Thursday, February 2, 2017

Introduction SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction, United States Court of Appeals "Fifth Circuit" U.S. Case No. 17-40068 "Louis Charles Hamilton II" Appellant v. Donald John Trump, Sr, 45th President Appellate (Now) appearance Before the Appeal Court”, Property of the United States of America, Slave Negro U.S Federal Judge George Carol Hanks, Jr.

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                                                                 Introduction

Louis Charles Hamilton, II v Donald John Trump Sr. 45th President:
Slavery Servitude of defendant Donald John Trump Sr. 45th President United States of America et al official timeline 

August 20th 1619 – February 7th 2013 upon the Archivist of defendant “United States of America et al 

“Charles A. Barth Director of the Federal Register”, acknowledge receipt of Senate Concurrent Resolution Number 574 Resolution, adopted by the defendant Mississippi Senate on February 16, 1995 and The Mississippi House of Representatives on March 16th 1995, as with this action,
 “Defendant”, The States of Mississippi has ratified the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of the defendant “United States” 

 SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

 SECTION 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. ABOLITION OF SLAVERY Origin and Purpose In 1863, Plaintiff President Lincoln issued an Emancipation Proclamation 

1 declaring, based on his war powers, that within named States and parts of States in rebellion against the United States ‘‘all persons held as slaves within said designated States, and parts of States, are, and henceforward shall be free; . . . .’’ 

The Proclamation did not allude to slaves held in the loyalist States, and moreover, there were questions about the Proclamation’s validity. Not only was there doubt concerning the President’s power to issue his order at all, but also there was a general conviction that its effect would not last beyond the restoration of the seceded States to the Union. 

2 Because the power of Congress was similarly deemed not to run to legislative extirpation of the ‘‘peculiar institution,’’ 

3 a constitutional amendment was then sought. After first failing to muster a two-thirds vote in the House of Representatives, the amendment was forwarded to the States on February 1, 1865, and ratified by the following December 18. 

4 In selecting the text of the Amendment, Congress ‘‘reproduced the historic words of the ordinance of 1787 for the government of the Northwest Territory, and gave them unrestricted application


1 12 Stat. 1267.

 2The legal issues were surveyed in Welling, The Emancipation Proclamation, 130 NO. AMER. REV. 163 (1880). See also J. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 371–404 (rev. ed. 1951).

 3K. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (1956).

4The congressional debate on adoption of the Amendment is conveniently collected in 1 B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES—CIVIL RIGHTS 25–96 (1970).




Louis Charles Hamilton, II v Donald John Trump Sr. 45th President                                          113

Within the United States.’’
 5 By its adoption, Congress intended, said Senator Trumbull, one of its sponsors, to ‘‘take this question [of emancipation] entirely away from the politics of the country. We relieve Congress of sectional strifes . . . .’’ 
6 An early Supreme Court decision, rejecting a contention that the Amendment reached servitude's on property as it did on persons, observed in dicta that the ‘‘word servitude is of larger meaning than slavery, . . . and the obvious purpose was to forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery.’’ While the Court was initially in doubt whether persons other than African Americans could share in the protection afforded by the Amendment, it did continue to say that although
‘‘[N]egro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment may safely be trusted to make it void.’’
 7 ‘‘This Amendment . . . is undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of circumstances. 

By its own unaided force and effect it abolished slavery, and established universal freedom.’’
 8 These words of the Court in 1883 have generally been noncontroversial and have evoked little disagreement in the intervening years. The ‘‘force and effect’’ of the Amendment itself has been invoked only a few times by the Court to strike down state legislation which it considered to have reintroduced servitude of persons, and the Court has not used section 1 of the Amendment against private parties.

 9 In 1968, however, the Court overturned almost century-old precedent and held that Congress may regulate private activity in exercise of its section 2 power to enforce section 1 of the Amendment.


5 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 240 (1911). During the debate, Senator Howard noted that the language was ‘‘the good old Anglo-Saxon language employed by our fathers in the ordinance of 1787, an expression which has been adjudicated upon repeatedly, which is perfectly well understood both by the public and by judicial tribunals. . . .’’ CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1489 (1864).

6 CONG. GLOBE at 1313-14.

7Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69, 71–72 (1873). This general applicability was again stated in Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1906), and confirmed by the result of the peonage cases, discussed under the next topic.

 8 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).


9 In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968), the Court left open the question whether the Amendment itself, unaided by legislation, would reach the ‘‘badges and incidents’’ of slavery not directly associated with involuntary servitude, and it continued to reserve the question in City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125–26 (1981). See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Justice Harlan dissenting). The Court drew back from the possibility in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226–27 (1971).




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