Friday, August 5, 2016

"Notice of Motion to Strike"Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al. Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305. before Honorable Court Justice Kenneth Michael Hoyt U.S. Docket No. 4:2016-CV-00964


In The United States District Court

For The Southern District of Texas

Houston Division

Slave Negro Louis Charles Hamilton II

U.S. Docket No.4:2016-CV-00964

Further appearances                                                        “Motion to Strike”

“PLANTIFFS”                                                   Defendant United States of America et al

Vs.                                                                  Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al.

And Timothy Hurdle, et al.

United States of America et al                        Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305.

Defendant(s) et al                                                Decided: December 13, 2006

"Negro Slaves “PLANTIFFS” collective official Notice of Motion to Strike Defendant(s) United States of America et al all “Entire Reply(s) collectively in the matter as described:

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

IN RE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al.

Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305., Decided: December 13, 2006

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and POSNER and MANION, Circuit Judges. Bruce I. Afran (argued), Carl J. Mayer, Princeton, NJ, Roger S. Wareham (argued), Wareham Law Office, Brooklyn, NY, Benjamin O. Nwoye, Nwoye & Associates, Chicago, IL, Barbara K. Ratliff (argued), Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Andrew R. McGaan,

 Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL, Owen C. Pell (argued), White & Case, New York, NY, Andrew L. Sandler, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom Llp, Washington, DC, Alan S. Madans (argued), Rothschild, Barry & Myers, Chicago, IL, Thomas F. Gardner, Jones Day, Chicago, IL, Heidi K. Hubbard, Williams & Connolly, Washington, DC, Christina M. Tchen, Ryan J. Rohlfsen, Skadden, Arps, Slate,

 Meagher & Flom Llp, Chicago, IL, James A. Fletcher, Fletcher & Sippel, Chicago, IL, Michael T. Novak, Homewood, IL, Debra Torres, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York, NY, John H. Beisner, O'Melveny & Meyers, Washington, DC, Maya M. Eckstein, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, VA, for Defendants-Appellees.

 Nine suits were filed in federal district courts around the country seeking monetary relief under both federal and state law for harms stemming from the enslavement of black people in America.  

A tenth suit, by the Hurdle group of plaintiffs, makes similar claims but was filed in a state court and then removed by the defendants to a federal district court.  

 The Multidistrict Litigation Panel consolidated all the suits in the district court in Chicago for pretrial proceedings.  28 U.S.C. § 1407.  

Once there, the plaintiffs (all but the Hurdle plaintiffs, about whom more shortly) filed a consolidated complaint, and since venue in Chicago was proper and in any event not objected to by the parties (other than the Hurdle group, whose objection we consider later in the opinion), the district court was unquestionably authorized, notwithstanding Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 28, 118 S.Ct. 956, 140 L.Ed.2d 62 (1998), to determine the merits of the suit.  

In re Carbon Dioxide Industry Antitrust Litigation, 229 F.3d 1321, 1325-27 (11th Cir.2000);  cf.  Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68, 60 S.Ct. 153, 84 L.Ed. 167 (1939).

 We are also persuaded that a district court to which a case is transferred under section 1407 can rule on a motion to dismiss the case even if the plaintiff has not agreed to let the court decide the merits.  In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1230-31 (9th Cir.2006);  

15 Charles W. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3866 (2006).   While it is true that the Supreme Court held in the Lexecon case that a transfer under section 1407 does not authorize the district court to retain the case for trial, the Court left open the question whether pretrial proceedings, which are the business (the exclusive business) of the transferee court, include rulings on dispositive pretrial motions, such as motions to dismiss.  

But the Court hinted that they do include them.  Section 1407(a) states that “each action so transferred [by the multidistrict litigation panel] shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated.”  

Concerning this “provision of § 1407(a) limiting the Panel's remand obligation to cases not ‘previously terminated’ during the pretrial period,” the Court remarked that “this exception to the Panel's remand obligation indicates that the Panel is not meant to issue ceremonial remand orders in cases already concluded by summary judgment, say, or dismissal,” 523 U.S. at 37, 118 S.Ct. 956 (emphasis added)-implying that the transferee court can indeed decide the entire case at the pretrial stage.

And rightly so.  

The duty to conduct the pretrial proceedings in a multidistrict litigation entails the transferee court's ruling on a host of pretrial motions, many of which, whether or not formally dispositive, can shape the litigation decisively.  

 There is no reason to exclude from the court's authority rulings on motions to dismiss-especially a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is no federal jurisdiction.   It would be odd to require a court to transfer a case to another federal court when it was apparent that neither court had jurisdiction over the case.

Were it not for the Hurdle suit, we wouldn't have to decide whether the district judge could have dismissed the transferred suits had the parties not agreed, by filing a new complaint, to his retaining them after completion of pretrial proceedings.   But the Hurdle plaintiffs did not agree, so we cannot duck the question.

The suits are a series of mostly identical class actions on behalf of all Americans descended from slaves with whom one or more of the defendants or their corporate predecessors may have been directly or indirectly involved.   The consolidated complaint (the Hurdle complaint is similar, so need not be discussed separately) alleges the following facts, for which we do not vouch, but merely summarize, the complaint having been dismissed before the truth or falsity of the allegations was determined.

The defendants are companies or the successors to companies that provided services, such as transportation, finance, and insurance, to slaveowners.  

At least two of the defendants were slaveowners;  the predecessor of one of the bank defendants once accepted 13,000 slaves as collateral on loans and ended up owning 1,250 of them when the borrowers defaulted, and the predecessor of another defendant ended up owning 346 slaves, also as a consequence of a borrower's default.  

Even before the Thirteenth Amendment, slavery was illegal in the northern states, and the complaint charges that the defendants were violating the laws of those states in transacting with slaveowners.  

It also claims that there were occasional enslavements long after the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and that some of the defendants were complicit in those too.   By way of relief, the complaint seeks disgorgement to the class members of the profits that the defendants obtained from their dealings with slaveowners.

 The legal basis for the plaintiffs' federal claim is 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which provides that “all citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”  

See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 119-20, 101 S.Ct. 1584, 67 L.Ed.2d 769 (1981);  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968).   A claim based on a federal statute invokes the federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts.   But since most of the conduct of which the plaintiffs complain occurred prior to the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, and indeed prior to the Civil War,

 section 1982 does not provide a sturdy basis for the retention of federal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' nonfederal claims.   A frivolous federal law claim cannot successfully invoke federal jurisdiction.  Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974);  Turner/Ozanne v. Hyman/Power, 111 F.3d 1312, 1317 (7th Cir.1997);  Crowley Cutlery Co. v. United States, 849 F.2d 273, 276-77 (7th Cir.1988);  

Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654-55 (4th Cir.1999).   So it cannot provide a perch on which to seat nonfederal claims in the name of the federal courts' supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.   And very few of the plaintiffs have a nonfrivolous claim under section 1982.

But with one exception, all the nonfederal claims are within the federal diversity jurisdiction and so do not require a federal-law handle.   The exception is Richard E. Barber, Sr.'s suit; for both he and Brown Brothers, one of the defendants in his suit, are citizens of New Jersey.  

Since he thus cannot invoke diversity as a basis for federal jurisdiction and does not have a colorable section 1982 claim (in fact he makes no section 1982 claim at all), his suit must be dismissed for want of federal jurisdiction without regard to the other challenges that the defendants mount to federal jurisdiction over these suits.

The district judge ruled that by virtue of both the political-question doctrine and the requirement of standing to sue derived from Article III of the Constitution, there was no federal jurisdiction over any of the suits and that in any event they had no merit because the applicable statutes of limitations had lapsed and anyway the complaint failed to state a claim.

  375 F.Supp.2d 721 (N.D.Ill.2005).   The dismissal was with prejudice.   But if the judge was correct that there is no jurisdiction, he should have dismissed the suits without prejudice and thus not decided their merits.

 The political-question doctrine bars the federal courts from adjudicating disputes that the Constitution has been interpreted to entrust to other branches of the federal government.   The earliest and still the best example is Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 12 L.Ed. 581 (1849).   Rhode Island had not adopted a new constitution after the break with England, but instead continued to govern itself under its colonial charter.  

Restive citizens convened a constitutional convention not authorized by the charter.   The convention adopted a new constitution to which the charter government refused to submit, precipitating rebellion and the establishment in 1842 of a rival state government.   The Supreme Court refused to decide which of the two competing governments was the legitimate one.   It would have been exceedingly difficult to gather and assess, by the methods of litigation, the facts needed for such a decision.  Id. at 41-42.  

It would have been even more difficult to formulate a legal concept of revolutionary legitimacy to guide the decision.   Formulating and enforcing a remedy would have presented additional stumbling blocks.   The case simply exceeded judicial capabilities.   So the Court left the matter to the President, to whom Congress had delegated the duty of resolving it.  Id. at 43;  see also Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District, 281 U.S. 74, 79-80, 50 S.Ct. 228, 74 L.Ed. 710 (1930);  Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133-50, 32 S.Ct. 224, 56 L.Ed. 377 (1912).

A case that sought reparations for the wrong of slavery would encounter similar obstacles, but the plaintiffs have been careful to cast the litigation as a quest for conventional legal relief.   All they are asking the federal judiciary to do is to apply state law (plus the one federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1982) to the defendants' conduct.  

 They face, of course, formidable obstacles, quite apart from the severely limited applicability of section 1982.   To name just one of those obstacles, it is highly unlikely that antebellum laws in northern states were intended to confer financial or other benefits on the twenty-first century descendants of slaves.  

But the obstacles to the vindication of the plaintiffs' legal claims have the form at least of conventional defenses to a lawsuit.   If one or more of the defendants violated a state law by transporting slaves in 1850, and the plaintiffs can establish standing to sue, prove the violation despite its antiquity, establish that the law was intended to provide a remedy (either directly or by providing the basis for a common law action for conspiracy, conversion, or restitution) to lawfully enslaved persons or their descendants, identify their ancestors, quantify damages incurred, and persuade the court to toll the statute of limitations, there would be no further obstacle to the grant of relief.

 But we think that the district court was correct, with some exceptions to be noted, in ruling that the plaintiffs lack standing to sue.   It would be impossible by the methods of litigation to connect the defendants' alleged misconduct with the financial and emotional harm that the plaintiffs claim to have suffered as a result of that conduct.  

See generally James R. Hackney, Jr., “The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations:  Ideological Conflict, African American Reparations, Tort Causation, and the Case for Social Welfare Transformation,” 84 B.U.L.Rev. 1193 (2004).  

For example, Aetna is alleged to have written several insurance policies on slaves in the 1850s in violation of state law applicable to the company, and to have obtained premiums from the insureds-the slaveowners-that (we'll assume) exceeded the cost of the insurance to Aetna (its expenses plus the payment of proceeds if the insured event came to pass).  

 The plaintiffs argue that Aetna's net income from this insurance was a wrongful profit that the company should be ordered to restore to the plaintiff classes.

If the insurance business was competitive back then (and the plaintiffs do not argue that it was not), Aetna did not profit in an economic sense from the transactions of which the plaintiffs complain (its “profit” would just be its cost of equity capital), and in any event it would have distributed any profits from the transactions to its shareholders long ago.  

All that to one side, there is a fatal disconnect between the victims and the plaintiffs.   When a person is wronged he can seek redress, and if he wins, his descendants may benefit, but the wrong to the ancestor is not a wrong to the descendants.  

For if it were, then (problems of proof to one side) statutes of limitations would be toothless.   A person whose ancestor had been wronged a thousand years ago could sue on the ground that it was a continuing wrong and he is one of the victims.

The plaintiffs introduce another claim of injury by asserting that had the defendants refused to violate their own states' laws by doing business with slaveowners, there would have been less slavery because the refusal would have been tantamount to subjecting the slaveowners to a partial boycott.  

That would have raised their costs, and, by making slavery less profitable, might have reduced the amount of it.  (“Might,” not “would,” because the higher costs might simply have depressed the price of a slave.)  

And had there been less slavery, the argument continues, some of the ancestors of the members of the plaintiff classes would not have been slaves, but instead free laborers, and they would have had some disposable income part of which they might have saved rather than spent, and left to their heirs.

But this causal chain is too long and has too many weak links for a court to be able to find that the defendants' conduct harmed the plaintiffs at all, let alone in an amount that could be estimated without the wildest speculation.  

 It is impossible to determine how much, if any, less slavery there would have been had the defendants not done business with slaveowners, what effect a diminution of slavery would have had on bequests by ancestors of the class members, and how much of the value of those bequests would have trickled down to the class members.

Suppose a class member could prove that he was descended from one of the slaves insured by Aetna or transported by the Union Pacific Railroad (another defendant) or bought with money lent to the buyer by the predecessor of the JPMorgan Chase Bank (still another defendant), and that these transactions were illegal and that the descendants of slaves are among the people whom the laws were intended to protect.

  Had he not been insured or transported or bought with a bank loan, how would the financial welfare of his remote descendant be affected?   Would the ancestor have been freed, or perhaps never enslaved in the first place?  

 As the plaintiffs stress, slavery was profitable;  is it conceivable that slaveholders would have been unable to insure, transport, and finance the purchase of slaves if northern companies had been excluded from the provision of these services or had refused to violate their states' laws that sought to keep them from providing the services?

Even if compliance with those laws would have curtailed slavery and even if it could be shown (it could not be) that as a result of that hypothetical curtailment a plaintiff's remote ancestor would not have been a slave but instead a free laborer, how could the wages that the ancestor would have earned as a free laborer be shown to have influenced the wealth of his remote descendant?  

Economists actually study such issues, under the rubric of “intergenerational mobility,” see, e.g., Kerwin Kofi Charles & Erik Hurst, “The Correlation of Wealth Across Generations,” 111 J. Pol. Econ. 1155 (2003);  Keith N. Hylton, “The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations:  Slavery and Tort Law,” 84 B.U.L.Rev. 1209, 1239-41 (2004), but these are studies of aggregate effects, not of the effects of particular acts, affecting particular individuals, on the wealth of specific remote descendants.   There is no way to determine that a given black American today is worse off by a specific, calculatable sum of money (or monetized emotional harm) as a result of the conduct of one or more of the defendants.

 Nor are the problems of measuring and tracing elided by recasting the relief sought as restitution rather than damages.   Restitution-the transfer of the wrongdoer's gain to his victim-is an alternative to damages, the monetization of the victim's loss.

 ConFold Pacific, Inc. v. Polaris Industries, Inc., 433 F.3d 952, 957-58 (7th Cir.2006);  Charter Communications Entertainment I, DST v. Burdulis, 460 F.3d 168, 182 (1st Cir.2006);  Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 944 (8th Cir.1999);  1 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies § 4. 1, pp. 551, 555 (2d ed.1993).

  It is a sensible remedy for egregious misconduct because it makes the conduct worthless to the defendant by taking away his profit even if it exceeds the loss to the plaintiff.   But it presupposes an injury-it is a remedy for a legal wrong-and there is no way in which to determine what if any injury the defendants inflicted on the members of the plaintiff classes.

And again, if there were a legal wrong, it would not be a wrong to any living persons unless they were somehow the authorized representatives to bring suits on behalf of their enslaved ancestors. With some exceptions to be noted, the plaintiffs are suing to redress harms to third parties (their ancestors), without being authorized to sue on behalf of those parties.

  It is like a suit by a descendant of a Union soldier, killed in battle, against a Civil War era gun manufacturer still in business that sold guns to the Confederacy in violation of federal law.   A federal court could not entertain the suit because the plaintiff would be unable to prove a harm to an interest of his (such as his bank account) that the law protects.

  E.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818-19, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997);  Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739-40, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972).   It is possible that had the ancestor not died when he did he would have become a wealthy person and left bequests so immense that his remote descendant, the plaintiff, would have inherited more money from his parents or grandparents than he actually did.  

 But that is too speculative an inquiry to provide a basis for a federal suit.   See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 225-26, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003);  Branton v. FCC, 993 F.2d 906, 909 (D.C.Cir.1993).

The two cases just cited, and others, treat remoteness as a limitation on Article III standing.   Still other cases treat it as a nonjurisdictional limitation on who may sue in federal court-but still a limitation.  Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268-69, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992);  Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476-77, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982);  Israel Travel Advisory Service, Inc. v. Israel Identity Tours, Inc., 61 F.3d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir.1995);  Allegheny General Hospital v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 435 (3d Cir.2000).  

 Another group of cases would deem the suit barred by Article III because one function of the Article III standing doctrine is to prevent parties with slight interests in a litigation from crowding those who have the main interests.  Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982);  

Morlan v. Universal Guaranty Life Insurance Co., 298 F.3d 609, 621 (7th Cir.2002);  Illinois Department of Transportation v. Hinson, 122 F.3d 370, 373 (7th Cir.1997);  People Organized for Welfare & Employment Rights (P.O.W. E.R.) v. Thompson, 727 F.2d 167, 173 (7th Cir.1984);  Abraham v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., 461 F.3d 1249, 1268 (10th Cir.2006).  

 In our hypothetical case of the Union soldier, the litigant with the paramount interest in the case would be his estate and the damages that the estate could recover would include whatever amount of money he would have wanted his descendant to inherit.   If the descendant could sue the tortfeasor directly for that amount (or for the tortfeasor's profit, in a suit for restitution), there would be either double recovery or an impossible task of allocating the monetary recovery between the descendant and the estate.

 A few of the plaintiff's claims, however, as we noted at the outset, are claims of subjection to involuntary servitude after it was outlawed by the Thirteenth Amendment, and indeed into the twentieth century.   Cain Wall, Sr. claims that “during the time that [he] was enslaved”-which he contends extended into the 1960s-“one or more of the defendants were doing business in Mississippi or Louisiana.  

 Some of the defendants had reason to know of the enslavement of Cain Wall and yet failed to take steps to eliminate same, while they continued to inure benefits from the illegal, but sanctioned system of servitude post-emancipation.”   But there is no claim that the defendants subjected Wall (or any other class member) to involuntary servitude or did anything to perpetuate or exacerbate his condition.  

 The claim is that they took no steps to free him.  

 The briefs suggest no basis for thinking that there is any kind of Good Samaritan legal duty to eliminate a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment committed by someone else.

 The limitations that Article III places on the right to sue in a federal court require us to affirm (though striking “with prejudice”), on the basis of lack of standing, the greater part of the district court's judgment.   But there are three qualifications.   First, although most of the plaintiffs and class members are suing as descendants rather than as representatives of their ancestors' estates authorized to sue on those ancestors' behalf, a few do claim to be suing in such a representative capacity.  

 It is highly unlikely that the estate of anyone who died a century or more ago, or indeed more than half a century ago (for although many former slaves survived into the twentieth century, very few would still have been alive 50 years ago, which is to say in 1956, 91 years after the end of the Civil War), has not yet been closed.   But the district judge accepted that the purported representatives had a right to sue on behalf of their ancestors, and the defendants offer only a perfunctory rebuttal.  

 We shall assume without deciding that some of the plaintiffs are legal representatives of their slave ancestors.   These plaintiffs not only escape the objection to standing that the suits seek damages for injuries actually suffered by third parties (the ancestors-no longer third parties, but the real parties in interest, merely represented by the plaintiffs), but have less to prove.   They just have to prove the injury to the ancestors;  the trickle-down question is elided.

In all likelihood it would still be impossible for them to prove injury, requiring as that would connecting the particular slavery transactions in which the defendants were involved to harm to particular slaves.   But in any event, suits complaining about injuries that occurred more than a century and a half ago have been barred for a long time by the applicable state statutes of limitations.  

 It is true that tolling doctrines can extend the time to sue well beyond the period of limitations-but not to a century and more beyond.   Slaves could not sue, and even after the Thirteenth Amendment became effective in 1865 suits such as these, if brought in the South, would not have received a fair hearing.  

 However, some northern courts would have been receptive to such suits, and since the defendants are (and were) northern companies, venue would have been proper in those states.   Even in the South, descendants of slaves have had decades of effective access to the courts to seek redress for the wrongs of which they complain.   And it's not as if it had been a deep mystery that corporations were involved in the operation of the slave system.   See, e.g., Edgar J. McManus, Black Bondage in the North 174 (1973);  Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution:  Slavery in the AnteBellum South 397 (1956).

 The second qualification concerns a claim, rather buried in the complaint but not forfeited, that in violation of state fraud or consumer protection law members of the plaintiff classes have bought products or services from some of the defendants that they would not have bought had the defendants not concealed their involvement in slavery.  

This claim has nothing to do with ancient violations and indeed would be unaffected if the defendants' dealings with slaveowners had been entirely legal.   It is a complaint of consumers' being deceived because sellers have concealed a material fact.   The injury is the loss incurred by buying something that one wouldn't have bought had one known the truth about the product.

It is true that under no consumer protection law known to us, whether a special statute or a doctrine of the common law of contracts or torts, has a seller a general duty to disclose every discreditable fact about himself that might if disclosed deflect a buyer.  

 To fulfill such a duty he would have to know much more about his consumers than he possibly could.   But the plaintiffs are charging the defendants with misrepresenting their activities in relation to slavery.  

 A seller who learns that some class of buyers would not buy his product if they knew it contained some component that he would normally have no duty to disclose, but fearing to lose those buyers falsely represents that the product does not contain the component, is guilty of fraud.  

 An example would be a manufacturer who represented that his products were made in the United States by companies that employ only union labor, whereas in fact they were made in Third World sweatshops.   See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal.4th 939, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 45 P.3d 243, 248 (Cal.2003);  Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 219 Ill.2d 182, 302 Ill.Dec. 1, 848 N.E.2d 1, 19 (Ill.2005);  Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 201 Ill.2d 134, 267 Ill.Dec. 14, 776 N.E.2d 151, 154-55 (Ill.2002);  Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1185 (3d Cir.1993).

We do not offer an opinion on the merits of the consumer protection claims, but merely reject the district court's ruling that they are barred at the threshold.

The third qualification concerns the Hurdle suit and is related to the second qualification.   Unlike the other plaintiffs, the Hurdle plaintiffs didn't want to remain in the district court in Chicago.   They wanted to return to the California district court from which their case had been transferred to Chicago for pretrial proceedings, when the pretrial proceedings concluded.  

 Actually they wanted to return to the California state court from which the defendants had removed their case to the district court, but that is an issue for that district court to resolve if and when the case is returned.   As we pointed out at the beginning of this opinion, the district court, as the transferee court in a transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, was authorized to rule on a motion to dismiss the Hurdle suit.  

 But though the district judge in the exercise of that power rightly dismissed so much of that suit as attacks wrongs done to the plaintiffs' ancestors, the Hurdle plaintiffs are among the plaintiffs who have consumer protection claims as well.   As to them there will be further pretrial proceedings, and they will be conducted in Chicago.   So the Hurdle plaintiffs can't go back to California, at least not yet.

To summarize, the district court's dismissal, for want of standing, of all but the claims brought by legal representatives of slaves plus the consumer protection claims is modified to be a dismissal without prejudice, and as so modified is affirmed.  (Barber's suit is dismissed, also without prejudice, for want of diversity.)   The dismissal of the claims brought by the plaintiffs who claim to be legal representatives is affirmed, but on the merits (statute of limitations) and so with prejudice.  

 The dismissal of the consumer protection claims is reversed and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings on those claims consistent with this opinion.   The district court is authorized to retain those claims for the duration of the litigation, except in the case of the Hurdle plaintiffs, as to whom the court is authorized only to conduct pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407.

Modified And Affirmed, In Part;  Reversed In Part And Remanded.

POSNER, Circuit Judge.

Pursuant to defendant own rules of governing laws namelyRule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Motion to Strike Defendant(s) United States of America et al, respond and reply, filed above being official Strike “Entire Reply/Respond pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Respectfully Appearance Slave Negro (Pro Se Plaintiff) Louis Charles Hamilton II herein (USN) #2712 before “Honorable Court Justice” Honorable Court Justice Kenneth Michael Hoyt

            Comes Now Slave Negro Pro Se Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II” United States of America Navy hereinMotion to Strike Defendant(s) “Entire Reply/Respond,

IN RE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al.

Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305., Decided: December 13, 2006

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and POSNER and MANION, Circuit Judges. Bruce I. Afran (argued), Carl J. Mayer, Princeton, NJ, Roger S. Wareham (argued), Wareham Law Office, Brooklyn, NY, Benjamin O. Nwoye, Nwoye & Associates, Chicago, IL, Barbara K. Ratliff (argued), Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Andrew R. McGaan,

Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL, Owen C. Pell (argued), White & Case, New York, NY, Andrew L. Sandler, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom Llp,

Washington, DC, Alan S. Madans (argued), Rothschild, Barry & Myers, Chicago, IL, Thomas F. Gardner, Jones Day, Chicago, IL, Heidi K. Hubbard, Williams & Connolly, Washington, DC, Christina M. Tchen, Ryan J. Rohlfsen, Skadden, Arps, Slate,

 Meagher & Flom Llp, Chicago, IL, James A. Fletcher, Fletcher & Sippel, Chicago, IL, Michael T. Novak, Homewood, IL, Debra Torres, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York, NY, John H. Beisner, O'Melveny & Meyers, Washington, DC, Maya M. Eckstein, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, VA, for Defendants-Appellees.

As follows are not valid or legally binding 1000% officially filed on the court records with accompanying

Notice of Motion to Vacate Judgement and “Motion to Vacate Judgment Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305., Decided: December 13, 2006 being listed US Case filed before their fraudulent “Slave Regime” Whites Supremacy control in “Support of “Slave PLAINTIFFS” and “Pro Se Slave Plaintiff” Louis Charles Hamilton II” MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT”S “United States of America et al (RICO) enterprise endeavor “Racket” Judicial Fraud illegal respond as further stating to wit:

On or about the 8th day of November 1961 having Slave Negro Pro Se Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II” United States of America Navy #2712 officially born into “Slavery Servitude of the Defendant “United States of America”, ‘Civil Rights” Attorney Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, born in the year 1966 et al., being also born into

“Slavery Servitude of the Defendant “United States of America”, all “legal records”, of her case United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit., IN RE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al., file is fully forever

“Plaintiffs exhibit (A) enforced completely against Defendant(s) United States of America et al”, and filed as exhibit, current with the “Clerk of Court” before this present case U.S. Docket No.4:2016-CV-00964 and released said “Judgment”  herein filed official “

Notice of Motion to Vacate Judgement and “Motion to Vacate Judgment of

United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.

IN RE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al.Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305., Decided: December 13, 2006 being listed in direct violation of

18 U.S. Code § 1028 - Fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents, authentication features, and information

And 18 U.S. Code § 1002 - Possession of false papers to defraud United States (RICO) Judicial Fraud US Case filed before their fraudulent “Slave Regime” defendant “United States of America” committed to the same as “Legal Circumstances” of RICO Judicial Obstruction of Justice Fraud of the Defendant “United States of America” et al Judicial Branch of Government” past, present and future, being described as the same

Slave Negro Pro Se Plaintiff “Louis Charles Hamilton II” United States of America Navy #2712 from “custody of Slavery servitude” of defendant (USA) on or about February 7th 2013 when Mississippi, officially free all 44.5 Million Negro Slaves including Chief Plaintiff “Pro Se Slave (Hamilton) appearance before the Honorable Court all cases filed:

  1. U.S. Docket No. 3:1999-CV-00011
  2. U.S. Docket No. 4:2011-CV-04420
  3. U. S. Docket No. 4: 1998-CV-00110
  4. 3.   U. S. Docket No. 2010-CV-02709
  5. U. S. Docket No. 2011-CV-00510
  6. U. S. Docket No. 2011-CV-04256
  7. U. S. Docket No. 2001-CV-00095
  8. U. S. Docket No. 2011-CV-00240
  9. U. S. Docket No. 2001-CV-00036
  10. U. S. Docket No. 2011-CV-00005
  11. U. S. Docket No.  2002-CV-00034
  12. U. S. Docket No. 2010-CV-02220
  13. U. S. Docket No. 2009-CV-00496
  14. U. S. Docket No. 2009-CV-07029
  15. U. S. Docket No. 2010-CV-00055
  16. U. S. Docket No.  2001-CV-00100
  17. U. S. Docket No. 2011-CV-00442
  18. U. S. Docket No. 2007-CV-01510
  19.   U. S. Docket No. 2009-CV-00954
  20. U. S. Docket No.  2009-CV-00289
  21. U. S. Docket No.  2012-CV-01014
  22. U. S. Docket No.   1999-CV-00011
  23. U. S. Docket No.  2010-CV-00808
  24. U. S. Docket No.  2001-CV-00069
  25.  U. S. Docket No.  2011-CV-00122
  26. U. S. Docket No. 2012-CV-00053
  27. U. S. Docket No. 2012-CV- 00038
  28.  U. S. Docket No. 2012-CV-00977

Being “Official” declared, Affirmed, and hostile dispute a defendant (USA) own governing laws requires “Prima Facial Tort in Law, that all described above Judgments 1-28 and

IN RE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al. Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305., being Vacate Judgment fully“ Voided” unconstitutional, fraudulent, based 100% illegally imposed by “Judicial Fraud of The US Courts and the laws derived of the

 United States of America et al from the exact date of August 20th 1619 - to the exact date of February 7th 2013 “pursuant” (MIA) 13th and 14th amendment provision by congress insurance equality to the governing Laws of the“Infamous Slave Trade Defendant “United States of America” et al

And equality under all of defendant (USA) governing rules of The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) governs civil procedure (i.e. for civil lawsuits) in United States district (federal) courts. The FRCP are promulgated by the United States Supreme Court pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, and then the United States Congress has 7 months to veto the rules promulgated or they become part of the FRCP.

The Court's modifications to the rules are usually based upon recommendations from the Judicial Conference of the United States, the federal judiciary's internal policy-making body. Although federal courts are required to apply the substantive law of the states as rules of decision in cases where state law is in question, the federal courts almost always use the FRCP as their rules of procedure. (States may determine their own rules, which apply in state courts, although most states have adopted rules that are based on the FRCP.)

The Rules, established in 1938, replaced the earlier procedures under the Federal Equity Rules and the Conformity Act (28 USC 724 (1934)) merging the procedure for cases, in law and equity, The Conformity Act required that procedures in suits at law conform to state practice usually the Field Code and common law pleading systems. Significant revisions have been made to the FRCP in 1948, 1963, 1966, 1970, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1993, 2000, and 2006.

(The FRCP contains a notes section that details the changes of each revision since 1938, explaining the rationale behind the language).


The King Elite Klansmen Rules, established in 1938, also established “Nigger Slaves Plaintiff (Hamilton) and collectively (Millions) of Negros Race similarly the same were on or about The Rules, established in 1938, replaced the earlier procedures under the Federal Equity Rules and the Conformity Act (28 USC 724 (1934) merging the procedure for cases, in law and equity,

The Conformity Act required that procedures in suits at law conform to state practice usually the Field Code and common law pleading systems. Significant revisions have been made to the FRCP in 1948, 1963, 1966, 1970, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1993, 2000, and 2006

 still under defendant (USA) 1619 continual (3) “ Black Code Laws, Jim Crow Laws and official “Slavery Servitude” as United States of America defendant own governing laws requires “Prima Facial Tort in Law, that all described

response by each and every defendant collectively 1000% official under law fully “Voided” unconstitutional, fraudulent, based 100% illegally imposed by (RICO) past acts of “Judicial Fraud of The US Courts and the laws derived of the United States of America et al from the exact date of August 20th 1619 - to the exact date of February 7th 2013 “pursuant” (MIA) 13th and 14th amendment provision by congress insurance equality to the governing Laws of the

“Infamous Slave Trade Defendant “United States of America” et al, which each defendant seeking salvation under immunity in US case law citing, US Amendment constitutional provision, US criminal case laws citing, RICO act,  The Rules, established in 1938, replaced the earlier procedures under the

Federal Equity Rules and the Conformity Act (28 USC 724 (1934)with all claimedSignificant revisions have been thereoffrom the exact date of August 20th 1619 - to the exact date of February 7th 2013 “made to the FRCP in 1948, 1963, 1966, 1970, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1993, 2000, and 2006, all being “Motion to Strike”

Defendant America et al grand scheme involving the continual criminal acts of

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (forced labor), 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor), “Slavery Servitude” money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 1957, “Slavery Servitude” money laundering statutes, RICO statute (18 U.S.C. § 1961(1),,, very 1000% 1790- 2016 (226) years control, in an ongoing future by the “Judicial Branch of Government of Defendant

“United States of America” et al and the very Honorable Knights of The Klu Klux Klansmen Whites Supremacy Absolutes unfetter 1000% biases

“Whites Only Klansmen terrorist controlled Immunity Sovereign Slave Regimes “Whites Supremacy” of The 1790 Naturalization Act reserves naturalized citizenship for whites only in 2016 (December) United States of America as

“Niggers Need Not Apply ever, in the “Sovereignty Nation of “United States of America, Pursuant to: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), official Slavery Servitude United States of America as such this Pro Se Plaintiff “Nigger/Negro

And IN RE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al.Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305.,

 Need Not ever Apply to said

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) govern civil procedure (i.e. for civil lawsuits) in United States district (federal) courts.

“Regardless worthless white trash congress supremacy for the Republican (KKK) and prosperity of “Whites Only” America (Bogus) discriminatory with all Significant revisions have been made after 1938 to the FRCP in 1948, 1963, 1966, 1970, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1993, 2000, and 2006.

 Once again being “Motion to Strike” all case laws cited in IN RE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al.Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305., lieu thereof, being “Presented by Defendant(s) each respond and reply,

Pro Se Slave Plaintiff (Hamilton) and Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al collectively still Slavery Servitude Subject, from November 8th 1961 – February 7th 2013, when “Defendant” United States of America Mississippi finally as required by (MIA) 13th Amendment free “Nigger/Negro Pro Se Plaintiff on or about February 7th 2013 and as being “Property and a Official” Slave “Motion to Strike” each reply, as defective,  

Voided, and 1000% unconstitutional amendment provide therein, false material subject matter regarding “Slavery Rights of Plaintiff, defective Constitutional State of Texas laws, and Federal laws, all derived in a Slave Regimes” of Defendant Whites Supremacy and all “Slave Laws derive since August 20th 1619 - February 7th 2013

AS such “Motion to Strike Defendant(s) reply in each entirely as before Law and equity “Slaves needing not apply to said governing laws of a “Slave Regime” in the exact time frame of August 20th 1619 - February 7th 2013further as the defendant “United States of America “Own” legal doings, “Motion to Strike” is adequate under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

 (FRCP) govern civil procedure (i.e. for civil lawsuits) in United States district (federal) courts, defendant case laws, constitutional laws, and State of Texas Laws cited and contained there in each reply fully from the effect date of such Laws, August 20th 1619 – February 7th 2013, filed in

U.S. Docket No. 4:2016-CV-00964 Respectfully Appearance Slave Negro (Pro Se Plaintiff) Louis Charles Hamilton II herein (USN) #2712 before “Honorable Court Justice” Honorable Court Justice Kenneth Michael Hoyt on  its whole face reply being defective legal non-effect in law and equity worthless legal trash in dealing with

“Slaves” having no citizenship rights of the 14th amendment in 2016 (December) as being required any law of defendant “United States of America” et al collectively submitted in said written reply in the exact time frame of August 20th 1619 – February 7th 2013 al Pro Se Plaintiff (Hamilton) USN Veteran herein, and

Presidential First Slaves Nigger (Obama) Family of the defendant of the “United States of America, and all 44.5 Million (Nigger Slaves Plaintiffs) having been by Defendant own occurred “Motion” to Strike” each reply as described herein and further Required “Oral Argument” on anOrder to Show Cause why “Motion to Strike” against each defendant entire reply/response, being levy and made entry into the record as

Have no legal standing as Identified above and each described Federal Court case laws, Amendment of the Constitution, Texas States Laws, US Court Case Citing fully submitted in the Time-Frame of August 20th 1619 – Mississippi Free Slave Negro Pro Se Plaintiff Veteran (Hamilton) #2712 born on November 8th 1961 from Slavery Servitude”, of the defendant “United States of America”, as such Slavery officially being continual till February 7th 2013 regarding

IN RE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al.Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305.,



Judical Grand Fraud committed against “Civil Rights Attorney of Record Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al in a (RICO) corruption Fraud None- disclosure  “, for and additional (75) years Slaves of America grand scheme involving the continual criminal acts of

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (forced labor), 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor), “Slavery Servitude” money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 1957, “Slavery Servitude” money laundering statutes, RICO statute (18 U.S.C. § 1961(1),,, very 1000% 1790- 2016 (226) years control, in an ongoing future by the

 “Judicial Branch of Government of Defendant all Said contain fully “Motion to Strike” invalid, null, ineffective, nonviable, useless, worthless, and officially in 2016 (December) on behalf of no-citizenship continual being official “Property and No Citizenship/Slave Pursuant to: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), being in “Human Rights Violation

official Slavery Servitude Subject Abused PLANTIFFS of Defendant collectively United States of America et al as “Niggers/Negro Plaintiff Pro Se Respectfully assert official Laws being denied to said Nigger/Negro Slave on or aboutthe Time-Frame of August 20th 1619 – Mississippi Free Slave Negro Pro Se Plaintiff Veteran (Hamilton) #2712 born on November 8th 1961 from Slavery Servitude”, of the defendant “United States of America”, as such Slavery officially being continual till February 7th 2013

Required Need Not ever Apply to said Slave Trade official lost voided herein  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) govern civil procedure (i.e. for civil lawsuits) in United States district (federal) courts.

 Whites Supremacy Slave Regime sealed under The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) White Man Only Slave endless Rules, established on or about 1938, 1948, 1963, 1966, 1970, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1993, 2000, and 2006, being “Motion to Strike” in its entire defense directed at the Pro Se Slave Plaintiff Louis Charles Hamilton II USN #2712 as a descendant of

August 20th 1619 since (Negro) Slave was born on November 8th 1961 thee official (FRCP) govern civil procedure (i.e. for civil lawsuits) being laws ruled over “Slaves whom have no rights, no citizenship which officially been denaturationand such Fraud, in destroyed constitutional 13th and 14th amendments  (MIA) with the official (FRCP) govern civil procedure, having no 14th amendment provide same equality for (Pro Se) Negro Hamilton held hostage in a defendant “United States of America a Slave regime, in 2016 (December)

Conclusion

Animal rights is the idea that some, or all, non-human animals are entitled to the possession of their own lives and that their most basic interests—such as the need to avoid suffering—should be afforded the same consideration as similar interests of human beings.

Appearance Slave Veteran Negro (Pro Se Plaintiff) Louis Charles Hamilton II herein (USN) #2712 Furtherance’s Affirm, state and fully declare all allegation, contention, disputes, disputation, argument, conflict and disharmony, fully cause of action for “official” Motion to Strike” each respond/reply being filed and supported

TO WIT: on or about “October” 9th 2012 past (RICO) enterprise David Hittner ‘United States District Judge” presiding official present (RICO) David Hittner ‘United States District Judge”

biased in the current (2016) matter Hamilton v. Federal Reserve Bank et al having full conscious knowledge and professional legal expert fiduciary responsibility on or about “October” 9th 2012 that:

1.         The 1790 Naturalization Act reserves naturalized citizenship for whites only was fully enforced against the (Pro Se Plaintiff) the first Presidential Negro Family (Obama) and 44.5 Million Negros legally without legal citizenship after 1865 “civil war” trapped by this continual 1790 (RICO) Naturalization Act.

2.         Articles of Agreement Relating to the Surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia. April 10, 1865, was fully violated and that “Mississippi” never freed the (Pro Se Plaintiff) the first Presidential Negro Family (Obama)  and 44.5 Million Negros legally without legal citizenship after 1865 “civil war” trapped by this continual collusion of the defendant (USA) The 1790 (RICO) Naturalization Act.

3.         The 13th amendment to the “United States of America” was destroyed, annihilate, wipe out, and fully obliterate, fully in law and equity” official in leaving (Pro Se Plaintiff), the first Presidential Negro Family (Obama) and 44.5 Million Negros legally born between the exact dates of August 20th 1619 - February 7th 2013 “Slaves of The United States of America”, as so legally Born unto “Slavery Servitude”.

4.         The 14th amendment to the “United States of America” was also destroyed, annihilate, wipe out, and fully obliterate, fully in law and equity” official in leaving (Pro Se Plaintiff), the first Presidential Negro Family (Obama)  and 44.5 Million Negros legally born between the exact dates of February 7th 2013 – 2099 pursuant to “Elite Secret Whites Only”

Judicial Government The 1790 Naturalization Act reserves naturalized citizenship for whites only having “officially” denaturalization (Pro Se Plaintiff), the first Presidential Negro Family (Obama)  and 44.5 Million Negros legally born between the exact dates of February 7th 2013 – 2099 “Leaving”

 (Pro Se Plaintiff), the first Presidential Negro Family (Obama) and 44.5 Million Negros “without” any legal citizenship, any just equal claim legal standing before any Federal Court of Law, and “official property” of all “card-holders” of the Knights of The Klu Klux Klansmen, and United States of America et al forevermore, Pursuant to: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857),

Notwithstanding Pro Se Slave Negro Louis Charles Hamilton II declared “Legally” 1000% Dead (DOA) to have his minor children kidnaped by the “Church of Jesus Christ of Ladder Day Saints in an ongoing (RICO) fraudulent cover up by defendant United States of America (Utah), as Being an open unlimited quite morbid statute of limitation wi9thy a (MIA) dead wife Body being the same all occurred in (UTAH) mystery of 2016 undersigned notary sealed date herein on additional defendant

RICO enterprise abduction of a pronounce “dead nigger pro se slave” (Hamilton) by also (Texas) State Hospital defendant herein of a Legally declared Dead Pro Se Nigger Slave Plaintiff, (Hamilton) in a fix 1619 – 2013 years of scheme of things surround among others Masterful Complex Bully in Obstruction of Judicial Branch of

Uncouth inbreed godless slim civilization of Conquering Klansmen Justices Government and “Whites Only”, Ho’s 1000% safe and always secured by The 1790 Naturalization Act reserves naturalized citizenship for whites only and enforced by David Hittner ‘United States District Judge” having full conscious knowledge and professional legal expert fiduciary responsibility with additional exhibit(s)

(A) filed in support herein fully as follows: Memorandum on Dismissal dated “October 9th 2012, as Pro Se (Hamilton) being sentenced by said court to remain a Slavery Servitude non-citizenship, trapped by

Supremacy Defendant United States of America RICO Judicial Fraud and “Obstruction of Justices as described being free from “Slavery in 2013 contradicting exhibit (A)dated “October 9th 2012,  and remaining a Negro slave – February 2013 by the same Conquering Klansmen and “Whites Only”,

Defendant “United States of America et al, secured by The 1790 Naturalization Act reserves naturalized citizenship for whites only and enforced by David Hittner ‘United States District Judge” having full conscious knowledge and professional legalexpert fiduciary responsibility as such evidence before this legal matter being filed in support and so served on the “Honorable Court as described, being “Truthful” Notary sworn before the Honorable Court Justices

Plaintiff Negro Slave Louis Charles Hamilton II respectfully requesting all other furtherance’s relief being fair, fully before the court in “Law and equity” defendant United States of America” et al and “District Judge” having full conscious knowledge and professional legal expert fiduciary responsibility

 IN RE: AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE DESCENDANTS LITIGATION. Appeals of Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, et al., and Timothy Hurdle, et al.Nos. 05-3265, 05-3266, 05-3305., to refrain from  (RICO) in Slavery officially being continual by “United States of America et al” Justices till February 7th 2013 in a Fraud None- disclosure racket “, for and additional (75) years Negro Plaintiff(s) collectively Slaves of defendant America grand scheme involving the continual criminal acts of

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (forced labor), 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor), “Slavery Servitude” money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 1957, “Slavery Servitude” money laundering statutes, RICO statute (18 U.S.C. § 1961(1),,, very 1000% 1790- 2016 (226) years control, in an ongoing future by the

 “Judicial Branch of Government of Defendant all Said contain fully “Motion to Strike” invalid, null, ineffective, nonviable, useless, worthless, and officially in 2016 (December) on behalf of no-citizenship continual being official “Property and No Citizenship/Slave Pursuant to: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), being in direct acts of

“Human Rights Violation as (PLANTIFFS) herein officially filed said complaints now 2016 request expedited hearing on an Order to show cause why each Federal Case all described contain herein official in that defendant committed (RICO) in law and equity Judicial Fraud against said case laws filed for “Judgement against (Plaintiffs) being committed under Fraud by (USA) in its entire form contained therein being

“Motion to Strike” forever in the records of each described “US Case with the Vacated of all Judgment in each separately in official light of a Criminal ongoing (RICO) schemes August 20th 1619 -  2016 (December) continual

(RICO) racket Slavery Servitude surrounding peddling (MIA)  13th and 14th amendment rights, (RICO) Judicial Fraud of civil stole rights under law and equity committed hostile-fashion the defendant (USA) past, present well into future

 (PLANTIFF NEGRO SLAVES) herein to be continual denied fairly, justly, and proper Honorable Honest in so heard legally before Justice in all matters as required by defendant “whites only” Law.



Subscribed before a Public Notary, On this ____ Day of ______________ 2016

____________________________________

                                  Public Notary



  ________________________________________

Pro Se Slave Negro Louis Charles Hamilton II (USN),

2724 61st street Ste. I-B

Galveston, Texas. 77551

bluefinlch2@gmail.com

832-894-9465

832-344-7134

louishamilton2015@gmail.com


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