Tuesday, November 29, 2016

In re AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al. Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305., Decided: December 13, 2006 and direct/compensatory/intentional/exemplary damages of $150,000.00 Million U.S. Dollars with 6% interest incurred payable to Negro Plaintiff Slave Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., under RICO statue Treble Damages ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT*, Article 6 Genocide, Article 7, Crimes against humanity and never ending defendant (USA) 1865 “Civil War” in direct violation of Article 8 War crimes to remain just that Chief Defendant Donald John Trump Sr. Leadership in a RICO Slave Trade of Pirates and KKK Criminals Judicial Government acting under color of law in 2016 (December) defendant GOP Government Federal/State/local defendant “Federal Reserve bank et al” all 50 states Alabama – Wyoming criminal individuals wanted for “International arrest warrant and Trial Before the (ICC) World Criminal Court Justices of the Hague defendant GOP Republican Party Government Federal/State/local, action for 18 U.S. Code § 1111 – Murder committed by Defendant “Knights of The Klu Klux Klansmen in collusion as a Unit Whites Supremacy GOP Government imposed forever “De jure segregation”


 +United Nations Human Rights +Peace Palace +DONALD TRUMP NEWS As already stated Notice to strike defendant  In re AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al. Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305., Decided: December 13, 2006 and direct/compensatory/intentional/exemplary damages of $150,000.00 Million U.S. Dollars with 6% interest incurred payable to Negro Plaintiff Slave Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., under RICO statue Treble Damages (included) for such high court rouge underhanded Judicial Whites Supremacy Klansmen Court Justices Funky White Man Greedy dogs as defendant GOP Government Judicial Justices acting quite criminal under color of planet “Pluto” governing laws continue to fraudulent keep RICO Mail and Wire Fraud, Cyber Fraud in all government and public crooked whites man records putting ya loser KKK bitches to official

“International Community” no less lie’s in snake ink funky ugly dog fashion print “Slavery Servitude” had end in defendant “State of Mississippi” back in 1865 covering up enslavement of 148 years delinquent defendant GOP Republican Party being pirates, looting, plundering the entire world for DNA Negro Plaintiffs Slaves race eliminated well incorporation RICO criminal scheme of things with defendant “Federal Reserve Bank et al” till 2013 slave trade peddlers as this (Whites Man) governing Judicial body of crooks enjoying ($$$) niggers taxes as such slave trade further criminal was Decided: December 13, 2006 and aftermath of the defendant

“State of Mississippi” actually ending “Slavery Servitude” in States of Mississippi” on or about February 7th 2013 some (MIA) 7 years later the defendant GOP Judicial Government, Defendant GOP Congress, Defendant GOP Supreme Court of Defendant (USA) conspired in the “full” legal enslavement of 44.5 Million Negro Plaintiffs Slaves all being still held captures since august 20th 1619, 1000% official no legal citizenship (ever) as all being

Crimes against humanity of the “entire” International Community” defendant (USA) cock roaching off all Immigrants Negro Plaintiffs Slaves to be further stripped of all past legal citizenship from a foreign country of origin to be now a dam Nigger Slave of Defendant 1865 – 2013 “legacy” and after 2013 “Limbo Nigger Loser no-citizenship slave trade abused toss off loss since 1619 the exact (MIA) years of crimes against humanity “trash” as said defendant GOP Republican Government did so knowingly with direct criminal conscious intent while acting under color of law of defendant (USA) RICO Mail and Wire Fraud of Judicial Court Records, all transcripts, and computer records therein void, fraudulent against the civil rights, peace, will, dignity, well-being of Negro Plaintiff Slave Deadria Farmer-Paellmann whom put aside her (career) in Law to having spent at the least five years digging for evidence that ties Corporate America to pre-Civil War slavery as all being described in this official complaint, further enforced, to include all facts, of

“Civil Rights Attorney Negro Plaintiff Slave being reincorporate, fully stated in full force as well already filed as evidence in Hamilton Vs. United States of America et al” U.S. District Judge Melinda Sue (Furche) Harmon official “De jure segregation”, under government seal  as “Chief Defendant”, U.S. District Judge Melinda Sue (Furche) Harmon continue in this pattern and practice of “Aggravated Perjury”, Fraud while acting under color of law in the capacity of defendant

“United States District Judge, for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division as such knowingly with direct criminal conscious intent while acting under color of law of defendant (USA) RICO Mail and Wire Fraud of Judicial Court Records,. under color of law against defendant “United States of America et al own rules of governing laws pursuant to 18 U.S. Code Chapter 47 - FRAUD AND FALSE STATEMENTS ... never served defendant United States of America et al said complaint Hamilton et al v. United States of America et al Filed: May 11, 2016 as 4:2016mc01057, with an actual copy of

 In re AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al. Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305., Decided: December 13, 2006 made into the evidence of the proceeding U.S. Docket No. 4:16-CV-01354 as U.S. District Judge Melinda Sue (Furche) Harmon continue in this pattern and practice of “Aggravated Perjury”, Fraud while acting under color of law in the capacity of defendant “United States District Judge, for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division as such

Knowingly with direct criminal conscious intent while acting under said (USA) color of law, having direct evidence of ongoing factual facts “Slavery Servitude” and the 13th amendment of defendant (USA) constitution was never ratified as Negro Plaintiffs Slaves were indeed entitled to Citizenship, compensation in excess of 6 Trillion U.S. Dollars conspired against all in fraudulent RICO whites supremacy slave trade of defendant GOP Judicial Government against normal (USA) defendant et al Federal/States/Local under law and equity as described in said complaint of the proceeding U.S. Docket No. 4:16-CV-01354,

Further being the conspiring factors in U.S. Docket No. 4:16-CV-01774 Hamilton et al vs. Federal Reserve Bank et al of Chief Defendant Federal Judge David Hittner, wrongfully in that Mississippi free said (Slave) Negro Plaintiff Hamilton on or about February 7th 2013 and as “Such” enslave Pro Se Hamilton having no constitutional rights of both “United States of America” et al and State of Texas et al,    

November 8th 1961 Birth Certificate  of Pro Se Plaintiff (Hamilton) II being filed into this action which under rules of common law, one cannot be Born into “Slavery Servitude” in 1961 while having 14th amendment privileges then free from “Slavery Servitude” 148 years later in 2013 after the passage of the

1865 Civil War establishment of equality for negro Race by the passage of 14th Amendment which is voided forever by United States of America Mississippi ratifying the (MIA) 13th amendment of the USA in 2013

As exhibit (A) filed into the records dated October 9th 2012 by “David Hittner” United States of America District Judge engaging in In conscious disregards for his (KKK) Fiduciary Duties of an acting sitting Official impartial United States District Government Federal Judge

 Signed at Houston Texas on or about October 9th 2012 Pro Se Slave Veteran “United States Navy #2712 Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II herein “Actually” born into “Slavery Servitude” on or about the direct birth on November 8th 1961 as

“One” David Hittner ‘United States District Judge” United States Southern District of Texas Federal Courthouse Houston Texas Division, engaged in The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act to continual Slavery Servitude ongoing  directed at

“pro se” Plaintiff (Hamilton) II in his person in Texas on or about October 9th 2012 – February 7th 2013 for an additional 4 months and days counting later legally “Enslavement” pursuant to the Civil War of 1865 passage of the missing 13th Amendment never freeing  said (Plaintiffs Slaves) collectively

When decision occurred by accident in a (RICO) 148 years delinquent later defendant “United States of America et al” KKK “Mississippi Lynching Town USDA free Pro Se Slave Veteran “United States Navy #2712 Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II herein February 7th 2013

official (52) enslavement years  being an official

Slaves of Defendant (USA) Judicial Government Grand Non-Disclosure of the 13th Amendment never was ratified for 148 years later after the “Civil War” This Fraud upon the Court committed under color of Law by Judge David Hittner criminal in promoting, directed, and securing

(RICO)18 U.S.C. § 1589 (forced labor), 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor),

“Slavery Servitude” money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 1957, “Slavery Servitude” money laundering statutes, RICO statute (18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), and

Texas Black Codes Laws, with “Jim Crow Laws protect in this omission of material facts submitted by the court in direct conflict of actual Living event v. the fabrication fraudulent dismissal in favor of the “White Only”  defendant (Texas) et al

RICO  obstruction of Justice direct with intent and deliberate conscious did Prima Facial Tort committed to David Hittner herein officially a defendant committed major fraud against the United States,

False Statements, Concealment—18 U.S.C. § 1001, having full knowledge of History of Pro Se Plaintiff and fully aware that President Barack Obama on file as (Plaintiff) being “Enslaved” in addition to 44.5 Million Negro race,

Further affirm David Hittner being Rouge in “Aiding & Abetting”, “Assisting or Encouraging”, “Assistant& Participating”, “Concert of Actions” all behalf of all Defendant and Co-Defendant as described being officially “Kidnaped” by Texas

to keeping the secret “Slaver Servitude still ongoing at the time said complaints were made dating to 2010, and the Mystery arrest being criminal conspire with all parties herein involved.

Judicial Fraud and Obstruction of Justice, abuse of power, Judicial bias, and having a direct interest in the out-come of said Hamilton v.

Federal Reserve Bank in nature of  (RICO) Professional Judge engaging forevermore in “Slavery Servitude surround circumstances of August 20th 1619 kidnapping of Plaintiff(s) Slaves collective descendant(s) and

 Human rights ugly violations occurred and continual to be the same in said abduction declared over at time frame of 1865 “Civil War” well now into February 7th2013 when “Mississippi” Join the Union of United States of America freeing said

Pro Se Slave Veteran “United States Navy #2712 on or about February 7th 2013 as “United States District Court Judge enjoying “Senior Status”,  David Hittner”, having already on or about On or about “October” 9th 2012 refusal to even acknowledge the Legal standing of a “Slave”

On or about “October” 9th 2012, and being the same (RICO) Judicial Corruption cover up in favor of Defendant “Federal Reserve Bank” (RICO 1913) scheme of things to maintain this “Racket” direct at destroyed

 14th amendment civil rights as of this undersigned notary sealed date Pro Se Slave Veteran “United States Navy #2712, his DNA Negro Family, DNA Negro Presidential first Family (Obama) and DNA 44.5 Million of Still Slaves from a destroyed having also no “Legal Citizenship” all current being scammed and “Obstruction of Justices” cover up

Judicial Republican 1865 ongoing Civil War Coup, to maintain of all things “Slavery Servitude”, whites supremacy, by vain, lost, out of control Justices, both Negro/whites race, now past the abysses of “National Security” in the direct destruction of all constitutional values in

“Conquering “Whites Only” control, over unjust enrichments of the “Slaves Plaintiffs herein “monetary taxes forevermore.

Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II herein from “Slavery Servitude” of United States of America et al Pursuant to: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60

U.S. 393 (1857), which “One” David Hittner ‘United States District

Judge” so did engaging in as shown in “Exhibit” A herein filed attached to the records U.S. Docket No. 4:16-CV-1774

On or about “October” 9th 2012 (RICO) enterprise declared said Pro Se Slave Veteran “United States Navy #2712 Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II have no legal standing before any Federal Court of Law and further (RICO) enterprise sentences further

Pro Se Slave Veteran “United States Navy #2712 Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II continual to be a “Slave” of United States of America Pursuant to: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), as which “Mississippi” so free said  Pro Se Slave Veteran “United States Navy #2712 Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II exactly (124) DAYS LATER

After Legally sealed (RICO) racket of ongoing White Supremacy” Slavery Servitude” refusal to acknowledge as described in “Exhibit” A attached herein

Signed at Houston Texas on or about October 9th 2012 “One” David Hittner ‘United States District Judge” United States Southern District of Texas Federal Courthouse Houston Texas Division, engaged in maintaining

Slavery Servitude” in direct violation of United States of America own rules of governing laws Namely The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (forced labor), 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor),

“Slavery Servitude” money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. 1956 and

1957, “Slavery Servitude” money laundering statutes, RICO statute (18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), direct with intent and deliberate conscious after Judicial Fraud and  Obstruction of Justice, abuse of power, Judicial bias,

 “White Supremacy” racket of an actual (RICO) enterprise scheme of things in physical Ownership of a (Public) Federal Courthouse, being illegal and criminal 1000% against the peace, will, life, well-being, civil rights and dignity, directed officially 1000% at the “Pro Se Plaintiff Negro Slave in his person, being (Louis Charles Hamilton II) born November 8th 1961 into Slavery Servitude of United States of America

Title 18, U.S.C., Section 242 Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law ... Title 18, U.S.C., Section 1001 Fraud and False Statements; forever in favor of all defendant United States of America et al and all acting “third party”

 Whites Supremacy Corporation Slave Trade unjust enrichment civil/criminal (RICO) ongoing hidden slave regime until Mississippi Join the “Union on February 7th 2013 ending official enslavement victory against Just Claims of still held enslaved Plaintiffs 1865 – 2013 herein

Slave Regime (RICO) enterprise of defendant United State of America et al” and defendant “State of Texas” well into the undersigned seal notary date before court inspection “Chief Defendant

Slave Negro Louis Charles Hamilton II (USN), herein reincorporates all and files a Notice of Motion to Strike Civil Action H-11-4256, Motion to Strike, with accompanying Motion to Vacate and invalidate this fraudulent

Public Record RICO Judgement, Notice requesting “Oral Arguments” and official certified records of Mississippi 13th Amendment being ratified on February 7th 2013 freeing the Pro Se Plaintiff Louis Charles Hamilton II filed into this Civil Action.,

Further 44.5 Million Negro Plaintiffs Slaves as of this undersigned notary seal date each and every crooked white bastard having laws degrees while playing (fu-cking) Judicial GOP Government rogue Attorney under color of laws of whites supremacy XXX stupid in your Judicial combine 1865 – 2017 (December) reading and comprehension skills against this particular “Pro Se” Negro Plaintiff Slaves  

To summarize, the district court's dismissal, for want of standing, of all but the claims brought by legal representatives of slaves, In re AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al. Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305. Decided: December 13, 2006, each case law cited therein including the Constitution of this (S-H-I-T) hole defendant “United States of America et al” as also each worthless case laws of fine pure inbred of drug up Judgment of sorts to still keeping “enslavement” of

44.5 Million Negro Plaintiffs Slaves as each UFO case laws citing identified 1- 11, below as such infamous UFO case laws citing including each 50th “States” Alabama – Wyoming constitution from the exact date of August 20th 1619 - to the exact date of February 7th 2013 “pursuant” among other things, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) these infamous case laws,  each 50th “States” Alabama – Wyoming constitution and the “entire defendant special ed. U. S. Constitution of rouge town Klansmen USDA Mississippi (elite) are

1000% “Funky Whites Man’s Gutter Snake Oil Disappearing Honky Yack Mouth Horse drunken thievery sorts of elicited perverted Klansmen Magic Words of Fu-cked up Slave Trade Trailer Park at Trump Klansmen 45th elected Presidential Sexual Predators of own mentions Groping XXX Whites Only Hotel Bottom Out/Oval Office finest Whites Man Garage selling off Ho sell discount “Garbage”,

if any laws* pay extra special attention greedy, crooked defendant GOP Judicial and Congress, and XXX and a X Loser GOP Republican Party Supreme Court of the Knights of the Klu Klux Klansmen, The 44.5 Million Negro will automatically motion for strike all UFO Case law citing between the exacts dates of August 20th 1619 – February 7th 2013, thereby you just save your “Ink and Paper, and funky whites lying Ho ass Klansmen (Loser) education laws degrees combine for the “Whole Rouge U.S. nations collectively”, submitted all such worthless trash to C/o:

     U.S. District Judge Melinda Sue (Furche) Harmon continue in this pattern and practice of “Aggravated Perjury”, Fraud while acting under color of law in the capacity of defendant “United States District Judge, for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division King KKK and extra K Chief Defendant Federal Judge David Hittner,, with enough exact bus fare back to 1960s Lynching town Mississippi Burring USDA and be sure with “bedsores” ride upon all the way in the “Back of the Bus” ya worthless 2016 December still Slave Trade wanted at large before the World Court Criminal Court (ICC) of the Hague these two  (Judicial Klansmen Cracker Ho’s Ass Rouge Bitches) and there sell-out sidekick 2  RICO Nigger fungus breath (Loser) bribery Judges, at the Bob Casey Federal Klansmen Texas Strong-hold Courthouse.

* if you’re a Honorable Judicial U.S. District Judge which I doubt,  please note from august 20th 1619 – February 7th 2013 all laws, derived thereof are voided and never represent the legal interest of 44.5 Million Negro Plaintiffs captures slaves before the “Whites Supremacy” “Lynching Crazy” Ass Loser defendant GOP Republican Party Government et al Federal/State/ and local (I) need not “Pro Se” Negro Plaintiff Slave reference such wording in the direct before the World Court Honorable Justices or “JAG” they collectively not motherfucking 24/7 = 365 GOP Republican Party Slave Trade criminally insane and fully “Ignorant”.

1.     Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28, 118 S.Ct. 956, 140 L.Ed.2d 62 (1998),In re Carbon Dioxide Industry Antitrust Litigation, 229 F.3d 1321, 1325-27 (11th Cir.2000);  cf.  Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68, 60 S.Ct. 153, 84 L.Ed. 167 (1939).

2.     Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 119-20, 101 S.Ct. 1584, 67 L.Ed.2d 769 (1981);  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968).  

3.     Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974);  Turner/Ozanne v. Hyman/Power, 111 F.3d 1312, 1317 (7th Cir.1997);  Crowley Cutlery Co. v. United States, 849 F.2d 273, 276-77 (7th Cir.1988);  Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654-55 (4th Cir.1999).  

4.     Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District, 281 U.S. 74, 79-80, 50 S.Ct. 228, 74 L.Ed. 710 (1930);  Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133-50, 32 S.Ct. 224, 56 L.Ed. 377 (1912).

5.      Kerwin Kofi Charles & Erik Hurst, “The Correlation of Wealth Across Generations,” 111 J. Pol. Econ. 1155 (2003);  Keith N. Hylton, “The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations:  Slavery and Tort Law,” 84 B.U.L.Rev. 1209, 1239-41 (2004),

6.     ConFold Pacific, Inc. v. Polaris Industries, Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 957-58 (7th Cir.2006);  Charter Communications Entertainment I, DST v. Burdulis, 460 F.3d 168, 182 (1st Cir.2006);  Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 944 (8th Cir.1999);  1 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies § 4. 1, pp. 551, 555 (2d ed.1993).  

7.     Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818-19, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997);  Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739-40, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972).  

8.     Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268-69, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992);  Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476-77, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982);  Israel Travel Advisory Service, Inc. v. Israel Identity Tours, Inc., 61 F.3d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir.1995);  Allegheny General Hospital v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 435 (3d Cir.2000).

9.     Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982);  Morlan v. Universal Guaranty Life Insurance Co., 298 F.3d 609, 621 (7th Cir.2002);  Illinois Department of Transportation v. Hinson, 122 F.3d 370, 373 (7th Cir.1997);  People Organized for Welfare & Employment Rights (P.O.W. E.R.) v. Thompson, 727 F.2d 167, 173 (7th Cir.1984);  Abraham v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., 461 F.3d 1249, 1268 (10th Cir.2006).

10.            Edgar J. McManus, Black Bondage in the North 174 (1973);  Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution:  Slavery in the AnteBellum South 397 (1956).

11.            Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal.4th 939, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 45 P.3d 243, 248 (Cal.2003);  Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 219 Ill.2d 182, 302 Ill.Dec. 1, 848 N.E.2d 1, 19 (Ill.2005);  Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 201 Ill.2d 134, 267 Ill.Dec. 14, 776 N.E.2d 151, 154-55 (Ill.2002);  Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1185 (3d Cir.1993).

As cited in

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

In re AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al.

Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305.

    Decided: December 13, 2006

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and POSNER and MANION, Circuit Judges.Bruce I. Afran (argued), Carl J. Mayer, Princeton, NJ, Roger S. Wareham (argued), Wareham Law Office, Brooklyn, NY, Benjamin O. Nwoye, Nwoye & Associates, Chicago, IL, Barbara K. Ratliff (argued), Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Andrew R. McGaan, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL, Owen C. Pell (argued), White & Case, New York, NY, Andrew L. Sandler, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom Llp, Washington, DC, Alan S. Madans (argued), Rothschild, Barry & Myers, Chicago, IL, Thomas F. Gardner, Jones Day, Chicago, IL, Heidi K. Hubbard, Williams & Connolly, Washington, DC, Christina M. Tchen, Ryan J. Rohlfsen, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom Llp, Chicago, IL, James A. Fletcher, Fletcher & Sippel, Chicago, IL, Michael T. Novak, Homewood, IL, Debra Torres, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York, NY, John H. Beisner, O'Melveny & Meyers, Washington, DC, Maya M. Eckstein, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, VA, for Defendants-Appellees.

 Nine suits were filed in federal district courts around the country seeking monetary relief under both federal and state law for harms stemming from the enslavement of black people in America.   A tenth suit, by the Hurdle group of plaintiffs, makes similar claims but was filed in a state court and then removed by the defendants to a federal district court.   The Multidistrict Litigation Panel consolidated all the suits in the district court in Chicago for pretrial proceedings.  28 U.S.C. § 1407.  

Once there, the plaintiffs (all but the Hurdle plaintiffs, about whom more shortly) filed a consolidated complaint, and since venue in Chicago was proper and in any event not objected to by the parties (other than the Hurdle group, whose objection we consider later in the opinion), the district court was unquestionably authorized, notwithstanding Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28, 118 S.Ct. 956, 140 L.Ed.2d 62 (1998), to determine the merits of the suit.  In re Carbon Dioxide Industry Antitrust Litigation, 229 F.3d 1321, 1325-27 (11th Cir.2000);  cf.  Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68, 60 S.Ct. 153, 84 L.Ed. 167 (1939).

 We are also persuaded that a district court to which a case is transferred under section 1407 can rule on a motion to dismiss the case even if the plaintiff has not agreed to let the court decide the merits.  In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1230-31 (9th Cir.2006);  15 Charles W. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3866 (2006).   While it is true that the Supreme Court held in the Lexecon case that a transfer under section 1407 does not authorize the district court to retain the case for trial, the Court left open the question whether pretrial proceedings, which are the business (the exclusive business) of the transferee court, include rulings on dispositive pretrial motions, such as motions to dismiss.

  But the Court hinted that they do include them.  Section 1407(a) states that “each action so transferred [by the multidistrict litigation panel] shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated.”   Concerning this “provision of § 1407(a) limiting the Panel's remand obligation to cases not ‘previously terminated’ during the pretrial period,” the Court remarked that “this exception to the Panel's remand obligation indicates that the Panel is not meant to issue ceremonial remand orders in cases already concluded by summary judgment, say, or dismissal,” 523 U.S. at 37, 118 S.Ct. 956 (emphasis added)-implying that the transferee court can indeed decide the entire case at the pretrial stage.

And rightly so. The duty to conduct the pretrial proceedings in a multidistrict litigation entails the transferee court's ruling on a host of pretrial motions, many of which, whether or not formally dispositive, can shape the litigation decisively.   There is no reason to exclude from the court's authority rulings on motions to dismiss-especially a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is no federal jurisdiction.   It would be odd to require a court to transfer a case to another federal court when it was apparent that neither court had jurisdiction over the case.

Were it not for the Hurdle suit, we wouldn't have to decide whether the district judge could have dismissed the transferred suits had the parties not agreed, by filing a new complaint, to his retaining them after completion of pretrial proceedings.   But the Hurdle plaintiffs did not agree, so we cannot duck the question.

The suits are a series of mostly identical class actions on behalf of all Americans descended from slaves with whom one or more of the defendants or their corporate predecessors may have been directly or indirectly involved.   The consolidated complaint (the Hurdle complaint is similar, so need not be discussed separately) alleges the following facts, for which we do not vouch, but merely summarize, the complaint having been dismissed before the truth or falsity of the allegations was determined.

The defendants are companies or the successors to companies that provided services, such as transportation, finance, and insurance, to slaveowners.   At least two of the defendants were slaveowners;  the predecessor of one of the bank defendants once accepted 13,000 slaves as collateral on loans and ended up owning 1,250 of them when the borrowers defaulted, and the predecessor of another defendant ended up owning 346 slaves, also as a consequence of a borrower's default.

  Even before the Thirteenth Amendment, slavery was illegal in the northern states, and the complaint charges that the defendants were violating the laws of those states in transacting with slaveowners.   It also claims that there were occasional enslavements long after the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and that some of the defendants were complicit in those too.   By way of relief, the complaint seeks disgorgement to the class members of the profits that the defendants obtained from their dealings with slaveowners.

 The legal basis for the plaintiffs' federal claim is 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which provides that “all citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”   See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 119-20, 101 S.Ct. 1584, 67 L.Ed.2d 769 (1981);  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968).   A claim based on a federal statute invokes the federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts.   But since most of the conduct of which the plaintiffs complain occurred prior to the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, and indeed prior to the Civil War, section 1982 does not provide a sturdy basis for the retention of federal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' nonfederal claims.  

A frivolous federal law claim cannot successfully invoke federal jurisdiction.  Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974);  Turner/Ozanne v. Hyman/Power, 111 F.3d 1312, 1317 (7th Cir.1997);  Crowley Cutlery Co. v. United States, 849 F.2d 273, 276-77 (7th Cir.1988);  Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654-55 (4th Cir.1999).   So it cannot provide a perch on which to seat nonfederal claims in the name of the federal courts' supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.   And very few of the plaintiffs have a nonfrivolous claim under section 1982.

But with one exception, all the nonfederal claims are within the federal diversity jurisdiction and so do not require a federal-law handle.   The exception is Richard E. Barber, Sr.'s suit;  for both he and Brown Brothers, one of the defendants in his suit, are citizens of New Jersey.   Since he thus cannot invoke diversity as a basis for federal jurisdiction and does not have a colorable section 1982 claim (in fact he makes no section 1982 claim at all), his suit must be dismissed for want of federal jurisdiction without regard to the other challenges that the defendants mount to federal jurisdiction over these suits.

The district judge ruled that by virtue of both the political-question doctrine and the requirement of standing to sue derived from Article III of the Constitution, there was no federal jurisdiction over any of the suits and that in any event they had no merit because the applicable statutes of limitations had lapsed and anyway the complaint failed to state a claim.   375 F.Supp.2d 721 (N.D.Ill.2005).   The dismissal was with prejudice.   But if the judge was correct that there is no jurisdiction, he should have dismissed the suits without prejudice and thus not decided their merits.

 The political-question doctrine bars the federal courts from adjudicating disputes that the Constitution has been interpreted to entrust to other branches of the federal government. The earliest and still the best example is Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 12 L.Ed. 581 (1849).   Rhode Island had not adopted a new constitution after the break with England, but instead continued to govern itself under its colonial charter.   Restive citizens convened a constitutional convention not authorized by the charter.   The convention adopted a new constitution to which the charter government refused to submit, precipitating rebellion and the establishment in 1842 of a rival state government.   The Supreme Court refused to decide which of the two competing governments was the legitimate one.  

 It would have been exceedingly difficult to gather and assess, by the methods of litigation, the facts needed for such a decision.  Id. at 41-42.   It would have been even more difficult to formulate a legal concept of revolutionary legitimacy to guide the decision.   Formulating and enforcing a remedy would have presented additional stumbling blocks.   The case simply exceeded judicial capabilities.   So the Court left the matter to the President, to whom Congress had delegated the duty of resolving it.  Id. at 43;  see also Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District, 281 U.S. 74, 79-80, 50 S.Ct. 228, 74 L.Ed. 710 (1930);  Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133-50, 32 S.Ct. 224, 56 L.Ed. 377 (1912).

A case that sought reparations for the wrong of slavery would encounter similar obstacles, but the plaintiffs have been careful to cast the litigation as a quest for conventional legal relief. All they are asking the federal judiciary to do is to apply state law (plus the one federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1982) to the defendants' conduct. They face, of course, formidable obstacles, quite apart from the severely limited applicability of section 1982.   To name just one of those obstacles, it is highly unlikely that antebellum laws in northern states were intended to confer financial or other benefits on the twenty-first century descendants of slaves.   But the obstacles to the vindication of the plaintiffs' legal claims have the form at least of conventional defenses to a lawsuit.   If one or more of the defendants violated a state law by transporting slaves in 1850, and the plaintiffs can establish standing to sue, prove the violation despite its antiquity, establish that the law was intended to provide a remedy (either directly or by providing the basis for a common law action for conspiracy, conversion, or restitution) to lawfully enslaved persons or their descendants, identify their ancestors, quantify damages incurred, and persuade the court to toll the statute of limitations, there would be no further obstacle to the grant of relief.

 But we think that the district court was correct, with some exceptions to be noted, in ruling that the plaintiffs lack standing to sue.   It would be impossible by the methods of litigation to connect the defendants' alleged misconduct with the financial and emotional harm that the plaintiffs claim to have suffered as a result of that conduct.  

See generally James R. Hackney, Jr., “The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations:  Ideological Conflict, African American Reparations, Tort Causation, and the Case for Social Welfare Transformation,” 84 B.U.L.Rev. 1193 (2004).   For example, Aetna is alleged to have written several insurance policies on slaves in the 1850s in violation of state law applicable to the company, and to have obtained premiums from the insureds-the slaveowners-that (we'll assume) exceeded the cost of the insurance to Aetna (its expenses plus the payment of proceeds if the insured event came to pass).   The plaintiffs argue that Aetna's net income from this insurance was a wrongful profit that the company should be ordered to restore to the plaintiff classes.

If the insurance business was competitive back then (and the plaintiffs do not argue that it was not), Aetna did not profit in an economic sense from the transactions of which the plaintiffs complain (its “profit” would just be its cost of equity capital), and in any event it would have distributed any profits from the transactions to its shareholders long ago.   All that to one side, there is a fatal disconnect between the victims and the plaintiffs.   When a person is wronged he can seek redress, and if he wins, his descendants may benefit, but the wrong to the ancestor is not a wrong to the descendants.   For if it were, then (problems of proof to one side) statutes of limitations would be toothless.   A person whose ancestor had been wronged a thousand years ago could sue on the ground that it was a continuing wrong and he is one of the victims.

The plaintiffs introduce another claim of injury by asserting that had the defendants refused to violate their own states' laws by doing business with slaveowners, there would have been less slavery because the refusal would have been tantamount to subjecting the slaveowners to a partial boycott.   That would have raised their costs, and, by making slavery less profitable, might have reduced the amount of it.  (“Might,” not “would,” because the higher costs might simply have depressed the price of a slave.)   And had there been less slavery, the argument continues, some of the ancestors of the members of the plaintiff classes would not have been slaves, but instead free laborers, and they would have had some disposable income part of which they might have saved rather than spent, and left to their heirs.

But this causal chain is too long and has too many weak links for a court to be able to find that the defendants' conduct harmed the plaintiffs at all, let alone in an amount that could be estimated without the wildest speculation.   It is impossible to determine how much, if any, less slavery there would have been had the defendants not done business with slaveowners, what effect a diminution of slavery would have had on bequests by ancestors of the class members, and how much of the value of those bequests would have trickled down to the class members.

Suppose a class member could prove that he was descended from one of the slaves insured by Aetna or transported by the Union Pacific Railroad (another defendant) or bought with money lent to the buyer by the predecessor of the JPMorgan Chase Bank (still another defendant), and that these transactions were illegal and that the descendants of slaves are among the people whom the laws were intended to protect.  

 Had he not been insured or transported or bought with a bank loan, how would the financial welfare of his remote descendant be affected?   Would the ancestor have been freed, or perhaps never enslaved in the first place?   As the plaintiffs stress, slavery was profitable;  is it conceivable that slaveholders would have been unable to insure, transport, and finance the purchase of slaves if northern companies had been excluded from the provision of these services or had refused to violate their states' laws that sought to keep them from providing the services?

Even if compliance with those laws would have curtailed slavery and even if it could be shown (it could not be) that as a result of that hypothetical curtailment a plaintiff's remote ancestor would not have been a slave but instead a free laborer, how could the wages that the ancestor would have earned as a free laborer be shown to have influenced the wealth of his remote descendant?   Economists actually study such issues, under the rubric of “intergenerational mobility,” see, e.g., Kerwin Kofi Charles & Erik Hurst, “The Correlation of Wealth Across Generations,” 111 J. Pol. Econ. 1155 (2003);  Keith N. Hylton, “The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations:  Slavery and Tort Law,” 84 B.U.L.Rev. 1209, 1239-41 (2004), but these are studies of aggregate effects, not of the effects of particular acts, affecting particular individuals, on the wealth of specific remote descendants.   There is no way to determine that a given black American today is worse off by a specific, calculatable sum of money (or monetized emotional harm) as a result of the conduct of one or more of the defendants.

 Nor are the problems of measuring and tracing elided by recasting the relief sought as restitution rather than damages. Restitution-the transfer of the wrongdoer's gain to his victim-is an alternative to damages, the monetization of the victim's loss.  ConFold Pacific, Inc. v. Polaris Industries, Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 957-58 (7th Cir.2006);  Charter Communications Entertainment I, DST v. Burdulis, 460 F.3d 168, 182 (1st Cir.2006);  Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 944 (8th Cir.1999);  1 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies § 4. 1, pp. 551, 555 (2d ed.1993).   It is a sensible remedy for egregious misconduct because it makes the conduct worthless to the defendant by taking away his profit even if it exceeds the loss to the plaintiff.   But it presupposes an injury-it is a remedy for a legal wrong-and there is no way in which to determine what if any injury the defendants inflicted on the members of the plaintiff classes.

And again, if there were a legal wrong, it would not be a wrong to any living persons unless they were somehow the authorized representatives to bring suits on behalf of their enslaved ancestors. With some exceptions to be noted, the plaintiffs are suing to redress harms to third parties (their ancestors), without being authorized to sue on behalf of those parties.   It is like a suit by a descendant of a Union soldier, killed in battle, against a Civil War era gun manufacturer still in business that sold guns to the Confederacy in violation of federal law.   A federal court could not entertain the suit because the plaintiff would be unable to prove a harm to an interest of his (such as his bank account) that the law protects.  

 E.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818-19, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997);  Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739-40, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972).   It is possible that had the ancestor not died when he did he would have become a wealthy person and left bequests so immense that his remote descendant, the plaintiff, would have inherited more money from his parents or grandparents than he actually did.   But that is too speculative an inquiry to provide a basis for a federal suit.   See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 225-26, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003);  Branton v. FCC, 993 F.2d 906, 909 (D.C.Cir.1993).

The two cases just cited, and others, treat remoteness as a limitation on Article III standing.   Still other cases treat it as a nonjurisdictional limitation on who may sue in federal court-but still a limitation.  Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268-69, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992);  Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476-77, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982);  Israel Travel Advisory Service, Inc. v. Israel Identity Tours, Inc., 61 F.3d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir.1995);  Allegheny General Hospital v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 435 (3d Cir.2000).   Another group of cases would deem the suit barred by Article III because one function of the Article III standing doctrine is to prevent parties with slight interests in a litigation from crowding those who have the main interests.  

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982);  Morlan v. Universal Guaranty Life Insurance Co., 298 F.3d 609, 621 (7th Cir.2002);  Illinois Department of Transportation v. Hinson, 122 F.3d 370, 373 (7th Cir.1997);  People Organized for Welfare & Employment Rights (P.O.W. E.R.) v. Thompson, 727 F.2d 167, 173 (7th Cir.1984);  Abraham v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., 461 F.3d 1249, 1268 (10th Cir.2006).  

 In our hypothetical case of the Union soldier, the litigant with the paramount interest in the case would be his estate and the damages that the estate could recover would include whatever amount of money he would have wanted his descendant to inherit.   If the descendant could sue the tortfeasor directly for that amount (or for the tortfeasor's profit, in a suit for restitution), there would be either double recovery or an impossible task of allocating the monetary recovery between the descendant and the estate.

 A few of the plaintiff's claims, however, as we noted at the outset, are claims of subjection to involuntary servitude after it was outlawed by the Thirteenth Amendment, and indeed into the twentieth century.   Cain Wall, Sr. claims that “during the time that [he] was enslaved”-which he contends extended into the 1960s-“one or more of the defendants were doing business in Mississippi or Louisiana.   Some of the defendants had reason to know of the enslavement of Cain Wall and yet failed to take steps to eliminate same, while they continued to inure benefits from the illegal, but sanctioned system of servitude post-emancipation.”   But there is no claim that the defendants subjected Wall (or any other class member) to involuntary servitude or did anything to perpetuate or exacerbate his condition.   The claim is that they took no steps to free him.   The briefs suggest no basis for thinking that there is any kind of Good Samaritan legal duty to eliminate a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment committed by someone else.

 The limitations that Article III places on the right to sue in a federal court require us to affirm (though striking “with prejudice”), on the basis of lack of standing, the greater part of the district court's judgment.   But there are three qualifications.   First, although most of the plaintiffs and class members are suing as descendants rather than as representatives of their ancestors' estates authorized to sue on those ancestors' behalf, a few do claim to be suing in such a representative capacity.   It is highly unlikely that the estate of anyone who died a century or more ago, or indeed more than half a century ago (for although many former slaves survived into the twentieth century, very few would still have been alive 50 years ago, which is to say in 1956, 91 years after the end of the Civil War), has not yet been closed.  

But the district judge accepted that the purported representatives had a right to sue on behalf of their ancestors, and the defendants offer only a perfunctory rebuttal.   We shall assume without deciding that some of the plaintiffs are legal representatives of their slave ancestors.   These plaintiffs not only escape the objection to standing that the suits seek damages for injuries actually suffered by third parties (the ancestors-no longer third parties, but the real parties in interest, merely represented by the plaintiffs), but have less to prove.   They just have to prove the injury to the ancestors;  the trickle-down question is elided.

In all likelihood it would still be impossible for them to prove injury, requiring as that would connecting the particular slavery transactions in which the defendants were involved to harm to particular slaves.   But in any event, suits complaining about injuries that occurred more than a century and a half ago have been barred for a long time by the applicable state statutes of limitations.   It is true that tolling doctrines can extend the time to sue well beyond the period of limitations-but not to a century and more beyond.   Slaves could not sue, and even after the Thirteenth Amendment became effective in 1865 suits such as these, if brought in the South, would not have received a fair hearing.   However, some northern courts would have been receptive to such suits, and since the defendants are (and were) northern companies, venue would have been proper in those states.   Even in the South, descendants of slaves have had decades of effective access to the courts to seek redress for the wrongs of which they complain.   And it's not as if it had been a deep mystery that corporations were involved in the operation of the slave system.   See, e.g., Edgar J. McManus, Black Bondage in the North 174 (1973);  Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution:  Slavery in the AnteBellum South 397 (1956).

 The second qualification concerns a claim, rather buried in the complaint but not forfeited, that in violation of state fraud or consumer protection law members of the plaintiff classes have bought products or services from some of the defendants that they would not have bought had the defendants not concealed their involvement in slavery.   This claim has nothing to do with ancient violations and indeed would be unaffected if the defendants' dealings with slaveowners had been entirely legal.   It is a complaint of consumers' being deceived because sellers have concealed a material fact.   The injury is the loss incurred by buying something that one wouldn't have bought had one known the truth about the product.

It is true that under no consumer protection law known to us, whether a special statute or a doctrine of the common law of contracts or torts, has a seller a general duty to disclose every discreditable fact about himself that might if disclosed deflect a buyer.   To fulfill such a duty he would have to know much more about his consumers than he possibly could.   But the plaintiffs are charging the defendants with misrepresenting their activities in relation to slavery.   A seller who learns that some class of buyers would not buy his product if they knew it contained some component that he would normally have no duty to disclose, but fearing to lose those buyers falsely represents that the product does not contain the component, is guilty of fraud.   An example would be a manufacturer who represented that his products were made in the United States by companies that employ only union labor, whereas in fact they were made in Third World sweatshops.  

See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal.4th 939, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 45 P.3d 243, 248 (Cal.2003);  Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 219 Ill.2d 182, 302 Ill.Dec. 1, 848 N.E.2d 1, 19 (Ill.2005);  Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 201 Ill.2d 134, 267 Ill.Dec. 14, 776 N.E.2d 151, 154-55 (Ill.2002);  Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1185 (3d Cir.1993).

We do not offer an opinion on the merits of the consumer protection claims, but merely reject the district court's ruling that they are barred at the threshold.

The third qualification concerns the Hurdle suit and is related to the second qualification.   Unlike the other plaintiffs, the Hurdle plaintiffs didn't want to remain in the district court in Chicago.   They wanted to return to the California district court from which their case had been transferred to Chicago for pretrial proceedings, when the pretrial proceedings concluded.   Actually they wanted to return to the California state court from which the defendants had removed their case to the district court, but that is an issue for that district court to resolve if and when the case is returned.  

As we pointed out at the beginning of this opinion, the district court, as the transferee court in a transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, was authorized to rule on a motion to dismiss the Hurdle suit.   But though the district judge in the exercise of that power rightly dismissed so much of that suit as attacks wrongs done to the plaintiffs' ancestors, the Hurdle plaintiffs are among the plaintiffs who have consumer protection claims as well.   As to them there will be further pretrial proceedings, and they will be conducted in Chicago.   So the Hurdle plaintiffs can't go back to California, at least not yet.

To summarize, the district court's dismissal, for want of standing, of all but the claims brought by legal representatives of slaves plus the consumer protection claims is modified to be a dismissal without prejudice, and as so modified is affirmed.  (Barber's suit is dismissed, also without prejudice, for want of diversity.)   The dismissal of the claims brought by the plaintiffs who claim to be legal representatives is affirmed, but on the merits (statute of limitations) and so with prejudice.   The dismissal of the consumer protection claims is reversed and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings on those claims consistent with this opinion.   The district court is authorized to retain those claims for the duration of the litigation, except in the case of the Hurdle plaintiffs, as to whom the court is authorized only to conduct pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407.

Modified And Affirmed, In Part;  Reversed In Part And Remanded.

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