaintiffs
can't go back to California, at least not yet.
To summarize, the
district court's dismissal, for want of standing, of all but the claims brought
by legal representatives of slaves plus the consumer protection claims is
modified to be a dismissal without prejudice, and as so modified is affirmed.
(Barber's suit is dismissed, also without prejudice, for want of diversity.)
The dismissal of the claims brought by the plaintiffs who claim to be legal
representatives is affirmed, but on the merits (statute of limitations) and so
with prejudice. The dismissal of the consumer protection claims is reversed
and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings on those
claims consistent with this opinion. The district court is authorized to
retain those claims for the duration of the litigation, except in the case of
the Hurdle plaintiffs, as to whom the court is authorized only to conduct
pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
Modified And
Affirmed, In Part; Reversed In Part And Remanded.
